GHSA-FC6G-2GCP-2QRQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-03 17:31 – Updated: 2026-02-03 18:55
VLAI?
Summary
RustFS has SourceIp bypass via spoofed X-Forwarded-For/Real-IP headers
Details
Summary
IP-based access control can be bypassed: get_condition_values trusts client-supplied X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip without verifying a trusted proxy, so any reachable client can spoof aws:SourceIp and satisfy IP-allowlist policies.
Details
- Vulnerable code:
rustfs/src/auth.rs:289-304setsremote_addrfromX-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip, then insertsSourceIpviaget_source_ip_raw, with no trust boundary or proxy validation:let remote_addr = header.get("x-forwarded-for").and_then(...).or_else(|| header.get("x-real-ip")...).unwrap_or("127.0.0.1");args.insert("SourceIp", vec![get_source_ip_raw(header, remote_addr)]);
- This value feeds IAM/bucket policy evaluation in
rustfs/src/storage/access.rs(authorization path), so any request that forges the header can meetaws:SourceIpconditions. - No authentication is required beyond the request itself; the header is taken at face value even on direct connections.
PoC
rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc.tar.gz
Steps (already included in rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc/):
- Start RustFS with two local volumes, e.g.:
mkdir -p /tmp/rustfs-data1 /tmp/rustfs-data2
RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=devadmin RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=devadmin \
cargo run --bin rustfs -- --address 0.0.0.0:9000 \
/tmp/rustfs-data1 /tmp/rustfs-data2
- From
rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc/, run:
ENDPOINT=http://127.0.0.1:9000 make run
The script:
- Creates bucket `rustfs-trusted-ip-poc`.
- Applies a bucket policy allowing `s3:ListBucket` only from `10.0.0.5/32` (`Principal: {"AWS":["*"]},` Resource array).
- Sends three unauthenticated `ListBucket` calls:
- Baseline (no spoof) → HTTP 403.
- Spoofed `X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.5` → HTTP 200 (policy bypass).
- Spoofed `X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4` → HTTP 403.
- Responses saved to `poc-baseline.xml`, `poc-spoofed.xml`, `poc-deny.xml`.
Impact
- Vulnerability type: Authorization bypass of IP-allowlist (
aws:SourceIp) via header spoofing. - Who is impacted: Any deployment relying on
aws:SourceIpin IAM/bucket policies for S3 operations. Attackers with network reach to RustFS can forge forwarded-IP headers to gain list/read/write where IP restrictions were meant to block them.
Credits
Identified by SecMate (https://secmate.dev) automated analysis and validated during manual triage.
Severity ?
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "rustfs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.0-alpha.78"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-21862"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-03T17:31:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-03T16:16:12Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nIP-based access control can be bypassed: get_condition_values trusts client-supplied X-Forwarded-For/X-Real-Ip without verifying a trusted proxy, so any reachable client can spoof aws:SourceIp and satisfy IP-allowlist policies.\n\n### Details\n\n - Vulnerable code: `rustfs/src/auth.rs:289-304` sets `remote_addr` from `X-Forwarded-For`/`X-Real-Ip`, then inserts `SourceIp` via\n `get_source_ip_raw`, with no trust boundary or proxy validation:\n - `let remote_addr = header.get(\"x-forwarded-for\").and_then(...).or_else(|| header.get(\"x-real-ip\")...).unwrap_or(\"127.0.0.1\");`\n - `args.insert(\"SourceIp\", vec![get_source_ip_raw(header, remote_addr)]);`\n - This value feeds IAM/bucket policy evaluation in `rustfs/src/storage/access.rs` (authorization path), so any request that forges the header can meet `aws:SourceIp` conditions.\n - No authentication is required beyond the request itself; the header is taken at face value even on direct connections.\n\n\n### PoC\n\n[rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc.tar.gz](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/24038162/rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc.tar.gz)\n\n\nSteps (already included in `rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc/`):\n\n 1. Start RustFS with two local volumes, e.g.:\n\n```\n mkdir -p /tmp/rustfs-data1 /tmp/rustfs-data2\n RUSTFS_ACCESS_KEY=devadmin RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY=devadmin \\\n cargo run --bin rustfs -- --address 0.0.0.0:9000 \\\n /tmp/rustfs-data1 /tmp/rustfs-data2\n```\n\n 2. From `rustfs-auth-trusted-ip-header-spoofing-poc`/, run:\n\n```\n ENDPOINT=http://127.0.0.1:9000 make run\n```\n\n The script:\n - Creates bucket `rustfs-trusted-ip-poc`.\n - Applies a bucket policy allowing `s3:ListBucket` only from `10.0.0.5/32` (`Principal: {\"AWS\":[\"*\"]},` Resource array).\n - Sends three unauthenticated `ListBucket` calls:\n - Baseline (no spoof) \u2192 HTTP 403.\n - Spoofed `X-Forwarded-For: 10.0.0.5` \u2192 HTTP 200 (policy bypass).\n - Spoofed `X-Forwarded-For: 1.2.3.4` \u2192 HTTP 403.\n - Responses saved to `poc-baseline.xml`, `poc-spoofed.xml`, `poc-deny.xml`.\n\n\n### Impact\n\n - Vulnerability type: Authorization bypass of IP-allowlist (`aws:SourceIp`) via header spoofing.\n - Who is impacted: Any deployment relying on `aws:SourceIp` in IAM/bucket policies for S3 operations. Attackers with network reach to RustFS can forge forwarded-IP headers to gain list/read/write where IP restrictions were meant to block them.\n\n### Credits\nIdentified by SecMate (https://secmate.dev) automated analysis and validated during manual triage.",
"id": "GHSA-fc6g-2gcp-2qrq",
"modified": "2026-02-03T18:55:45Z",
"published": "2026-02-03T17:31:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/security/advisories/GHSA-fc6g-2gcp-2qrq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21862"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs/commit/b4ba62fa3300b5b258fdc0da141481e3be7ea960"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/rustfs/rustfs"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "RustFS has SourceIp bypass via spoofed X-Forwarded-For/Real-IP headers"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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