GHSA-F7CQ-GVH6-QR25

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 20:46 – Updated: 2026-04-24 20:28
VLAI
Summary
Monitoring is vulnerable to Archive Slip due to missing checks in sanitization
Details

The sanitizeArchivePath function in pkg/extract/extract.go (lines 248–254) is vulnerable to a path traversal bypass due to a missing trailing path separator in the strings.HasPrefix check. A crafted tar archive can write files outside the intended destination directory when using the extractor CLI tool or the extract.DumpOTelCollector library function.

Vulnerable Code

File: pkg/extract/extract.go, lines 248–254

func sanitizeArchivePath(d, t string) (v string, err error) {
    v = filepath.Join(d, t)
    if strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d)) {   // ← missing trailing separator
        return v, nil
    }
    return "", fmt.Errorf("filepath is tainted: %s", t)
}

The function is called at line 219 inside untar, which is invoked by copyFromPod (line 205) during the Cold Extract data dump workflow.

Root Cause

strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d)) does not append a trailing / to the directory prefix, causing a directory name prefix collision. If the destination is /home/user/extract-output and a tar entry is named ../extract-outputevil/pwned, the joined path /home/user/extract-outputevil/pwned passes the prefix check — it starts with /home/user/extract-output — even though it is entirely outside the intended directory.

Steps to Reproduce

  1. Deploy the monitoring stack with ColdExtract: true. The OTEL Collector begins writing signal data (otel_traces, otel_metrics, otel_logs) to the shared PVC.

  2. Place the PoC tar on the PVC. Any pod with write access to the ReadWriteMany PVC (or the compromised OTEL Collector itself) copies a poc-path-traversal.tar into the /data/collector mount path. The archive contains three real-looking OTLP telemetry files alongside two crafted entries with path-traversal names.

  3. Run the extractor against the namespace:

extractor \ --namespace monitoring \ --pvc-name <signals-pvc-name> \ --directory /home/user/extract-output

  1. Observe the bypass. untar processes the tar stream. For the malicious entries:

``` // entry name: ../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt filepath.Join("/home/user/extract-output", "../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt") => "/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt"

strings.HasPrefix("/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt", "/home/user/extract-output") => true // BUG: prefix collision; file lands OUTSIDE target dir ```

Both malicious entries are written outside /home/user/extract-output/. The three legitimate OTLP files land correctly inside it.

Impact

Successful exploitation gives an attacker arbitrary file write on the machine running the extractor. Real-world primitives include:

  • Overwriting ~/.bashrc / ~/.zshrc / ~/.profile for RCE on next shell login
  • Appending to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys for persistent SSH backdoor
  • Dropping a malicious entry into ~/.kube/config to hijack cluster access
  • Writing crontab entries for persistent scheduled execution

The attack surface is widened by the default ReadWriteMany PVC access mode, which means any pod in the cluster with the PVC mounted can inject the payload — not just the OTEL Collector itself.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/ctfer-io/monitoring"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32771"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T20:46:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-20T01:15:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The `sanitizeArchivePath` function in `pkg/extract/extract.go` (lines 248\u2013254) is vulnerable to a path traversal bypass due to a missing trailing path separator in the `strings.HasPrefix` check. A crafted tar archive can write files outside the intended destination directory when using the `extractor` CLI tool or the `extract.DumpOTelCollector` library function.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\nFile: `pkg/extract/extract.go`, lines 248\u2013254\n\n```go\nfunc sanitizeArchivePath(d, t string) (v string, err error) {\n    v = filepath.Join(d, t)\n    if strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d)) {   // \u2190 missing trailing separator\n        return v, nil\n    }\n    return \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"filepath is tainted: %s\", t)\n}\n```\n\nThe function is called at line 219 inside `untar`, which is invoked by `copyFromPod` (line 205) during the Cold Extract data dump workflow.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`strings.HasPrefix(v, filepath.Clean(d))` does not append a trailing `/` to the directory prefix, causing a **directory name prefix collision**. If the destination is `/home/user/extract-output` and a tar entry is named `../extract-outputevil/pwned`, the joined path `/home/user/extract-outputevil/pwned` passes the prefix check \u2014 it starts with `/home/user/extract-output` \u2014 even though it is entirely outside the intended directory.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n1. **Deploy the monitoring stack** with `ColdExtract: true`. The OTEL Collector begins writing signal data (`otel_traces`, `otel_metrics`, `otel_logs`) to the shared PVC.\n\n2. **Place the PoC tar on the PVC.** Any pod with write access to the `ReadWriteMany` PVC (or the compromised OTEL Collector itself) copies a `poc-path-traversal.tar` into the `/data/collector` mount path. The archive contains three real-looking OTLP telemetry files alongside two crafted entries with path-traversal names.\n\n3. **Run the extractor against the namespace:**\n\n   ```\n   extractor \\\n     --namespace monitoring \\\n     --pvc-name \u003csignals-pvc-name\u003e \\\n     --directory /home/user/extract-output\n   ```\n\n4. **Observe the bypass.** `untar` processes the tar stream. For the malicious entries:\n\n   ```\n   // entry name: ../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\n   filepath.Join(\"/home/user/extract-output\", \"../extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\")\n     =\u003e \"/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\"\n\n   strings.HasPrefix(\"/home/user/extract-outputevil/poc-proof.txt\",\n                     \"/home/user/extract-output\")\n     =\u003e true   // BUG: prefix collision; file lands OUTSIDE target dir\n   ```\n\n   Both malicious entries are written outside `/home/user/extract-output/`. The three legitimate OTLP files land correctly inside it.\n\n## Impact\n\nSuccessful exploitation gives an attacker arbitrary file write on the machine running the extractor. Real-world primitives include:\n\n- Overwriting `~/.bashrc` / `~/.zshrc` / `~/.profile` for RCE on next shell login\n- Appending to `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` for persistent SSH backdoor\n- Dropping a malicious entry into `~/.kube/config` to hijack cluster access\n- Writing crontab entries for persistent scheduled execution\n\nThe attack surface is widened by the default `ReadWriteMany` PVC access mode, which means any pod in the cluster with the PVC mounted can inject the payload \u2014 not just the OTEL Collector itself.",
  "id": "GHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25",
  "modified": "2026-04-24T20:28:49Z",
  "published": "2026-03-16T20:46:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ctfer-io/monitoring/security/advisories/GHSA-f7cq-gvh6-qr25"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32771"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ctfer-io/monitoring/commit/269dba165aa42210352628c0db6756f3b8fd3c8a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ctfer-io/monitoring"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.snyk.io/research/zip-slip-vulnerability#expandable-socPI9fFAJ-title"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:L/SA:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Monitoring is vulnerable to Archive Slip due to missing checks in sanitization"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.