GHSA-FHVM-J76F-QMJV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:34 – Updated: 2026-03-06 00:58
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw has a potential access-group authorization bypass if channel type lookup fails
Details

Summary

When Telegram webhook mode is enabled without a configured webhook secret, OpenClaw may accept unauthenticated HTTP POST requests at the Telegram webhook endpoint and trust attacker-controlled update JSON. This can allow forged Telegram updates that spoof message.from.id / chat.id, potentially bypassing sender allowlists and executing privileged bot commands.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Affected: <= 2026.1.30
  • Patched: >= 2026.2.1

Impact

An attacker who can reach the webhook endpoint can forge Telegram updates and impersonate allowlisted/paired senders by spoofing fields in the webhook payload (for example message.from.id). Impact depends on enabled commands/tools and the deployment’s network exposure.

Mitigations / Workarounds

  • Configure a strong channels.telegram.webhookSecret and ensure your reverse proxy forwards the X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token header unchanged.

Fix Commit(s)

  • ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d (config validation: webhookUrl requires webhookSecret)

Defense-in-depth / supporting fixes:

  • 5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670 (default webhook listener bind host to loopback)
  • 3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930 (bound webhook request body size/time)
  • 633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09 (runtime guard: reject webhook startup when secret is missing/empty)

Release Process Note

patched_versions is set to the first fixed release (2026.2.1).

Thanks @yueyueL for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28454"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:34:36Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:17Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nWhen Telegram webhook mode is enabled without a configured webhook secret, OpenClaw may accept unauthenticated HTTP POST requests at the Telegram webhook endpoint and trust attacker-controlled update JSON. This can allow forged Telegram updates that spoof `message.from.id` / `chat.id`, potentially bypassing sender allowlists and executing privileged bot commands.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.1.30`\n- Patched: `\u003e= 2026.2.1`\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can reach the webhook endpoint can forge Telegram updates and impersonate allowlisted/paired senders by spoofing fields in the webhook payload (for example `message.from.id`). Impact depends on enabled commands/tools and the deployment\u2019s network exposure.\n\n## Mitigations / Workarounds\n\n- Configure a strong `channels.telegram.webhookSecret` and ensure your reverse proxy forwards the `X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token` header unchanged.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d (config validation: `webhookUrl` requires `webhookSecret`)\n\nDefense-in-depth / supporting fixes:\n\n- 5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670 (default webhook listener bind host to loopback)\n- 3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930 (bound webhook request body size/time)\n- 633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09 (runtime guard: reject webhook startup when secret is missing/empty)\n\n## Release Process Note\n\n`patched_versions` is set to the first fixed release (`2026.2.1`).\n\nThanks @yueyueL for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-fhvm-j76f-qmjv",
  "modified": "2026-03-06T00:58:46Z",
  "published": "2026-02-17T21:34:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-fhvm-j76f-qmjv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28454"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-via-unauthenticated-telegram-webhook"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has a potential access-group authorization bypass if channel type lookup fails"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…