GHSA-J2GX-QFWV-H2PP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-12 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-12 12:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ACPICA: Revert "ACPICA: avoid Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine."

Undo the modifications made in commit d410ee5109a1 ("ACPICA: avoid "Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.""). The initial purpose of this commit was to stop memory mappings for operation regions from overlapping page boundaries, as it can trigger warnings if different page attributes are present.

However, it was found that when this situation arises, mapping continues until the boundary's end, but there is still an attempt to read/write the entire length of the map, leading to a NULL pointer deference. For example, if a four-byte mapping request is made but only one byte is mapped because it hits the current page boundary's end, a four-byte read/write attempt is still made, resulting in a NULL pointer deference.

Instead, map the entire length, as the ACPI specification does not mandate that it must be within the same page boundary. It is permissible for it to be mapped across different regions.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-40984"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-07-12T13:15:19Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nACPICA: Revert \"ACPICA: avoid Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.\"\n\nUndo the modifications made in commit d410ee5109a1 (\"ACPICA: avoid\n\"Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.\"\"). The initial\npurpose of this commit was to stop memory mappings for operation\nregions from overlapping page boundaries, as it can trigger warnings\nif different page attributes are present.\n\nHowever, it was found that when this situation arises, mapping\ncontinues until the boundary\u0027s end, but there is still an attempt to\nread/write the entire length of the map, leading to a NULL pointer\ndeference. For example, if a four-byte mapping request is made but\nonly one byte is mapped because it hits the current page boundary\u0027s\nend, a four-byte read/write attempt is still made, resulting in a NULL\npointer deference.\n\nInstead, map the entire length, as the ACPI specification does not\nmandate that it must be within the same page boundary. It is\npermissible for it to be mapped across different regions.",
  "id": "GHSA-j2gx-qfwv-h2pp",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T12:32:02Z",
  "published": "2024-07-12T15:31:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-40984"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-265688.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-355557.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-613116.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/434c6b924e1f4c219aab2d9e05fe79c5364e37d3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/435ecc978c3d5d0c4e172ec5b956dc1904061d98"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6eca23100e9030725f69c1babacd58803f29ec8d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a83e1385b780d41307433ddbc86e3c528db031f0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae465109d82f4fb03c5adbe85f2d6a6a3d59124c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc5017c57f5eee80020c73ff8b67ba7f9fd08b1f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddc1f5f124479360a1fd43f73be950781d172239"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e21a4c9129c72fa54dd00f5ebf71219b41d43c04"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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