Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-G9XJ-752Q-XH63

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 21:17 – Updated: 2026-03-30 21:13

Summary

Vikjuna Bypasses Webhook SSRF Protections During OpenID Connect Avatar Download

Details

Summary

The DownloadImage function in pkg/utils/avatar.go uses a bare http.Client{} with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect picture claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system.

Details

When a user authenticates via OpenID Connect, Vikunja extracts the picture claim from the ID token or UserInfo endpoint and passes it to syncUserAvatarFromOpenID, which calls utils.DownloadImage with the attacker-controlled URL:

Claim extraction (pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:70-78):

type claims struct {
    Email              string                   `json:"email"`
    Name               string                   `json:"name"`
    PreferredUsername   string                   `json:"preferred_username"`
    Nickname           string                   `json:"nickname"`
    VikunjaGroups      []map[string]interface{} `json:"vikunja_groups"`
    Picture            string                   `json:"picture"`
    // ...
}

Avatar sync trigger (pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:348-352):

// Try sync avatar if available
err = syncUserAvatarFromOpenID(s, u, cl.Picture)
if err != nil {
    log.Errorf("Error syncing avatar for user %s: %v", u.Username, err)
}

Vulnerable download (pkg/utils/avatar.go:94-115):

func DownloadImage(url string) ([]byte, error) {
    ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)
    defer cancel()

    req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create HTTP request: %w", err)
    }

    resp, err := (&http.Client{}).Do(req)  // No SSRF protection
    // ...
    return io.ReadAll(resp.Body)  // No size limit
}

In contrast, the webhook system correctly applies SSRF protection (pkg/models/webhooks.go:306-310):

if !config.WebhooksAllowNonRoutableIPs.GetBool() {
    guardian := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())
    transport.DialContext = (&net.Dialer{
        Control: guardian.Safe,
    }).DialContext
}

The avatar download path has none of this protection. There is no URL scheme validation, no IP address filtering, and no response body size limit.

PoC

Prerequisites: A Vikunja instance with OpenID Connect configured (e.g., Keycloak, Authentik). Attacker has an account on the OIDC provider.

Step 1: Set up a listener to observe incoming requests:

# On attacker-controlled server or internal service
nc -lvp 8888

Step 2: In the OIDC provider (e.g., Keycloak admin), update the attacker's user profile picture URL to an internal address:

http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

Or to probe internal services:

http://internal-service:8888/admin

Step 3: Log in to Vikunja via the OIDC provider. After the callback completes, the Vikunja server will make a GET request from its own network context to the URL set in the picture claim.

Step 4: Observe the request arriving at the internal endpoint or listener. The request originates from the Vikunja server's IP, bypassing any network-level access controls that allow Vikunja server traffic.

Cloud metadata example (AWS):

# Set picture URL to:
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/

# Vikunja server makes GET to this URL from its own network context
# The response is read into memory (io.ReadAll) before image.Decode fails
# The HTTP request itself reaches the metadata service

Impact

Cloud metadata access: Attacker can reach cloud instance metadata services (AWS IMDSv1 at 169.254.169.254, GCP, Azure equivalents) from the Vikunja server's network position, potentially leaking IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data.
Internal network reconnaissance: Port scanning and service discovery of internal hosts reachable from the Vikunja server by observing response timing and error messages.
Internal service interaction: Any internal service that acts on GET requests (cache purges, status endpoints, admin panels) can be triggered.
Memory pressure: The io.ReadAll call with no size limit means pointing the URL at a large resource could cause memory exhaustion on the Vikunja server, though the 3-second timeout partially mitigates this.
Repeated exploitation: The SSRF triggers on every OIDC login, allowing the attacker to iterate through different internal URLs by updating their OIDC profile between logins.

Recommended Fix

Apply the same SSRF protection used in webhooks to DownloadImage, and add a response body size limit:

// pkg/utils/avatar.go
import (
    "net"
    "code.dny.dev/ssrf"
)

func DownloadImage(url string) ([]byte, error) {
    ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)
    defer cancel()

    req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to create HTTP request: %w", err)
    }

    // SSRF protection: block requests to non-globally-routable IPs
    guardian := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())
    client := &http.Client{
        Transport: &http.Transport{
            DialContext: (&net.Dialer{
                Control: guardian.Safe,
            }).DialContext,
        },
    }

    resp, err := client.Do(req)
    if err != nil {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to download image: %w", err)
    }
    defer resp.Body.Close()

    if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
        return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to download image, status code: %d", resp.StatusCode)
    }

    // Limit response body to 10MB to prevent memory exhaustion
    const maxAvatarSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024
    return io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxAvatarSize))
}

Severity ?

6.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.2.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33679"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T21:17:56Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-24T16:16:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a user authenticates via OpenID Connect, Vikunja extracts the `picture` claim from the ID token or UserInfo endpoint and passes it to `syncUserAvatarFromOpenID`, which calls `utils.DownloadImage` with the attacker-controlled URL:\n\n**Claim extraction** (`pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:70-78`):\n```go\ntype claims struct {\n\tEmail              string                   `json:\"email\"`\n\tName               string                   `json:\"name\"`\n\tPreferredUsername   string                   `json:\"preferred_username\"`\n\tNickname           string                   `json:\"nickname\"`\n\tVikunjaGroups      []map[string]interface{} `json:\"vikunja_groups\"`\n\tPicture            string                   `json:\"picture\"`\n\t// ...\n}\n```\n\n**Avatar sync trigger** (`pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:348-352`):\n```go\n// Try sync avatar if available\nerr = syncUserAvatarFromOpenID(s, u, cl.Picture)\nif err != nil {\n\tlog.Errorf(\"Error syncing avatar for user %s: %v\", u.Username, err)\n}\n```\n\n**Vulnerable download** (`pkg/utils/avatar.go:94-115`):\n```go\nfunc DownloadImage(url string) ([]byte, error) {\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create HTTP request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\tresp, err := (\u0026http.Client{}).Do(req)  // No SSRF protection\n\t// ...\n\treturn io.ReadAll(resp.Body)  // No size limit\n}\n```\n\nIn contrast, the webhook system correctly applies SSRF protection (`pkg/models/webhooks.go:306-310`):\n```go\nif !config.WebhooksAllowNonRoutableIPs.GetBool() {\n\tguardian := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())\n\ttransport.DialContext = (\u0026net.Dialer{\n\t\tControl: guardian.Safe,\n\t}).DialContext\n}\n```\n\nThe avatar download path has none of this protection. There is no URL scheme validation, no IP address filtering, and no response body size limit.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** A Vikunja instance with OpenID Connect configured (e.g., Keycloak, Authentik). Attacker has an account on the OIDC provider.\n\n**Step 1:** Set up a listener to observe incoming requests:\n```bash\n# On attacker-controlled server or internal service\nnc -lvp 8888\n```\n\n**Step 2:** In the OIDC provider (e.g., Keycloak admin), update the attacker\u0027s user profile picture URL to an internal address:\n```\nhttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\n```\nOr to probe internal services:\n```\nhttp://internal-service:8888/admin\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Log in to Vikunja via the OIDC provider. After the callback completes, the Vikunja server will make a GET request from its own network context to the URL set in the picture claim.\n\n**Step 4:** Observe the request arriving at the internal endpoint or listener. The request originates from the Vikunja server\u0027s IP, bypassing any network-level access controls that allow Vikunja server traffic.\n\n**Cloud metadata example (AWS):**\n```\n# Set picture URL to:\nhttp://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\n\n# Vikunja server makes GET to this URL from its own network context\n# The response is read into memory (io.ReadAll) before image.Decode fails\n# The HTTP request itself reaches the metadata service\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Cloud metadata access:** Attacker can reach cloud instance metadata services (AWS IMDSv1 at `169.254.169.254`, GCP, Azure equivalents) from the Vikunja server\u0027s network position, potentially leaking IAM credentials, instance identity tokens, and configuration data.\n- **Internal network reconnaissance:** Port scanning and service discovery of internal hosts reachable from the Vikunja server by observing response timing and error messages.\n- **Internal service interaction:** Any internal service that acts on GET requests (cache purges, status endpoints, admin panels) can be triggered.\n- **Memory pressure:** The `io.ReadAll` call with no size limit means pointing the URL at a large resource could cause memory exhaustion on the Vikunja server, though the 3-second timeout partially mitigates this.\n- **Repeated exploitation:** The SSRF triggers on every OIDC login, allowing the attacker to iterate through different internal URLs by updating their OIDC profile between logins.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nApply the same SSRF protection used in webhooks to `DownloadImage`, and add a response body size limit:\n\n```go\n// pkg/utils/avatar.go\nimport (\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"code.dny.dev/ssrf\"\n)\n\nfunc DownloadImage(url string) ([]byte, error) {\n\tctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 3*time.Second)\n\tdefer cancel()\n\n\treq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodGet, url, nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to create HTTP request: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\n\t// SSRF protection: block requests to non-globally-routable IPs\n\tguardian := ssrf.New(ssrf.WithAnyPort())\n\tclient := \u0026http.Client{\n\t\tTransport: \u0026http.Transport{\n\t\t\tDialContext: (\u0026net.Dialer{\n\t\t\t\tControl: guardian.Safe,\n\t\t\t}).DialContext,\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\n\tresp, err := client.Do(req)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to download image: %w\", err)\n\t}\n\tdefer resp.Body.Close()\n\n\tif resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {\n\t\treturn nil, fmt.Errorf(\"failed to download image, status code: %d\", resp.StatusCode)\n\t}\n\n\t// Limit response body to 10MB to prevent memory exhaustion\n\tconst maxAvatarSize = 10 * 1024 * 1024\n\treturn io.ReadAll(io.LimitReader(resp.Body, maxAvatarSize))\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T21:13:41Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T21:17:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33679"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/363aa6642352b08fc8bc6aaff2f3a550393af1cf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2026-4852"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.2-was-released"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vikjuna Bypasses Webhook SSRF Protections During OpenID Connect Avatar Download "
}

CVE-2026-33679 (GCVE-0-2026-33679)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-24 15:46 – Updated: 2026-03-24 17:34

Title

Vikunja has SSRF via OpenID Connect Avatar Download that Bypasses Webhook SSRF Protections

Summary

Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, the `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue.

Severity ?

6.4 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L

CWE

CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

URL

Tags

	https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/ad…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
	https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/363a…	x_refsource_MISC
	https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.2-was-r…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version
	go-vikunja	vikunja	Affected: < 2.2.1

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-33679",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-03-24T17:33:25.887211Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-03-24T17:34:14.519Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "vikunja",
          "vendor": "go-vikunja",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 2.2.1"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to version 2.2.1, the `DownloadImage` function in `pkg/utils/avatar.go` uses a bare `http.Client{}` with no SSRF protection when downloading user avatar images from the OpenID Connect `picture` claim URL. An attacker who controls their OIDC profile picture URL can force the Vikunja server to make HTTP GET requests to arbitrary internal or cloud metadata endpoints. This bypasses the SSRF protections that are correctly applied to the webhook system. Version 2.2.1 patches the issue."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "LOW",
            "baseScore": 6.4,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:L",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-918",
              "description": "CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-03-24T15:46:10.417Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/363aa6642352b08fc8bc6aaff2f3a550393af1cf",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/363aa6642352b08fc8bc6aaff2f3a550393af1cf"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.2-was-released",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.2-was-released"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-g9xj-752q-xh63",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Vikunja has SSRF via OpenID Connect Avatar Download that Bypasses Webhook SSRF Protections"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-33679",
    "datePublished": "2026-03-24T15:46:10.417Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-23T16:34:59.931Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-03-24T17:34:14.519Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-G9XJ-752Q-XH63

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Recommended Fix

CVE-2026-33679 (GCVE-0-2026-33679)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature