{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Meridian.Mapping"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Meridian.Mediator"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1325",
      "CWE-209",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-532",
      "CWE-665",
      "CWE-674",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T22:50:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nMeridian v2.1.0 (`Meridian.Mapping` and `Meridian.Mediator`) shipped with nine defense-in-depth gaps reachable through its public APIs. Two are HIGH severity \u2014 the advertised `DefaultMaxCollectionItems` and `DefaultMaxDepth` safety caps are silently bypassed on the `IMapper.Map(source, destination)` overload and anywhere `.UseDestinationValue()` is configured on a collection-typed property. Four are MEDIUM (constructor invariant bypass, OpenTelemetry stack-trace info disclosure, retry amplification, notification fan-out amplification). Three are LOW (exception message disclosure, dictionary duplicate-key echo, static mediator cache growth under closed-generic types).\n\nAll nine are patched in **v2.1.1**. Upgrade is a drop-in NuGet bump; see the v2.1.1 CHANGELOG for the four behavioural changes (constructor selection, OTel default, publisher fan-out cap, retry caps).\n\n## Severity Matrix\n\n| # | Severity | CWE | Finding | Fix |\n|---|---|---|---|---|\n| 1 | **HIGH** | CWE-770 | `MappingEngine.TryMapCollectionOntoExisting` enumerated the source without enforcing `DefaultMaxCollectionItems`. Reachable via `Mapper.Map\u003cTSrc,TDst\u003e(src, dst)` and any `.ForMember(..., o =\u003e o.UseDestinationValue())` on a collection member through a plain `Map(src)` call. | Shared cap enforcement helper between `MapCollection` and `TryMapCollectionOntoExisting`. |\n| 2 | **HIGH** | CWE-674 | Collection-item recursion in the existing-destination path did not increment `ResolutionContext.Depth`, so self-referential collection graphs could reach stack overflow before `DefaultMaxDepth` fired. | Depth increments at every collection-item boundary. |\n| 3 | MEDIUM | CWE-665 | `ObjectCreator.CreateWithConstructorMapping` always invoked the widest public constructor, silently filling unresolved parameters with `default(T)` and bypassing narrower-ctor invariants. | Widest-ctor selection now requires every parameter to be bound via explicit ctor mapping, source-name match, or a C# optional default. |\n| 4 | MEDIUM | CWE-532 | `Mediator.MarkActivityFailure` emitted the full `ex.ToString()` (stack + inner chain) to the OpenTelemetry `exception.stacktrace` activity tag by default, leaking context to any shared trace sink. | Gated on `MediatorTelemetryOptions.RecordExceptionStackTrace` \u2014 opt-in, default `false`. |\n| 5 | MEDIUM | CWE-400 | `RetryBehavior` retried every exception type with unbounded `MaxRetries`; the exponential-backoff delay overflowed `TimeSpan` at ~30 attempts. No cancellation exclusion. | Server-side `MaxRetriesCap = 10`, `MaxBackoff = 5 min`, `OperationCanceledException` short-circuit, recommended `RetryPolicy.TransientOnly` helper. |\n| 6 | MEDIUM | CWE-400 | `TaskWhenAllPublisher` started every registered handler concurrently with no bound on fan-out. | New constructor parameter `maxDegreeOfParallelism` (default 16; `-1` restores legacy unbounded). |\n| 7 | LOW | CWE-209 | Public mapping exceptions leaked `FullName` of source/destination types and concatenated inner exception messages into top-level property-mapping errors. | Scrubbed to type `Name`; inner details only via `InnerException` chain. |\n| 8 | LOW | CWE-209 | Dictionary materialization threw `ArgumentException` on duplicate keys, echoing the attacker-supplied key\u0027s `.ToString()`. | Last-write-wins indexer semantics. |\n| 9 | LOW | CWE-1325 | Static mediator handler caches grow monotonically under closed-generic request types. **Doc-only mitigation**; no code change \u2014 consumers must not allow attacker-controlled runtime type materialization to reach `Send`, `Publish`, or `CreateStream`. | Documented in `docs/security-model.md`. |\n\n## Exploitation\n\n**Finding 1 / 2 (headline):** A consumer that maps user-supplied collection payloads onto an existing destination list via `mapper.Map(userCollection, existingList)` \u2014 a documented and commonly used AutoMapper-style idiom \u2014 processes the full attacker-supplied collection with no size cap and no depth cap. An attacker sending a single request with a large (or self-referential) collection payload can block the worker thread for seconds and exhaust the managed heap or the call stack. Equivalent exposure through `.UseDestinationValue()` on a collection-typed destination member, reachable via a plain `Map(src)` call whose destination type default-initializes that member.\n\n**Finding 3:** A destination type with multiple public constructors that differ only in their parameter-binding invariants (e.g., `new UserAccount(string name, Email email)` enforcing a non-default `Email`) could be instantiated with the narrower ctor\u0027s invariants silently bypassed if any source field was absent \u2014 the widest ctor was always picked, with unbound parameters replaced by `default(T)`.\n\n**Findings 4 / 5 / 6:** Amplification / information-disclosure vectors described in the matrix above. Each requires moderate integration context (telemetry sink trust, handler count, retry policy) to weaponize, but each is reachable through public APIs without authentication.\n\n## Patches\n\n- `Meridian.Mapping` **2.1.1** (published 2026-04-16)\n- `Meridian.Mediator` **2.1.1** (published 2026-04-16)\n\nVerified via:\n- GitHub Release assets at \u003chttps://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/releases/tag/v2.1.1\u003e\n- Sigstore attestation (`actions/attest-build-provenance@v2` \u2192 `gh attestation verify` green on both `.nupkg` from the GitHub Release)\n- NuGet.org indexed both packages within the release workflow run\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade immediately may:\n1. Avoid `mapper.Map(src, dst)` and `.UseDestinationValue()` on collection-typed destination members.\n2. Wrap input collection deserialization with an explicit size limit before handing the payload to Meridian.\n3. Register `TaskWhenAllPublisher` with `maxDegreeOfParallelism` \u2264 16 manually (v2.1.1+ only).\n4. Disable OpenTelemetry `exception.stacktrace` tag emission at the trace exporter level if your trace sink is less trusted than your application.\n\nThese are defense-in-depth; the only complete mitigation is upgrading to 2.1.1.\n\n## Supported Versions\n\nAs of this advisory the supported security branch is **2.1.x**. The 2.0.x line (published 2026-04-15) is not receiving the Phase 1 safety-defaults infrastructure needed to carry the HIGH-severity fixes, so 2.0.x is deprecated in favor of 2.1.x. See `SECURITY.md` for the updated supported-versions table.\n\n## Credits\n\n- UmutKorkmaz (reporter and maintainer)\n\n## References\n\n- v2.1.1 CHANGELOG section: \u003chttps://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#211---2026-04-16\u003e\n- `docs/security-model.md` threat model: \u003chttps://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/blob/main/docs/security-model.md\u003e\n- `SECURITY.md` disclosure policy: \u003chttps://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/blob/main/SECURITY.md\u003e\n- AutoMapper CVE-2026-32933 (motivating precedent for Meridian\u0027s safety-defaults)",
  "id": "GHSA-f5v8-v6q3-q4h6",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T22:50:37Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T22:50:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/security/advisories/GHSA-f5v8-v6q3-q4h6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/blob/main/CHANGELOG.md#211---2026-04-16"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/UmutKorkmaz/meridian/releases/tag/v2.1.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Meridian: Multiple defense-in-depth gaps (collection/depth caps, telemetry, retry, fan-out)"
}