GHSA-GQC5-XV7M-GCJQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 19:23 – Updated: 2026-03-11 21:37
VLAI?
Summary
Shopware has user enumeration via distinct error codes on Store API login endpoint
Details
Summary
The Store API login endpoint (POST /store-api/account/login) returns different error codes depending on whether the submitted email address belongs to a registered customer (CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_AUTH_BAD_CREDENTIALS) or is unknown (CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_NOT_FOUND). The "not found" response also echoes the probed email address. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to enumerate valid customer accounts. The storefront login controller correctly unifies both error paths, but the Store API does not — indicating an inconsistent defense.
CWE
- CWE-204: Observable Response Discrepancy
Description
Distinct error codes leak account existence
The login flow in AccountService::getCustomerByLogin() calls getCustomerByEmail() first, which throws CustomerNotFoundException if the email is not found. If the email IS found but the password is wrong, a separate BadCredentialsException is thrown:
// src/Core/Checkout/Customer/SalesChannel/AccountService.php:116-145
public function getCustomerByLogin(string $email, string $password, SalesChannelContext $context): CustomerEntity
{
if ($this->isPasswordTooLong($password)) {
throw CustomerException::badCredentials();
}
$customer = $this->getCustomerByEmail($email, $context);
// ↑ Throws CustomerNotFoundException with CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_NOT_FOUND if email unknown
if ($customer->hasLegacyPassword()) {
if (!$this->legacyPasswordVerifier->verify($password, $customer)) {
throw CustomerException::badCredentials();
// ↑ Throws BadCredentialsException with CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_AUTH_BAD_CREDENTIALS
}
// ...
}
if ($customer->getPassword() === null
|| !password_verify($password, $customer->getPassword())) {
throw CustomerException::badCredentials();
// ↑ Same: CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_AUTH_BAD_CREDENTIALS
}
// ...
}
The two exception types produce clearly distinguishable API responses:
Email not registered:
{
"errors": [{
"status": "401",
"code": "CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_NOT_FOUND",
"detail": "No matching customer for the email \"probe@example.com\" was found.",
"meta": { "parameters": { "email": "probe@example.com" } }
}]
}
Email registered, wrong password:
{
"errors": [{
"status": "401",
"code": "CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_AUTH_BAD_CREDENTIALS",
"detail": "Invalid username and/or password."
}]
}
Storefront is protected — Store API is not
The storefront login controller demonstrates that Shopware's developers are aware of this risk class. AuthController::login() catches both exceptions together and returns a generic error:
// src/Storefront/Controller/AuthController.php:203
} catch (BadCredentialsException|CustomerNotFoundException) {
// Unified handling — no distinction exposed to the user
}
The Store API LoginRoute::login() does NOT catch these exceptions. They propagate to the global ErrorResponseFactory, which serializes the distinct error codes into the JSON response:
// src/Core/Checkout/Customer/SalesChannel/LoginRoute.php:54-58
$token = $this->accountService->loginByCredentials(
$email,
(string) $data->get('password'),
$context
);
// No try/catch — exceptions propagate with distinct codes
This inconsistency confirms the Store API exposure is an oversight, not a design decision.
Rate limiting is present but insufficient for enumeration
The login route has rate limiting (LoginRoute.php:47-51) keyed on strtolower($email) . '-' . $clientIp. This slows bulk enumeration but does not prevent it because:
- The attacker only needs one request per email to determine existence
- The rate limit key includes the IP, so rotating IPs resets the counter
- The rate limiter is designed to prevent brute-force password guessing, not single-probe enumeration
Impact
- Customer email enumeration: An attacker can confirm whether specific email addresses are registered as customers, enabling targeted attacks
- Phishing enablement: Confirmed customer emails can be targeted with store-specific phishing campaigns (e.g., fake order confirmations, password reset lures)
- Credential stuffing optimization: Attackers with breached credential databases can first filter for valid emails before attempting password guesses, improving efficiency against rate limits
- Privacy violation: Confirms an individual's association with a specific store, which may be sensitive depending on the store's nature (e.g., medical supplies, adult products)
- Email reflection: The
CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_NOT_FOUNDresponse echoes the probed email in thedetailandmeta.parameters.emailfields, which could be leveraged in reflected content attacks
Recommended Remediation
Option 1: Catch both exceptions in LoginRoute and throw a unified error (Preferred)
Apply the same pattern already used in the storefront controller:
// src/Core/Checkout/Customer/SalesChannel/LoginRoute.php
public function login(#[\SensitiveParameter] RequestDataBag $data, SalesChannelContext $context): ContextTokenResponse
{
EmailIdnConverter::encodeDataBag($data);
$email = (string) $data->get('email', $data->get('username'));
if ($this->requestStack->getMainRequest() !== null) {
$cacheKey = strtolower($email) . '-' . $this->requestStack->getMainRequest()->getClientIp();
try {
$this->rateLimiter->ensureAccepted(RateLimiter::LOGIN_ROUTE, $cacheKey);
} catch (RateLimitExceededException $exception) {
throw CustomerException::customerAuthThrottledException($exception->getWaitTime(), $exception);
}
}
try {
$token = $this->accountService->loginByCredentials(
$email,
(string) $data->get('password'),
$context
);
} catch (CustomerNotFoundException) {
// Normalize to the same exception as bad credentials
throw CustomerException::badCredentials();
}
if (isset($cacheKey)) {
$this->rateLimiter->reset(RateLimiter::LOGIN_ROUTE, $cacheKey);
}
return new ContextTokenResponse($token);
}
This ensures both "not found" and "bad credentials" return the same CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_AUTH_BAD_CREDENTIALS code and generic message.
Option 2: Unify at the AccountService layer
For defense in depth, change AccountService::getCustomerByLogin() to throw BadCredentialsException instead of letting CustomerNotFoundException propagate:
// src/Core/Checkout/Customer/SalesChannel/AccountService.php
public function getCustomerByLogin(string $email, string $password, SalesChannelContext $context): CustomerEntity
{
if ($this->isPasswordTooLong($password)) {
throw CustomerException::badCredentials();
}
try {
$customer = $this->getCustomerByEmail($email, $context);
} catch (CustomerNotFoundException) {
throw CustomerException::badCredentials();
}
// ... rest of password verification
}
This protects all callers of getCustomerByLogin() regardless of how they handle exceptions. Note: getCustomerByEmail() is also called independently (e.g., password recovery), so that method should continue to throw CustomerNotFoundException for internal use — the normalization should happen at the login boundary.
Additional: Fix registration endpoint
The registration endpoint (POST /store-api/account/register) also leaks email existence via CUSTOMER_EMAIL_NOT_UNIQUE. For complete remediation, consider returning a generic success response and sending a notification email to the existing address instead.
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.
Severity ?
5.3 (Medium)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "shopware/platform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.7.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "shopware/platform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.10.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "shopware/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.7.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "shopware/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.6.10.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31888"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-204"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T19:23:49Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-11T19:16:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe Store API login endpoint (`POST /store-api/account/login`) returns different error codes depending on whether the submitted email address belongs to a registered customer (`CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_AUTH_BAD_CREDENTIALS`) or is unknown (`CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_NOT_FOUND`). The \"not found\" response also echoes the probed email address. This allows an unauthenticated attacker to enumerate valid customer accounts. The storefront login controller correctly unifies both error paths, but the Store API does not \u2014 indicating an inconsistent defense.\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-204**: Observable Response Discrepancy\n\n## Description\n\n### Distinct error codes leak account existence\n\nThe login flow in `AccountService::getCustomerByLogin()` calls `getCustomerByEmail()` first, which throws `CustomerNotFoundException` if the email is not found. If the email IS found but the password is wrong, a separate `BadCredentialsException` is thrown:\n\n```php\n// src/Core/Checkout/Customer/SalesChannel/AccountService.php:116-145\npublic function getCustomerByLogin(string $email, string $password, SalesChannelContext $context): CustomerEntity\n{\n if ($this-\u003eisPasswordTooLong($password)) {\n throw CustomerException::badCredentials();\n }\n\n $customer = $this-\u003egetCustomerByEmail($email, $context);\n // \u2191 Throws CustomerNotFoundException with CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_NOT_FOUND if email unknown\n\n if ($customer-\u003ehasLegacyPassword()) {\n if (!$this-\u003elegacyPasswordVerifier-\u003everify($password, $customer)) {\n throw CustomerException::badCredentials();\n // \u2191 Throws BadCredentialsException with CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_AUTH_BAD_CREDENTIALS\n }\n // ...\n }\n\n if ($customer-\u003egetPassword() === null\n || !password_verify($password, $customer-\u003egetPassword())) {\n throw CustomerException::badCredentials();\n // \u2191 Same: CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_AUTH_BAD_CREDENTIALS\n }\n // ...\n}\n```\n\nThe two exception types produce clearly distinguishable API responses:\n\n**Email not registered:**\n```json\n{\n \"errors\": [{\n \"status\": \"401\",\n \"code\": \"CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_NOT_FOUND\",\n \"detail\": \"No matching customer for the email \\\"probe@example.com\\\" was found.\",\n \"meta\": { \"parameters\": { \"email\": \"probe@example.com\" } }\n }]\n}\n```\n\n**Email registered, wrong password:**\n```json\n{\n \"errors\": [{\n \"status\": \"401\",\n \"code\": \"CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_AUTH_BAD_CREDENTIALS\",\n \"detail\": \"Invalid username and/or password.\"\n }]\n}\n```\n\n### Storefront is protected \u2014 Store API is not\n\nThe storefront login controller demonstrates that Shopware\u0027s developers are aware of this risk class. `AuthController::login()` catches both exceptions together and returns a generic error:\n\n```php\n// src/Storefront/Controller/AuthController.php:203\n} catch (BadCredentialsException|CustomerNotFoundException) {\n // Unified handling \u2014 no distinction exposed to the user\n}\n```\n\nThe Store API `LoginRoute::login()` does NOT catch these exceptions. They propagate to the global `ErrorResponseFactory`, which serializes the distinct error codes into the JSON response:\n\n```php\n// src/Core/Checkout/Customer/SalesChannel/LoginRoute.php:54-58\n$token = $this-\u003eaccountService-\u003eloginByCredentials(\n $email,\n (string) $data-\u003eget(\u0027password\u0027),\n $context\n);\n// No try/catch \u2014 exceptions propagate with distinct codes\n```\n\nThis inconsistency confirms the Store API exposure is an oversight, not a design decision.\n\n### Rate limiting is present but insufficient for enumeration\n\nThe login route has rate limiting (LoginRoute.php:47-51) keyed on `strtolower($email) . \u0027-\u0027 . $clientIp`. This slows bulk enumeration but does not prevent it because:\n\n1. The attacker only needs **one request per email** to determine existence\n2. The rate limit key includes the IP, so rotating IPs resets the counter\n3. The rate limiter is designed to prevent brute-force password guessing, not single-probe enumeration\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Customer email enumeration**: An attacker can confirm whether specific email addresses are registered as customers, enabling targeted attacks\n- **Phishing enablement**: Confirmed customer emails can be targeted with store-specific phishing campaigns (e.g., fake order confirmations, password reset lures)\n- **Credential stuffing optimization**: Attackers with breached credential databases can first filter for valid emails before attempting password guesses, improving efficiency against rate limits\n- **Privacy violation**: Confirms an individual\u0027s association with a specific store, which may be sensitive depending on the store\u0027s nature (e.g., medical supplies, adult products)\n- **Email reflection**: The `CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_NOT_FOUND` response echoes the probed email in the `detail` and `meta.parameters.email` fields, which could be leveraged in reflected content attacks\n\n## Recommended Remediation\n\n### Option 1: Catch both exceptions in LoginRoute and throw a unified error (Preferred)\n\nApply the same pattern already used in the storefront controller:\n\n```php\n// src/Core/Checkout/Customer/SalesChannel/LoginRoute.php\npublic function login(#[\\SensitiveParameter] RequestDataBag $data, SalesChannelContext $context): ContextTokenResponse\n{\n EmailIdnConverter::encodeDataBag($data);\n $email = (string) $data-\u003eget(\u0027email\u0027, $data-\u003eget(\u0027username\u0027));\n\n if ($this-\u003erequestStack-\u003egetMainRequest() !== null) {\n $cacheKey = strtolower($email) . \u0027-\u0027 . $this-\u003erequestStack-\u003egetMainRequest()-\u003egetClientIp();\n\n try {\n $this-\u003erateLimiter-\u003eensureAccepted(RateLimiter::LOGIN_ROUTE, $cacheKey);\n } catch (RateLimitExceededException $exception) {\n throw CustomerException::customerAuthThrottledException($exception-\u003egetWaitTime(), $exception);\n }\n }\n\n try {\n $token = $this-\u003eaccountService-\u003eloginByCredentials(\n $email,\n (string) $data-\u003eget(\u0027password\u0027),\n $context\n );\n } catch (CustomerNotFoundException) {\n // Normalize to the same exception as bad credentials\n throw CustomerException::badCredentials();\n }\n\n if (isset($cacheKey)) {\n $this-\u003erateLimiter-\u003ereset(RateLimiter::LOGIN_ROUTE, $cacheKey);\n }\n\n return new ContextTokenResponse($token);\n}\n```\n\nThis ensures both \"not found\" and \"bad credentials\" return the same `CHECKOUT__CUSTOMER_AUTH_BAD_CREDENTIALS` code and generic message.\n\n### Option 2: Unify at the AccountService layer\n\nFor defense in depth, change `AccountService::getCustomerByLogin()` to throw `BadCredentialsException` instead of letting `CustomerNotFoundException` propagate:\n\n```php\n// src/Core/Checkout/Customer/SalesChannel/AccountService.php\npublic function getCustomerByLogin(string $email, string $password, SalesChannelContext $context): CustomerEntity\n{\n if ($this-\u003eisPasswordTooLong($password)) {\n throw CustomerException::badCredentials();\n }\n\n try {\n $customer = $this-\u003egetCustomerByEmail($email, $context);\n } catch (CustomerNotFoundException) {\n throw CustomerException::badCredentials();\n }\n\n // ... rest of password verification\n}\n```\n\nThis protects all callers of `getCustomerByLogin()` regardless of how they handle exceptions. Note: `getCustomerByEmail()` is also called independently (e.g., password recovery), so that method should continue to throw `CustomerNotFoundException` for internal use \u2014 the normalization should happen at the login boundary.\n\n### Additional: Fix registration endpoint\n\nThe registration endpoint (`POST /store-api/account/register`) also leaks email existence via `CUSTOMER_EMAIL_NOT_UNIQUE`. For complete remediation, consider returning a generic success response and sending a notification email to the existing address instead.\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).",
"id": "GHSA-gqc5-xv7m-gcjq",
"modified": "2026-03-11T21:37:32Z",
"published": "2026-03-11T19:23:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware/security/advisories/GHSA-gqc5-xv7m-gcjq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31888"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/shopware/shopware"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Shopware has user enumeration via distinct error codes on Store API login endpoint"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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