GHSA-JMMG-JQC7-5QF4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 22:18 – Updated: 2026-03-20 21:13
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw's browser-origin WebSocket auth hardening gap could enable loopback password brute-force chains
Details

This issue is a browser-origin WebSocket auth chain on local loopback deployments using password auth. It is serious, but conditional: an attacker must get the user to open a malicious page and then successfully guess the gateway password.

Context and Preconditions

OpenClaw’s web/gateway surface is designed for local use and trusted-operator workflows. In affected versions, a browser-origin client could combine three behaviors:

  • Origin checks not enforced for some non-Control-UI WebSocket client IDs.
  • Loopback auth attempts exempt from password-failure throttling.
  • Silent local pairing path available to browser-origin non-Control-UI clients.

Successful exploitation requires all of the following:

  • Gateway reachable on loopback (default).
  • Password auth mode in use.
  • Victim opens attacker-controlled web content.
  • Password is guessable within feasible brute-force/dictionary attempts.

Practical Impact

If the password is guessed, an attacker can establish an authenticated operator WebSocket session and invoke control-plane methods available to that role. This is not an unauthenticated internet-exposed RCE class issue by itself; it is a local browser-origin auth-hardening gap with meaningful impact under the conditions above.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected versions: <=2026.2.24 (latest published npm version as of February 26, 2026)
  • Patched versions : >=2026.2.25

Fix Commit(s)

  • c736f11a16d6bc27ea62a0fe40fffae4cb071fdb

Fix Details

  • Enforce browser-origin checks for direct browser WebSocket clients beyond Control UI/Webchat (trusted-proxy forwarded flows remain supported).
  • Apply browser-origin auth failure throttling with loopback exemption disabled.
  • Block silent auto-pairing for non-Control-UI browser-origin clients.

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next npm release (2026.2.25) so once that release is published, the advisory is published.

OpenClaw thanks @luz-oasis for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.2.24"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.25"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32025"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-307",
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T22:18:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T22:16:37Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "This issue is a browser-origin WebSocket auth chain on local loopback deployments using password auth. It is serious, but conditional: an attacker must get the user to open a malicious page and then successfully guess the gateway password.\n\n## Context and Preconditions\n\nOpenClaw\u2019s web/gateway surface is designed for local use and trusted-operator workflows. In affected versions, a browser-origin client could combine three behaviors:\n\n- Origin checks not enforced for some non-Control-UI WebSocket client IDs.\n- Loopback auth attempts exempt from password-failure throttling.\n- Silent local pairing path available to browser-origin non-Control-UI clients.\n\nSuccessful exploitation requires all of the following:\n\n- Gateway reachable on loopback (default).\n- Password auth mode in use.\n- Victim opens attacker-controlled web content.\n- Password is guessable within feasible brute-force/dictionary attempts.\n\n## Practical Impact\n\nIf the password is guessed, an attacker can establish an authenticated operator WebSocket session and invoke control-plane methods available to that role. This is not an unauthenticated internet-exposed RCE class issue by itself; it is a local browser-origin auth-hardening gap with meaningful impact under the conditions above.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c=2026.2.24` (latest published npm version as of February 26, 2026)\n- Patched versions : `\u003e=2026.2.25`\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `c736f11a16d6bc27ea62a0fe40fffae4cb071fdb`\n\n## Fix Details\n\n- Enforce browser-origin checks for direct browser WebSocket clients beyond Control UI/Webchat (trusted-proxy forwarded flows remain supported).\n- Apply browser-origin auth failure throttling with loopback exemption disabled.\n- Block silent auto-pairing for non-Control-UI browser-origin clients.\n\n## Release Process Note\n\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next npm release (`2026.2.25`) so once that release is published, the advisory is published.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @luz-oasis for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-jmmg-jqc7-5qf4",
  "modified": "2026-03-20T21:13:30Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T22:18:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-jmmg-jqc7-5qf4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32025"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c736f11a16d6bc27ea62a0fe40fffae4cb071fdb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-password-brute-force-via-browser-origin-websocket-authentication-bypass"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw\u0027s browser-origin WebSocket auth hardening gap could enable loopback password brute-force chains"
}


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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


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