GHSA-J72W-3754-92GG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-18 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:35
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fs: ntfs3: fix infinite loop triggered by zero-sized ATTR_LIST

We found an infinite loop bug in the ntfs3 file system that can lead to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) condition.

A malformed NTFS image can cause an infinite loop when an ATTR_LIST attribute indicates a zero data size while the driver allocates memory for it.

When ntfs_load_attr_list() processes a resident ATTR_LIST with data_size set to zero, it still allocates memory because of al_aligned(0). This creates an inconsistent state where ni->attr_list.size is zero, but ni->attr_list.le is non-null. This causes ni_enum_attr_ex to incorrectly assume that no attribute list exists and enumerates only the primary MFT record. When it finds ATTR_LIST, the code reloads it and restarts the enumeration, repeating indefinitely. The mount operation never completes, hanging the kernel thread.

This patch adds validation to ensure that data_size is non-zero before memory allocation. When a zero-sized ATTR_LIST is detected, the function returns -EINVAL, preventing a DoS vulnerability.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-71267"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-835"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T11:16:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfs: ntfs3: fix infinite loop triggered by zero-sized ATTR_LIST\n\nWe found an infinite loop bug in the ntfs3 file system that can lead to a\nDenial-of-Service (DoS) condition.\n\nA malformed NTFS image can cause an infinite loop when an ATTR_LIST attribute\nindicates a zero data size while the driver allocates memory for it.\n\nWhen ntfs_load_attr_list() processes a resident ATTR_LIST with data_size set\nto zero, it still allocates memory because of al_aligned(0). This creates an\ninconsistent state where ni-\u003eattr_list.size is zero, but ni-\u003eattr_list.le is\nnon-null. This causes ni_enum_attr_ex to incorrectly assume that no attribute\nlist exists and enumerates only the primary MFT record. When it finds\nATTR_LIST, the code reloads it and restarts the enumeration, repeating\nindefinitely. The mount operation never completes, hanging the kernel thread.\n\nThis patch adds validation to ensure that data_size is non-zero before memory\nallocation. When a zero-sized ATTR_LIST is detected, the function returns\n-EINVAL, preventing a DoS vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-j72w-3754-92gg",
  "modified": "2026-10-15T03:35:18Z",
  "published": "2026-03-18T12:31:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71267"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-082556.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/06909b2549d631a47fcda249d34be26f7ca1711d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ef219656febf5ae06ae56b1fce47ebd05f92b68"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d8c70b57dbeda3eb165c0940b97e85373ca9354"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9267d99fade76d44d4a133599524031fe684156e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/976e6a7c51fabf150478decbe8ef5d9a26039b7c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9779a6eaaabdf47aa57910d352b398ad742e6a5f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd508939dbca5eceefb2d0c2564beb15469572f2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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