GHSA-F359-R3PV-2PHF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-26 18:10 – Updated: 2026-04-08 23:15Summary
isSSRFSafeURL() validates URLs against private/reserved IP ranges before fetching, but url_get_contents() follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the redirect target. An attacker can bypass SSRF protection by redirecting from a public URL to an internal target.
Root Cause
Check-time: isSSRFSafeURL() at objects/functions.php:4066 resolves the hostname and validates the IP.
Use-time: url_get_contents() at objects/functions.php:1990 calls file_get_contents() with PHP's default follow_location=1 — redirects are followed without re-validation. The wget fallback at line 2047 also follows redirects by default.
Affected endpoint: objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php at lines 67-68, 107-108, 135-136, 160-161:
if (isValidURL($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image']) && isSSRFSafeURL($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image'])) {
$content = url_get_contents($_REQUEST['downloadURL_image']);
Proof of Concept
- Attacker sets up
https://attacker.com/redirto respond with302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ - Authenticated user (with upload+edit permissions) triggers image download:
GET /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php?downloadURL_image=https://attacker.com/redir&...
isSSRFSafeURL()resolvesattacker.com→ public IP → passes validationurl_get_contents()follows 302 redirect to169.254.169.254→ SSRF
Impact
- Cloud metadata access (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure)
- Internal network service access
- Bypasses the existing SSRF protection that was added to prevent exactly this class of attack
Note
The curl path in url_get_contents() does NOT set CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION so it is not affected. Only the file_get_contents and wget fallback paths are vulnerable.
Suggested Fix
Set follow_location to 0 in the stream context and handle redirects manually with re-validation, or add isSSRFSafeURL() check inside url_get_contents() after resolving the final URL.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33766"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T18:10:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-27T15:16:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`isSSRFSafeURL()` validates URLs against private/reserved IP ranges before fetching, but `url_get_contents()` follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the redirect target. An attacker can bypass SSRF protection by redirecting from a public URL to an internal target.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n**Check-time:** `isSSRFSafeURL()` at `objects/functions.php:4066` resolves the hostname and validates the IP.\n\n**Use-time:** `url_get_contents()` at `objects/functions.php:1990` calls `file_get_contents()` with PHP\u0027s default `follow_location=1` \u2014 redirects are followed without re-validation. The wget fallback at line 2047 also follows redirects by default.\n\n**Affected endpoint:** `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` at lines 67-68, 107-108, 135-136, 160-161:\n```php\nif (isValidURL($_REQUEST[\u0027downloadURL_image\u0027]) \u0026\u0026 isSSRFSafeURL($_REQUEST[\u0027downloadURL_image\u0027])) {\n $content = url_get_contents($_REQUEST[\u0027downloadURL_image\u0027]);\n```\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n1. Attacker sets up `https://attacker.com/redir` to respond with `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`\n2. Authenticated user (with upload+edit permissions) triggers image download:\n```\nGET /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php?downloadURL_image=https://attacker.com/redir\u0026...\n```\n3. `isSSRFSafeURL()` resolves `attacker.com` \u2192 public IP \u2192 passes validation\n4. `url_get_contents()` follows 302 redirect to `169.254.169.254` \u2192 SSRF\n\n## Impact\n\n- Cloud metadata access (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure)\n- Internal network service access\n- Bypasses the existing SSRF protection that was added to prevent exactly this class of attack\n\n## Note\n\nThe curl path in `url_get_contents()` does NOT set `CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION` so it is not affected. Only the `file_get_contents` and `wget` fallback paths are vulnerable.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nSet `follow_location` to `0` in the stream context and handle redirects manually with re-validation, or add `isSSRFSafeURL()` check inside `url_get_contents()` after resolving the final URL.",
"id": "GHSA-f359-r3pv-2phf",
"modified": "2026-04-08T23:15:59Z",
"published": "2026-03-26T18:10:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-f359-r3pv-2phf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33766"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/8b7e9dad359d5fac69e0cbbb370250e0b284bc12"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo has SSRF Protection Bypass via HTTP Redirect in Image Download Endpoints"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.