GHSA-F24X-5G9Q-753F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 22:31 – Updated: 2026-04-15 21:06
VLAI?
Summary
OAuth2 Proxy's session cookies are not cleared when rendering sign-in page
Details

Impact

A regression introduced in v7.11.0 is preventing OAuth2 Proxy from clearing the session cookie when rendering the sign-in page.

This only impacts deployments that rely on the sign-in page as part of their logout flow. In those setups, a user may be shown the sign-in page while the existing session cookie remains valid, so the browser session is not actually logged out. On shared workstations be it browsers or devices, a subsequent user could continue to use the previous user's authenticated session.

Deployments that use a dedicated logout/sign-out endpoint to terminate sessions are not affected.

Patches

This issue is fixed in v7.15.2.

Workarounds

Do not rely on the sign-in page to clear an existing session. Instead:

  • Use the dedicated logout/sign-out endpoint of OAuth2 Proxy
  • Ensure your application logout flow explicitly clears the OAuth2 Proxy session cookie before redirecting users to the sign-in page
  • If needed, clear the session cookie at the reverse proxy or application layer as a temporary mitigation
Severity ?
3.5 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.11.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.15.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34454"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-384",
      "CWE-613"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T22:31:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-14T23:16:28Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nA regression introduced in [v7.11.0](https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pull/2605) is preventing OAuth2 Proxy from clearing the session cookie when rendering the sign-in page.\n\nThis only impacts deployments that rely on the sign-in page as part of their logout flow. In those setups, a user may be shown the sign-in page while the existing session cookie remains valid, so the browser session is not actually logged out. On shared workstations be it browsers or devices, a subsequent  user could continue to use the previous user\u0027s authenticated session.\n\nDeployments that use a dedicated logout/sign-out endpoint to terminate sessions are not affected.\n\n### Patches\nThis issue is fixed in v7.15.2.\n\n### Workarounds\nDo not rely on the sign-in page to clear an existing session. Instead:\n\n- Use the dedicated logout/sign-out endpoint of OAuth2 Proxy\n- Ensure your application logout flow explicitly clears the OAuth2 Proxy   session cookie before redirecting users to the sign-in page\n- If needed, clear the session cookie at the reverse proxy or application   layer as a temporary mitigation",
  "id": "GHSA-f24x-5g9q-753f",
  "modified": "2026-04-15T21:06:34Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T22:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-f24x-5g9q-753f"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34454"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/pull/2605"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/releases/tag/v7.15.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OAuth2 Proxy\u0027s session cookies are not cleared when rendering sign-in page"
}


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