GHSA-JMMG-JQC7-5QF4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 22:18 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:13This issue is a browser-origin WebSocket auth chain on local loopback deployments using password auth. It is serious, but conditional: an attacker must get the user to open a malicious page and then successfully guess the gateway password.
Context and Preconditions
OpenClaw’s web/gateway surface is designed for local use and trusted-operator workflows. In affected versions, a browser-origin client could combine three behaviors:
- Origin checks not enforced for some non-Control-UI WebSocket client IDs.
- Loopback auth attempts exempt from password-failure throttling.
- Silent local pairing path available to browser-origin non-Control-UI clients.
Successful exploitation requires all of the following:
- Gateway reachable on loopback (default).
- Password auth mode in use.
- Victim opens attacker-controlled web content.
- Password is guessable within feasible brute-force/dictionary attempts.
Practical Impact
If the password is guessed, an attacker can establish an authenticated operator WebSocket session and invoke control-plane methods available to that role. This is not an unauthenticated internet-exposed RCE class issue by itself; it is a local browser-origin auth-hardening gap with meaningful impact under the conditions above.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<=2026.2.24(latest published npm version as of February 26, 2026) - Patched versions :
>=2026.2.25
Fix Commit(s)
c736f11a16d6bc27ea62a0fe40fffae4cb071fdb
Fix Details
- Enforce browser-origin checks for direct browser WebSocket clients beyond Control UI/Webchat (trusted-proxy forwarded flows remain supported).
- Apply browser-origin auth failure throttling with loopback exemption disabled.
- Block silent auto-pairing for non-Control-UI browser-origin clients.
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next npm release (2026.2.25) so once that release is published, the advisory is published.
OpenClaw thanks @luz-oasis for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.24"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-32025"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-307",
"CWE-346"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T22:18:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "This issue is a browser-origin WebSocket auth chain on local loopback deployments using password auth. It is serious, but conditional: an attacker must get the user to open a malicious page and then successfully guess the gateway password.\n\n## Context and Preconditions\n\nOpenClaw\u2019s web/gateway surface is designed for local use and trusted-operator workflows. In affected versions, a browser-origin client could combine three behaviors:\n\n- Origin checks not enforced for some non-Control-UI WebSocket client IDs.\n- Loopback auth attempts exempt from password-failure throttling.\n- Silent local pairing path available to browser-origin non-Control-UI clients.\n\nSuccessful exploitation requires all of the following:\n\n- Gateway reachable on loopback (default).\n- Password auth mode in use.\n- Victim opens attacker-controlled web content.\n- Password is guessable within feasible brute-force/dictionary attempts.\n\n## Practical Impact\n\nIf the password is guessed, an attacker can establish an authenticated operator WebSocket session and invoke control-plane methods available to that role. This is not an unauthenticated internet-exposed RCE class issue by itself; it is a local browser-origin auth-hardening gap with meaningful impact under the conditions above.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c=2026.2.24` (latest published npm version as of February 26, 2026)\n- Patched versions : `\u003e=2026.2.25`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `c736f11a16d6bc27ea62a0fe40fffae4cb071fdb`\n\n## Fix Details\n\n- Enforce browser-origin checks for direct browser WebSocket clients beyond Control UI/Webchat (trusted-proxy forwarded flows remain supported).\n- Apply browser-origin auth failure throttling with loopback exemption disabled.\n- Block silent auto-pairing for non-Control-UI browser-origin clients.\n\n## Release Process Note\n\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next npm release (`2026.2.25`) so once that release is published, the advisory is published.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @luz-oasis for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-jmmg-jqc7-5qf4",
"modified": "2026-03-20T21:13:30Z",
"published": "2026-03-03T22:18:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-jmmg-jqc7-5qf4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32025"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c736f11a16d6bc27ea62a0fe40fffae4cb071fdb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-password-brute-force-via-browser-origin-websocket-authentication-bypass"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s browser-origin WebSocket auth hardening gap could enable loopback password brute-force chains"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.