GHSA-J4XF-2G29-59PH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-20 17:25 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:36Summary
When unpacking a tar archive, the tar crate's unpack_dir function uses fs::metadata() to check whether a path that already exists is a directory. Because fs::metadata() follows symbolic links, a crafted tarball containing a symlink entry followed by a directory entry with the same name causes the crate to treat the symlink target as a valid existing directory — and subsequently apply chmod to it. This allows an attacker to modify the permissions of arbitrary directories outside the extraction root.
Reproducer
A malicious tarball contains two entries: (1) a symlink foo pointing to an arbitrary external directory, and (2) a directory entry foo/. (or just foo). When unpacked, create_dir("foo") fails with EEXIST because the symlink is already on disk. The fs::metadata() check then follows the symlink, sees a directory at the target, and allows processing to continue. The directory entry's mode bits are then applied via chmod, which also follows the symlink — modifying the permissions of the external target directory.
Fix
The fix is very simple, we now use fs::symlink_metadata() in unpack_dir, so symlinks are detected and rejected rather than followed.
Credit
This issue was reported by @xokdvium - thank you!
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.4.44"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.45"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33056"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-61"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-20T17:25:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T08:16:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen unpacking a tar archive, the `tar` crate\u0027s `unpack_dir` function uses `fs::metadata()` to check whether a path that already exists is a directory. Because `fs::metadata()` follows symbolic links, a crafted tarball containing a symlink entry followed by a directory entry with the same name causes the crate to treat the symlink target as a valid existing directory \u2014 and subsequently apply `chmod` to it. This allows an attacker to modify the permissions of arbitrary directories outside the extraction root.\n\n## Reproducer\n\nA malicious tarball contains two entries: (1) a symlink `foo` pointing to an arbitrary external directory, and (2) a directory entry `foo/.` (or just `foo`). When unpacked, `create_dir(\"foo\")` fails with `EEXIST` because the symlink is already on disk. The `fs::metadata()` check then follows the symlink, sees a directory at the target, and allows processing to continue. The directory entry\u0027s mode bits are then applied via `chmod`, which also follows the symlink \u2014 modifying the permissions of the external target directory.\n\n## Fix \n\nThe fix is very simple, we now use `fs::symlink_metadata()` in `unpack_dir`, so symlinks are detected and rejected rather than followed.\n\n## Credit\n\nThis issue was reported by @xokdvium - thank you!",
"id": "GHSA-j4xf-2g29-59ph",
"modified": "2026-03-25T18:36:33Z",
"published": "2026-03-20T17:25:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/security/advisories/GHSA-j4xf-2g29-59ph"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33056"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs/commit/17b1fd84e632071cb8eef9d3709bf347bd266446"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/alexcrichton/tar-rs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0067.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "tar-rs `unpack_in` can chmod arbitrary directories by following symlinks"
}
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