GHSA-CX6C-45WP-F5PR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-03 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-26 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rose: fix NULL pointer dereference in rose_transmit_link on reconnect
syzkaller reported a bug [1], and the reproducer is available at [2].
ROSE sockets use four sk->sk_state values: TCP_CLOSE, TCP_LISTEN, TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_ESTABLISHED. rose_connect() already rejects calls for TCP_ESTABLISHED (-EISCONN) and TCP_CLOSE with SS_CONNECTING (-ECONNREFUSED), but lacks a check for TCP_SYN_SENT.
When rose_connect() is called a second time while the first connection attempt is still in progress (TCP_SYN_SENT), it overwrites rose->neighbour via rose_get_neigh(). If that returns NULL, the socket is left with rose->state == ROSE_STATE_1 but rose->neighbour == NULL. When the socket is subsequently closed, rose_release() sees ROSE_STATE_1 and calls rose_write_internal() -> rose_transmit_link(skb, NULL), causing a NULL pointer dereference.
Per connect(2), a second connect() while a connection is already in progress should return -EALREADY. Add this missing check for TCP_SYN_SENT to complete the state validation in rose_connect().
[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d00f90e0af54102fb271 [2] https://gist.github.com/mrpre/9e6779e0d13e2c66779b1653fef80516
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-23460"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-03T16:16:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/rose: fix NULL pointer dereference in rose_transmit_link on reconnect\n\nsyzkaller reported a bug [1], and the reproducer is available at [2].\n\nROSE sockets use four sk-\u003esk_state values: TCP_CLOSE, TCP_LISTEN,\nTCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_ESTABLISHED. rose_connect() already rejects\ncalls for TCP_ESTABLISHED (-EISCONN) and TCP_CLOSE with SS_CONNECTING\n(-ECONNREFUSED), but lacks a check for TCP_SYN_SENT.\n\nWhen rose_connect() is called a second time while the first connection\nattempt is still in progress (TCP_SYN_SENT), it overwrites\nrose-\u003eneighbour via rose_get_neigh(). If that returns NULL, the socket\nis left with rose-\u003estate == ROSE_STATE_1 but rose-\u003eneighbour == NULL.\nWhen the socket is subsequently closed, rose_release() sees\nROSE_STATE_1 and calls rose_write_internal() -\u003e\nrose_transmit_link(skb, NULL), causing a NULL pointer dereference.\n\nPer connect(2), a second connect() while a connection is already in\nprogress should return -EALREADY. Add this missing check for\nTCP_SYN_SENT to complete the state validation in rose_connect().\n\n[1] https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=d00f90e0af54102fb271\n[2] https://gist.github.com/mrpre/9e6779e0d13e2c66779b1653fef80516",
"id": "GHSA-cx6c-45wp-f5pr",
"modified": "2026-05-26T15:32:06Z",
"published": "2026-04-03T18:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-23460"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c3e8bff808f17ad37a51d8e719eed22c7863120"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c9fb70a206a8734e10468ecc24d57c7596cf64e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/508f49ccbe0329641bb681f7d0052bb4e5943252"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a12254050e3050f1011cd24f3b880a6882d0139d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a753844d2a8136f090123c8fb1ff6c7f6ee7c2b3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2ab74c12932e52cfa1e7e4582d42b0c8bec96c7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c85fe6580e86947ca07907ebf4363a73c156fda7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e1f0a18c9564cdb16523c802e2c6fe5874e3d944"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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