GHSA-F934-5RQF-XX47
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-17 22:33 – Updated: 2026-04-17 22:33Summary
The QMD backend memory_get read path accepted arbitrary workspace Markdown paths that were inside the workspace but outside the canonical memory locations or indexed QMD result set.
Impact
When the QMD backend was enabled, a caller with access to memory_get could read arbitrary *.md files under the configured workspace root, even when those files were not canonical memory files and had not been returned by QMD search. Severity remains low because exploitation requires access to the memory tool surface and is limited to workspace Markdown files, but it bypassed the intended memory-path policy.
Affected versions
- Affected:
< 2026.4.15 - Patched:
2026.4.15
Fix
OpenClaw 2026.4.15 restricts QMD reads to canonical memory paths or previously indexed QMD workspace paths. Workspace containment alone is no longer sufficient.
Verified in v2026.4.15:
extensions/memory-core/src/memory/qmd-manager.tsrejects non-default workspace Markdown paths unless they match an indexed QMD workspace read path.extensions/memory-core/src/memory/qmd-manager.test.tscovers QMD session search-result reads and the read-path restriction behavior.
Fix commit included in v2026.4.15 and absent from v2026.4.14:
37d5971db36491d5050efd42c333cbe0b98ed292via PR #66026
Thanks to @zsxsoft, Keen Security Lab, and @qclawer for reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-17T22:33:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe QMD backend `memory_get` read path accepted arbitrary workspace Markdown paths that were inside the workspace but outside the canonical memory locations or indexed QMD result set.\n\n## Impact\n\nWhen the QMD backend was enabled, a caller with access to `memory_get` could read arbitrary `*.md` files under the configured workspace root, even when those files were not canonical memory files and had not been returned by QMD search. Severity remains low because exploitation requires access to the memory tool surface and is limited to workspace Markdown files, but it bypassed the intended memory-path policy.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- Affected: `\u003c 2026.4.15`\n- Patched: `2026.4.15`\n\n## Fix\n\nOpenClaw `2026.4.15` restricts QMD reads to canonical memory paths or previously indexed QMD workspace paths. Workspace containment alone is no longer sufficient.\n\nVerified in `v2026.4.15`:\n\n- `extensions/memory-core/src/memory/qmd-manager.ts` rejects non-default workspace Markdown paths unless they match an indexed QMD workspace read path.\n- `extensions/memory-core/src/memory/qmd-manager.test.ts` covers QMD session search-result reads and the read-path restriction behavior.\n\nFix commit included in `v2026.4.15` and absent from `v2026.4.14`:\n\n- `37d5971db36491d5050efd42c333cbe0b98ed292` via PR #66026\n\nThanks to @zsxsoft, Keen Security Lab, and @qclawer for reporting this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-f934-5rqf-xx47",
"modified": "2026-04-17T22:33:33Z",
"published": "2026-04-17T22:33:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-f934-5rqf-xx47"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/66026"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/37d5971db36491d5050efd42c333cbe0b98ed292"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: QMD memory_get restricts reads to canonical or indexed memory paths"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.