GHSA-HVJF-55RW-W8JM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-24 15:32 – Updated: 2026-04-24 15:32
VLAI?
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: handle invalid dinode in ocfs2_group_extend

[BUG] kernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:ocfs2_group_extend+0x10aa/0x1ae0 fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308 Code: 8b8520ff ffff83f8 860f8580 030000e8 5cc3c1fe Call Trace: ... ocfs2_ioctl+0x175/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:869 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583 x64_sys_call+0x1144/0x26a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x93/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e ...

[CAUSE] ocfs2_group_extend() assumes that the global bitmap inode block returned from ocfs2_inode_lock() has already been validated and BUG_ONs when the signature is not a dinode. That assumption is too strong for crafted filesystems because the JBD2-managed buffer path can bypass structural validation and return an invalid dinode to the resize ioctl.

[FIX] Validate the dinode explicitly in ocfs2_group_extend(). If the global bitmap buffer does not contain a valid dinode, report filesystem corruption with ocfs2_error() and fail the resize operation instead of crashing the kernel.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31596"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-24T15:16:37Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: handle invalid dinode in ocfs2_group_extend\n\n[BUG]\nkernel BUG at fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308!\nOops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI\nRIP: 0010:ocfs2_group_extend+0x10aa/0x1ae0 fs/ocfs2/resize.c:308\nCode: 8b8520ff ffff83f8 860f8580 030000e8 5cc3c1fe\nCall Trace:\n ...\n ocfs2_ioctl+0x175/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/ioctl.c:869\n vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]\n __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]\n __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x197/0x1e0 fs/ioctl.c:583\n x64_sys_call+0x1144/0x26a0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0x93/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n ...\n\n[CAUSE]\nocfs2_group_extend() assumes that the global bitmap inode block\nreturned from ocfs2_inode_lock() has already been validated and\nBUG_ONs when the signature is not a dinode. That assumption is too\nstrong for crafted filesystems because the JBD2-managed buffer path\ncan bypass structural validation and return an invalid dinode to the\nresize ioctl.\n\n[FIX]\nValidate the dinode explicitly in ocfs2_group_extend(). If the global\nbitmap buffer does not contain a valid dinode, report filesystem\ncorruption with ocfs2_error() and fail the resize operation instead of\ncrashing the kernel.",
  "id": "GHSA-hvjf-55rw-w8jm",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T15:32:34Z",
  "published": "2026-04-24T15:32:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31596"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10fb72c47aac446f12a4ccd962c7daa60cc890a1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41c6e9bc3a09539deab43957a3211d902a4818f0"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/911b557dd7817460881fd51a03069b539c674d0e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e384a850a3370d89a7a446cdeccd964bfba2a302"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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