GHSA-JQ42-HFCH-42F3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-06-01 21:20 – Updated: 2021-10-05 17:22Impact
Due to incorrect use of a default URL, singularity action commands (run/shell/exec) specifying a container using a library:// URI will always attempt to retrieve the container from the default remote endpoint (cloud.sylabs.io) rather than the configured remote endpoint.
An attacker may be able to push a malicious container to the default remote endpoint with a URI that is identical to the URI used by a victim with a non-default remote endpoint, thus executing the malicious container.
Only action commands (run/shell/exec) against library:// URIs are affected. Other commands such as pull / push respect the configured remote endpoint.
Patches
All users should upgrade to Singularity 3.7.4 or later.
Workarounds
Users who only interact with the default remote endpoint or do not use the library:// url are not affected.
Installations with an execution control list configured to restrict execution to containers signed with specific secure keys are not affected.
Acknowledgements
This issue was found by Mike Frisch and brought to our attention by Sylabs. Sylabs is making a coordinated disclosure.
For more information
General questions about the impact of the advisory can be asked in the:
Singularity Slack Channel Singularity Mailing List Any sensitive security concerns should be directed to: singularity-security@hpcng.org
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hpcng/singularity"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.7.2"
},
{
"fixed": "3.7.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-28T20:04:38Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Impact\nDue to incorrect use of a default URL, `singularity` action commands (`run`/`shell`/`exec`) specifying a container using a `library://` URI will always attempt to retrieve the container from the default remote endpoint (`cloud.sylabs.io`) rather than the configured remote endpoint.\n\nAn attacker may be able to push a malicious container to the default remote endpoint with a URI that is identical to the URI used by a victim with a non-default remote endpoint, thus executing the malicious container.\n\nOnly action commands (`run`/`shell`/`exec`) against `library://` URIs are affected. Other commands such as `pull` / `push` respect the configured remote endpoint.\n\n# Patches\nAll users should upgrade to Singularity 3.7.4 or later.\n\n# Workarounds\nUsers who only interact with the default remote endpoint or do not use the library:// url are not affected.\n\nInstallations with an execution control list configured to restrict execution to containers signed with specific secure keys are not affected.\n\n# Acknowledgements\nThis issue was found by Mike Frisch and brought to our attention by Sylabs. Sylabs is making a [coordinated disclosure](https://github.com/sylabs/singularity/security/advisories/GHSA-5mv9-q7fq-9394).\n\n# For more information\nGeneral questions about the impact of the advisory can be asked in the:\n\n[Singularity Slack Channel](https://join.slack.com/t/hpcng/shared_invite/zt-qda4h1ls-OP0Uouq6sSmVE6i_0NrWdw)\n[Singularity Mailing List](https://groups.google.com/a/lbl.gov/g/singularity)\nAny sensitive security concerns should be directed to: [singularity-security@hpcng.org](mailto:singularity-security@hpcng.org)\n",
"id": "GHSA-jq42-hfch-42f3",
"modified": "2021-10-05T17:22:08Z",
"published": "2021-06-01T21:20:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hpcng/singularity/security/advisories/GHSA-jq42-hfch-42f3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sylabs/singularity/security/advisories/GHSA-5mv9-q7fq-9394"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hpcng/singularity"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Action Commands (run/shell/exec) Against Library URIs Ignore Configured Remote Endpoint"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.