{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.bitcoinj:bitcoinj-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.15"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.17.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44714"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T17:43:06Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`ScriptExecution.correctlySpends()` contains two fast-path verification bugs for standard `P2PKH` and native `P2WPKH` spends in `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java`.\n\nIn both branches, bitcoinj verifies an attacker-controlled signature/public-key pair but fails to verify that the public key is the one committed to by the output being spent. As a result, any attacker keypair can satisfy bitcoinj\u0027s local verification for arbitrary `P2PKH` and `P2WPKH` outputs.\n\nThis doesn\u0027t affect the SPV (simple payment verification) trust model, as this model follows PoW and doesn\u0027t verify input signatures at all.\n\n### Details\nThe issue is in the optimized branches of `ScriptExecution.correctlySpends(...)`.\n\nIn the `P2PKH` fast path at `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java:1042`, the code:\n\n- parses the attacker-supplied signature from `scriptSig`\n- parses the attacker-supplied public key from `scriptSig`\n- computes the sighash against the victim output\u0027s `scriptPubKey`\n- checks only `pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature)`\n\nIt never enforces the missing `P2PKH` binding:\n\n- `HASH160(pubkey) == ScriptPattern.extractHashFromP2PKH(scriptPubKey)`\n\nThat means the `OP_DUP OP_HASH160 \u003chash\u003e OP_EQUALVERIFY OP_CHECKSIG` semantics are not actually enforced in this fast path.\n\nRelevant code:\n\n```java\n} else if (ScriptPattern.isP2PKH(scriptPubKey)) {\n    if (chunks.size() != 2)\n        throw new ScriptException(...);\n    TransactionSignature signature;\n    try {\n        byte[] data = Objects.requireNonNull(chunks.get(0).data);\n        signature = TransactionSignature.decodeFromBitcoin(data, true, true);\n    } catch (SignatureDecodeException x) {\n        throw new ScriptException(...);\n    }\n    ECKey pubkey = ECKey.fromPublicOnly(Objects.requireNonNull(chunks.get(1).data));\n    Sha256Hash sigHash = txContainingThis.hashForSignature(scriptSigIndex, scriptPubKey,\n            signature.sigHashMode(), false);\n    boolean validSig = pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature);\n    if (!validSig)\n        throw new ScriptException(...);\n}\n```\n\nIn the native `P2WPKH` fast path at `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/script/ScriptExecution.java:1023`, the bug is similar. The code:\n\n- reads the attacker-supplied pubkey from `witness`\n- builds `scriptCode` from that attacker pubkey with `ScriptBuilder.createP2PKHOutputScript(pubkey)`\n- computes the BIP143 sighash using that attacker-derived `scriptCode`\n- verifies the signature against the attacker pubkey\n\nIt never enforces:\n\n- `HASH160(pubkey) == ScriptPattern.extractHashFromP2WH(scriptPubKey)`\n\nSo for `P2WPKH`, the attacker controls both the pubkey and the `scriptCode` used for signing.\n\nRelevant code:\n\n```java\nif (ScriptPattern.isP2WPKH(scriptPubKey)) {\n    Objects.requireNonNull(witness);\n    if (witness.getPushCount() \u003c 2)\n        throw new ScriptException(...);\n    TransactionSignature signature;\n    try {\n        signature = TransactionSignature.decodeFromBitcoin(witness.getPush(0), true, true);\n    } catch (SignatureDecodeException x) {\n        throw new ScriptException(...);\n    }\n    ECKey pubkey = ECKey.fromPublicOnly(witness.getPush(1));\n    Script scriptCode = ScriptBuilder.createP2PKHOutputScript(pubkey);\n    Sha256Hash sigHash = txContainingThis.hashForWitnessSignature(scriptSigIndex, scriptCode, value,\n            signature.sigHashMode(), false);\n    boolean validSig = pubkey.verify(sigHash, signature);\n    if (!validSig)\n        throw new ScriptException(...);\n}\n```\n\nAffected call sites include:\n\n- `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/core/TransactionInput.java:546`\n- `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/wallet/Wallet.java:4520`\n- `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/signers/LocalTransactionSigner.java:84`\n- `core/src/main/java/org/bitcoinj/signers/CustomTransactionSigner.java:77`\n\nThese call sites use `correctlySpends()` for transaction/input validation and pre-signing checks. Any application that treats a successful result from this path as proof that a spend is valid is affected.\n\n### Fix\nThe issue is fixed on the `release-0.17` branch via 2bc5653c41d260d840692bc554690d4d79208f9c, and on `master` via b575a682acf614b9ff95cacbdeb48f86c3ababe0. A 0.17.1 maintenance release has been made available on Maven Central.",
  "id": "GHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T17:43:06Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T17:43:06Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj/security/advisories/GHSA-hfcf-v2f8-x9pc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bitcoinj/bitcoinj/releases/tag/v0.17.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "bitcoinj has a ScriptExecution P2PKH/P2WPKH Verification Bypass"
}