GHSA-GHC4-35X6-CRW5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 18:30 – Updated: 2026-04-13 17:291. Summary
The Envoy RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) filter contains a logic vulnerability in how it validates HTTP headers when multiple values are present for the same header name. Instead of validating each header value individually, Envoy concatenates all values into a single comma-separated string. This behavior allows attackers to bypass RBAC policies—specifically "Deny" rules—by sending duplicate headers, effectively obscuring the malicious value from exact-match mechanisms.
2. Attack Scenario
Consider an environment where an administrator wants to block external access to internal resources using a specific header flag.
Configuration
The Envoy proxy is configured with a Deny rule to reject requests containing the header internal: true.
* Rule Type: Exact Match
* Target: internal header must not equal true.
The Bypass Logic
-
Standard Request (Blocked):
- Input:
internal: true - Envoy Processing: Sees string
"true". - Result: Match found. Request Denied.
- Input:
-
Exploit Request (Bypassed):
- Input:
http internal: true internal: true - Envoy Processing: Concatenates values into
"true,true". - Matcher Evaluation: Does
"true,true"equal"true"? No. - Result: The Deny rule fails to trigger. Request Allowed.
- Input:
3. Implications
- RBAC Bypass: Remote attackers can bypass configured access controls.
- Unauthorized Access: Sensitive internal resources or administrative endpoints protected by header-based Deny rules become accessible.
- Risk: High, particularly for deployments relying on "Exact Match" strategies for security blocking.
4. Reproduction Steps
To verify this vulnerability:
- Deploy Envoy: Configure an instance with an RBAC Deny rule that performs an exact match on a specific header (e.g.,
internal: true). - Baseline Test: Send a request containing the header
internal: true.- Observation: Envoy blocks this request (HTTP 403).
- Exploit Test: Send a second request containing the same header twice:
http GET /restricted-resource HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com internal: true internal: true- Observation: Envoy allows the request, granting access to the resource.
6. Recommendations
Fix Header Validation Logic:
Modify the RBAC filter to validate each header value instance individually. Avoid relying on the concatenated string output of getAllOfHeaderAsString() for security-critical matching unless the matcher is explicitly designed to parse comma-separated lists.
** Examine the DENY role to use a Regex style fix.
Credit: Dor Konis
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.37.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.37.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.37.0"
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.36.4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.36.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.36.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.35.8"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.35.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.35.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.34.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.34.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26308"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T18:30:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T20:16:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## 1. Summary\nThe Envoy RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) filter contains a logic vulnerability in how it validates HTTP headers when multiple values are present for the same header name. Instead of validating each header value individually, Envoy concatenates all values into a single comma-separated string. This behavior allows attackers to bypass RBAC policies\u2014specifically \"Deny\" rules\u2014by sending duplicate headers, effectively obscuring the malicious value from exact-match mechanisms.\n\n## 2. Attack Scenario\nConsider an environment where an administrator wants to block external access to internal resources using a specific header flag.\n\n### Configuration\nThe Envoy proxy is configured with a **Deny** rule to reject requests containing the header `internal: true`.\n* **Rule Type:** Exact Match\n* **Target:** `internal` header must not equal `true`.\n\n### The Bypass Logic\n1. **Standard Request (Blocked):**\n * **Input:** `internal: true`\n * **Envoy Processing:** Sees string `\"true\"`.\n * **Result:** Match found. **Request Denied.**\n\n2. **Exploit Request (Bypassed):**\n * **Input:**\n ```http\n internal: true\n internal: true\n ```\n * **Envoy Processing:** Concatenates values into `\"true,true\"`.\n * **Matcher Evaluation:** Does `\"true,true\"` equal `\"true\"`? **No.**\n * **Result:** The Deny rule fails to trigger. **Request Allowed.**\n\n## 3. Implications\n* **RBAC Bypass:** Remote attackers can bypass configured access controls.\n* **Unauthorized Access:** Sensitive internal resources or administrative endpoints protected by header-based Deny rules become accessible.\n* **Risk:** High, particularly for deployments relying on \"Exact Match\" strategies for security blocking.\n\n## 4. Reproduction Steps\nTo verify this vulnerability:\n\n1. **Deploy Envoy:** Configure an instance with an RBAC **Deny** rule that performs an **exact match** on a specific header (e.g., `internal: true`).\n2. **Baseline Test:** Send a request containing the header `internal: true`.\n * *Observation:* Envoy blocks this request (HTTP 403).\n3. **Exploit Test:** Send a second request containing the same header twice:\n ```http\n GET /restricted-resource HTTP/1.1\n Host: example.com\n internal: true\n internal: true\n ```\n * *Observation:* Envoy allows the request, granting access to the resource.\n\n## 6. Recommendations\n**Fix Header Validation Logic:**\nModify the RBAC filter to validate each header value instance individually. Avoid relying on the concatenated string output of `getAllOfHeaderAsString()` for security-critical matching unless the matcher is explicitly designed to parse comma-separated lists.\n\n** Examine the DENY role to use a Regex style fix.\n\n**Credit:** Dor Konis",
"id": "GHSA-ghc4-35x6-crw5",
"modified": "2026-04-13T17:29:34Z",
"published": "2026-03-10T18:30:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/security/advisories/GHSA-ghc4-35x6-crw5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26308"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy/commit/b6ba0b2294b98484fb0ed8556897d1073cc27867"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/envoyproxy/envoy"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Envoy has RBAC Header Validation Bypass via Multi-Value Header Concatenation"
}
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