GHSA-H352-G5VW-3926
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-11-16 17:26 – Updated: 2023-06-13 17:27Methods of NSString for conversion to a string may return a partial result. Since they call CStr::from_ptr on a pointer to the string buffer, the string is terminated at the first null byte, which might not be the end of the string.
In addition to the vulnerable functions listed for this issue, the implementations of Display, PartialEq, PartialOrd, and ToString for NSString are also affected, since they call those functions.
Since NSString is commonly used as the type for paths by the Foundation framework, null byte truncation might allow for easily bypassing file extension checks. For example, if a file name is provided by a user and validated to have one of a specific set of extensions, with validation taking place before truncation, an attacker can add an accepted extension after a null byte (e.g., file.exe\0.txt). After truncation, the file name used by the application would be file.exe.
It would be better to generate unique names for files, instead of using user-provided names, but not all applications take this approach.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "fruity"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-43620"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-11-16T15:32:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-11-15T05:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Methods of NSString for conversion to a string may return a partial result. Since they call CStr::from_ptr on a pointer to the string buffer, the string is terminated at the first null byte, which might not be the end of the string.\n\nIn addition to the vulnerable functions listed for this issue, the implementations of Display, PartialEq, PartialOrd, and ToString for NSString are also affected, since they call those functions.\n\nSince NSString is commonly used as the type for paths by the Foundation framework, null byte truncation might allow for easily bypassing file extension checks. For example, if a file name is provided by a user and validated to have one of a specific set of extensions, with validation taking place before truncation, an attacker can add an accepted extension after a null byte (e.g., file.exe\\0.txt). After truncation, the file name used by the application would be file.exe.\n\nIt would be better to generate unique names for files, instead of using user-provided names, but not all applications take this approach.",
"id": "GHSA-h352-g5vw-3926",
"modified": "2023-06-13T17:27:02Z",
"published": "2021-11-16T17:26:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-43620"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nvzqz/fruity/issues/14"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rustsec/advisory-db/pull/1102"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nvzqz/fruity"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2021-0123.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Improper Input Validation in fruity"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.