GHSA-F5CX-H789-J959
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-19 16:19 – Updated: 2025-06-20 14:19Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
This is a disclosure for a security vulnerability in the SparseMatrix class. The vulnerability is a deserialization issue that
can lead to a wide range of privilege escalations depending on the circumstances. The problematic area is the read method
of the SparseMatrix class.
This method takes in an InputStream and returns a SparseMatrix object. We consider this to be a method that can be
exposed to untrusted input in at least two use cases:
- A user can adopt this method in an application where users can submit an InputStream and the application parses it into
a SparseMatrix. This can be a multi-tenant application that hosts many different users perhaps with different privilege
levels.
- A user adopts the method for a local tool but receives the InputStream from external sources.
Am I impacted?
You are vulnerable if you import non-controlled serialized SparseMatrix objects.
Patches
com.powsybl:powsybl-math:6.7.2 and higher
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Do not use SparseMatrix deserialization (SparseMatrix.read(...) methods).
References
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.7.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.powsybl:powsybl-math"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.7.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-47771"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-19T16:19:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-20T00:15:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\nThis is a disclosure for a security vulnerability in the `SparseMatrix` class. The vulnerability is a deserialization issue that\ncan lead to a wide range of privilege escalations depending on the circumstances. The problematic area is the `read` method\nof the `SparseMatrix` class.\nThis method takes in an `InputStream` and returns a `SparseMatrix` object. We consider this to be a method that can be\nexposed to untrusted input in at least two use cases:\n- A user can adopt this method in an application where users can submit an `InputStream` and the application parses it into\na `SparseMatrix`. This can be a multi-tenant application that hosts many different users perhaps with different privilege\nlevels.\n- A user adopts the method for a local tool but receives the `InputStream` from external sources.\n\n#### Am I impacted?\nYou are vulnerable if you import non-controlled serialized `SparseMatrix` objects.\n\n\n### Patches\ncom.powsybl:powsybl-math:6.7.2 and higher\n\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nDo not use `SparseMatrix` deserialization (`SparseMatrix.read(...)` methods).\n\n### References\n[powsybl-core v6.7.2](https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/releases/tag/v6.7.2)",
"id": "GHSA-f5cx-h789-j959",
"modified": "2025-06-20T14:19:25Z",
"published": "2025-06-19T16:19:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/security/advisories/GHSA-f5cx-h789-j959"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47771"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/commit/8ed16ce41683c4aef5f6aa1dd5ae8642aa5ed2bd"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/releases/tag/v6.7.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "PowSyBl Core allows deserialization of untrusted SparseMatrix data"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
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