GHSA-HQXQ-HWQF-WG83

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 19:23 – Updated: 2026-04-10 15:00
VLAI?
Summary
monetr: Protected Transactions Deletable via PUT
Details

Summary

A transaction integrity flaw allows an authenticated tenant user to soft-delete synced non-manual transactions through the transaction update endpoint, despite the application explicitly blocking deletion of those transactions via the normal DELETE path. This bypass undermines the intended protection for imported transaction records and allows protected transactions to be hidden from normal views.

Details

The issue affects the transaction update path for synced transactions associated with non-manual links. The intended policy is clearly enforced in the DELETE handler: deletion of synced transactions for non-manual links is rejected with an error indicating that such transactions cannot be deleted.

However, the PUT update path still accepts a client-controlled full Transaction object and persists fields that should be server-managed, including deletedAt. The update logic appears to restrict only selected fields, which leaves deletedAt attacker-controllable.

Verified behavior on the same synced transaction showed:

  • DELETE was denied with the expected protection error for non-manual links
  • PUT with a user-supplied deletedAt value succeeded and returned 200 OK
  • a subsequent transaction list no longer showed the transaction
  • GET by transaction ID still returned the record with deletedAt populated

This demonstrates a policy bypass: although the server explicitly defines synced transactions on non-manual links as non-deletable through the dedicated delete route, the same outcome can still be achieved through the update route by setting the soft-delete field directly.

The vulnerability is therefore not a simple UI inconsistency. It is a server-side authorization and integrity flaw caused by trusting a client-supplied full transaction object and failing to protect sensitive server-managed fields from modification.

PoC

The issue can be reproduced by identifying a synced transaction on a non-manual link, confirming that the normal DELETE route rejects deletion, then submitting an update request that sets the transaction’s deletedAt field. The transaction will then disappear from normal listing views even though direct retrieval still shows the record as soft-deleted.

Impact

  • Type: Authorization bypass / integrity violation
  • Who is impacted: Authenticated tenant users and any deployment relying on synced transaction immutability for non-manual links
  • Security impact: Attackers can hide or effectively delete protected imported transactions that should not be deletable, compromising transaction history, bookkeeping integrity, and trust in audit-relevant server-managed fields
  • Attack preconditions: The attacker must be authenticated and able to access a synced transaction within their own tenant/account scope
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.12.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/monetr/monetr"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.12.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-39901"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T19:23:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T22:16:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nA transaction integrity flaw allows an authenticated tenant user to soft-delete synced non-manual transactions through the transaction update endpoint, despite the application explicitly blocking deletion of those transactions via the normal `DELETE` path. This bypass undermines the intended protection for imported transaction records and allows protected transactions to be hidden from normal views.\n\n### Details\nThe issue affects the transaction update path for synced transactions associated with non-manual links. The intended policy is clearly enforced in the `DELETE` handler: deletion of synced transactions for non-manual links is rejected with an error indicating that such transactions cannot be deleted.\n\nHowever, the `PUT` update path still accepts a client-controlled full `Transaction` object and persists fields that should be server-managed, including `deletedAt`. The update logic appears to restrict only selected fields, which leaves `deletedAt` attacker-controllable.\n\nVerified behavior on the same synced transaction showed:\n\n- `DELETE` was denied with the expected protection error for non-manual links\n- `PUT` with a user-supplied `deletedAt` value succeeded and returned `200 OK`\n- a subsequent transaction list no longer showed the transaction\n- `GET` by transaction ID still returned the record with `deletedAt` populated\n\nThis demonstrates a policy bypass: although the server explicitly defines synced transactions on non-manual links as non-deletable through the dedicated delete route, the same outcome can still be achieved through the update route by setting the soft-delete field directly.\n\nThe vulnerability is therefore not a simple UI inconsistency. It is a server-side authorization and integrity flaw caused by trusting a client-supplied full transaction object and failing to protect sensitive server-managed fields from modification.\n\n### PoC\nThe issue can be reproduced by identifying a synced transaction on a non-manual link, confirming that the normal `DELETE` route rejects deletion, then submitting an update request that sets the transaction\u2019s `deletedAt` field. The transaction will then disappear from normal listing views even though direct retrieval still shows the record as soft-deleted.\n\n### Impact\n- **Type:** Authorization bypass / integrity violation\n- **Who is impacted:** Authenticated tenant users and any deployment relying on synced transaction immutability for non-manual links\n- **Security impact:** Attackers can hide or effectively delete protected imported transactions that should not be deletable, compromising transaction history, bookkeeping integrity, and trust in audit-relevant server-managed fields\n- **Attack preconditions:** The attacker must be authenticated and able to access a synced transaction within their own tenant/account scope",
  "id": "GHSA-hqxq-hwqf-wg83",
  "modified": "2026-04-10T15:00:12Z",
  "published": "2026-04-08T19:23:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/monetr/monetr/security/advisories/GHSA-hqxq-hwqf-wg83"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39901"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/monetr/monetr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/monetr/monetr/releases/tag/v1.12.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "monetr: Protected Transactions Deletable via PUT"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…