GHSA-G792-JHJ8-228V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 12:30 – Updated: 2026-03-25 12:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: clone set on flush only
Syzbot with fault injection triggered a failing memory allocation with GFP_KERNEL which results in a WARN splat:
iter.err WARNING: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845 at nft_map_deactivate+0x34e/0x3c0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845, CPU#0: syz.0.17/5992 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5992 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026 RIP: 0010:nft_map_deactivate+0x34e/0x3c0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845 Code: 8b 05 86 5a 4e 09 48 3b 84 24 a0 00 00 00 75 62 48 8d 65 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc e8 63 6d fa f7 90 <0f> 0b 90 43 +80 7c 35 00 00 0f 85 23 fe ff ff e9 26 fe ff ff 89 d9 RSP: 0018:ffffc900045af780 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff89ca45bd RBX: 00000000fffffff4 RCX: ffff888028111e40 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffffff4 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc900045af870 R08: 0000000000400dc0 R09: 00000000ffffffff R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d141db R12: ffffc900045af7e0 R13: 1ffff920008b5f24 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffc900045af920 FS: 000055557a6a5500(0000) GS:ffff888125496000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fb5ea271fc0 CR3: 000000003269e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: __nft_release_table+0xceb/0x11f0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:12115 nft_rcv_nl_event+0xc25/0xdb0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:12187 notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6a/0x90 kernel/notifier.c:380 netlink_release+0x123b/0x1ad0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:761 __sock_release net/socket.c:662 [inline] sock_close+0xc3/0x240 net/socket.c:1455
Restrict set clone to the flush set command in the preparation phase. Add NFT_ITER_UPDATE_CLONE and use it for this purpose, update the rbtree and pipapo backends to only clone the set when this iteration type is used.
As for the existing NFT_ITER_UPDATE type, update the pipapo backend to use the existing set clone if available, otherwise use the existing set representation. After this update, there is no need to clone a set that is being deleted, this includes bound anonymous set.
An alternative approach to NFT_ITER_UPDATE_CLONE is to add a .clone interface and call it from the flush set path.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23385"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-25T11:16:38Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnetfilter: nf_tables: clone set on flush only\n\nSyzbot with fault injection triggered a failing memory allocation with\nGFP_KERNEL which results in a WARN splat:\n\niter.err\nWARNING: net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845 at nft_map_deactivate+0x34e/0x3c0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845, CPU#0: syz.0.17/5992\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5992 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2026\nRIP: 0010:nft_map_deactivate+0x34e/0x3c0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:845\nCode: 8b 05 86 5a 4e 09 48 3b 84 24 a0 00 00 00 75 62 48 8d 65 d8 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc e8 63 6d fa f7 90 \u003c0f\u003e 0b 90 43\n+80 7c 35 00 00 0f 85 23 fe ff ff e9 26 fe ff ff 89 d9\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900045af780 EFLAGS: 00010293\nRAX: ffffffff89ca45bd RBX: 00000000fffffff4 RCX: ffff888028111e40\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffffff4 RDI: 0000000000000000\nRBP: ffffc900045af870 R08: 0000000000400dc0 R09: 00000000ffffffff\nR10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d141db R12: ffffc900045af7e0\nR13: 1ffff920008b5f24 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffffc900045af920\nFS: 000055557a6a5500(0000) GS:ffff888125496000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00007fb5ea271fc0 CR3: 000000003269e000 CR4: 00000000003526f0\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n __nft_release_table+0xceb/0x11f0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:12115\n nft_rcv_nl_event+0xc25/0xdb0 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:12187\n notifier_call_chain+0x19d/0x3a0 kernel/notifier.c:85\n blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x6a/0x90 kernel/notifier.c:380\n netlink_release+0x123b/0x1ad0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:761\n __sock_release net/socket.c:662 [inline]\n sock_close+0xc3/0x240 net/socket.c:1455\n\nRestrict set clone to the flush set command in the preparation phase.\nAdd NFT_ITER_UPDATE_CLONE and use it for this purpose, update the rbtree\nand pipapo backends to only clone the set when this iteration type is\nused.\n\nAs for the existing NFT_ITER_UPDATE type, update the pipapo backend to\nuse the existing set clone if available, otherwise use the existing set\nrepresentation. After this update, there is no need to clone a set that\nis being deleted, this includes bound anonymous set.\n\nAn alternative approach to NFT_ITER_UPDATE_CLONE is to add a .clone\ninterface and call it from the flush set path.",
"id": "GHSA-g792-jhj8-228v",
"modified": "2026-03-25T12:30:24Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T12:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23385"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9154945a6394029822bd08c24cef5a3f86d0424a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b7f67282ca2be14b727dd698b50e10cf5d8c66f9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb7fb4016300ac622c964069e286dc83166a5d52"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
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