GHSA-FWJ8-62R8-8P8M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-04 19:38 – Updated: 2026-05-08 21:47
VLAI?
Summary
Incus has Nil-Pointer Dereference via S3 Bucket Import
Details

Summary

Missing error handling could lead an authenticated Incus user to cause a daemon crash through the import of a truncated storage bucket backup file.

Details

It was found that TransferManager.UploadAllFiles iterates over tar entries but only checks for io.EOF from tr.Next(). When tr.Next() returns a non-EOF error, such as unexpected EOF from a truncated archive, the header hdr is nil and the code continues to access hdr.Name, causing a nil-pointer dereference that panics the daemon.

This may allow the Incus daemon to be crashed during S3 bucket restore if a truncated or corrupted backup archive is provided. A panic can occur when a malformed archive produces a non-EOF tar read error after the first entry. Any caller of UploadAllFiles that processes attacker-controlled archive content may be affected.

Affected File: https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/…server/storage/s3/transfer_manager.go#L127

The tar-iteration loop only checks for EOF:

Affected Code:

for {
    hdr, err := tr.Next()
    if err == io.EOF {
        break // End of archive.
    }

    // Skip index.yaml file
    if hdr.Name == "backup/index.yaml" {

When tr.Next() returns a non-EOF error, hdr is nil. The code does not check for this case and immediately dereferences hdr.Name.

This was confirmed as follows:

Command:

go test ./test/fuzz -run='FuzzS3BucketUploadTarParsing/s3_nil_deref_truncated_tar' -count=1 -v

Output:

=== RUN   FuzzS3BucketUploadTarParsing
=== RUN   FuzzS3BucketUploadTarParsing/s3_nil_deref_truncated_tar
   s3_bucket_upload_fuzz_test.go:82: UploadAllFiles panicked: runtime error: invalid memory address
       or nil pointer dereference
--- FAIL: FuzzS3BucketUploadTarParsing/s3_nil_deref_truncated_tar (0.00s)
FAIL

It is recommended to add a non-EOF error check after tr.Next().

Proposed Fix:

hdr, err := tr.Next()
if err == io.EOF {
    break
}

if err != nil {
    return fmt.Errorf("Error reading backup archive: %w", err)
}

A patch is available at https://github.com/lxc/incus/releases/tag/v7.0.0.

Credits

This issue was discovered and reported by the team at 7asecurity (https://7asecurity.com/)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/lxc/incus/v6/cmd/incusd"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "6.23.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-41647"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-04T19:38:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-07T14:16:03Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nMissing error handling could lead an authenticated Incus user to cause a daemon crash through the import of a truncated storage bucket backup file.\n\n### Details\nIt was found that TransferManager.UploadAllFiles iterates over tar entries but only checks for io.EOF from tr.Next(). When tr.Next() returns a non-EOF error, such as unexpected EOF from a truncated archive, the header hdr is nil and the code continues to access hdr.Name, causing a nil-pointer dereference that panics the daemon.\n\nThis may allow the Incus daemon to be crashed during S3 bucket restore if a truncated or corrupted backup archive is provided. A panic can occur when a malformed archive produces a non-EOF tar read error after the first entry. Any caller of UploadAllFiles that processes attacker-controlled archive content may be affected.\n\nAffected File:\n[https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/\u2026server/storage/s3/transfer_manager.go#L127](https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/storage/s3/transfer_manager.go#L127) \n\nThe tar-iteration loop only checks for EOF:\n\nAffected Code:\n```\nfor {\n    hdr, err := tr.Next()\n    if err == io.EOF {\n        break // End of archive.\n    }\n\n    // Skip index.yaml file\n    if hdr.Name == \"backup/index.yaml\" {\n```\n\nWhen tr.Next() returns a non-EOF error, hdr is nil. The code does not check for this case and immediately dereferences hdr.Name.\n\nThis was confirmed as follows:\n\nCommand:\n```\ngo test ./test/fuzz -run=\u0027FuzzS3BucketUploadTarParsing/s3_nil_deref_truncated_tar\u0027 -count=1 -v\n```\n\nOutput:\n```\n=== RUN   FuzzS3BucketUploadTarParsing\n=== RUN   FuzzS3BucketUploadTarParsing/s3_nil_deref_truncated_tar\n   s3_bucket_upload_fuzz_test.go:82: UploadAllFiles panicked: runtime error: invalid memory address\n       or nil pointer dereference\n--- FAIL: FuzzS3BucketUploadTarParsing/s3_nil_deref_truncated_tar (0.00s)\nFAIL\n```\n\nIt is recommended to add a non-EOF error check after tr.Next().\n\nProposed Fix:\n```\nhdr, err := tr.Next()\nif err == io.EOF {\n    break\n}\n\nif err != nil {\n    return fmt.Errorf(\"Error reading backup archive: %w\", err)\n}\n```\n\nA patch is available at https://github.com/lxc/incus/releases/tag/v7.0.0.\n\n### Credits\nThis issue was discovered and reported by the team at 7asecurity (https://7asecurity.com/)",
  "id": "GHSA-fwj8-62r8-8p8m",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T21:47:04Z",
  "published": "2026-05-04T19:38:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-fwj8-62r8-8p8m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41647"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lxc/incus/releases/tag/v7.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Incus has Nil-Pointer Dereference via S3 Bucket Import"
}


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