GHSA-CPM7-CFPX-3HVP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-07 20:17 – Updated: 2026-04-07 20:17
VLAI
Summary
Emissary has Stored XSS via Navigation Template Link Injection
Details

Summary

Mustache navigation templates interpolated configuration-controlled link values directly into href attributes without URL scheme validation. An administrator who could modify the navItems configuration could inject javascript: URIs, enabling stored cross-site scripting (XSS) against other authenticated users viewing the Emissary web interface.

Details

Vulnerable code — nav.mustache (line 10)

{{#navItems}}
<li class="nav-item">
  <a class="nav-link" href="{{link}}">{{display}}</a>
</li>
{{/navItems}}

The {{link}} value was rendered without any scheme validation. Mustache's default HTML escaping protects against injection of new HTML tags but does not prevent javascript: URIs in href attributes, since javascript: contains no characters that HTML-escaping would alter.

Attack vector

An administrator sets a navigation item's link to:

javascript:alert(document.cookie)

Any authenticated user who clicks the navigation link executes the script in their browser context.

Impact

  • Session hijacking via cookie theft
  • Actions performed on behalf of the victim user
  • Requires administrative access to modify navigation configuration
  • Requires user interaction (clicking the malicious link)

Mitigating factors

  • Exploitation requires administrative access to modify the navItems configuration
  • User interaction (clicking the link) is required
  • The Emissary web interface is typically accessed only by authenticated operators within a trusted network

Remediation

Fixed in PR #1293, merged into release 8.39.0.

Server-side link validation — NavAction.java

An allowlist regex was added that only permits http://, https://, or site-relative (/) URLs:

private static final Pattern VALID_LINK = Pattern.compile("^(https?:/)?/.*");

private static boolean isValidLink(String link) {
    if (!VALID_LINK.matcher(link).matches()) {
        logger.warn("Skipping invalid navigation link '{}'", link);
        return false;
    }
    return true;
}

Invalid links are logged and silently dropped from the rendered navigation.

Template hardening — nav.mustache

Added rel="noopener noreferrer" to all navigation link anchor tags as a defense-in-depth measure:

<a class="nav-link" href="{{link}}" rel="noopener noreferrer">{{display}}</a>

Tests were added to verify that javascript: and ftp:// URIs are rejected while http://, https://, and site-relative (/path) links are accepted.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, audit the navigation configuration to ensure all navItems link values use only http://, https://, or relative (/) URL schemes.

References

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.38.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "gov.nsa.emissary:emissary"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.39.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35571"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-07T20:17:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T16:16:29Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nMustache navigation templates interpolated configuration-controlled link values\ndirectly into `href` attributes without URL scheme validation. An administrator\nwho could modify the `navItems` configuration could inject `javascript:` URIs,\nenabling stored cross-site scripting (XSS) against other authenticated users\nviewing the Emissary web interface.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerable code \u2014 `nav.mustache` (line 10)\n\n```html\n{{#navItems}}\n\u003cli class=\"nav-item\"\u003e\n  \u003ca class=\"nav-link\" href=\"{{link}}\"\u003e{{display}}\u003c/a\u003e\n\u003c/li\u003e\n{{/navItems}}\n```\n\nThe `{{link}}` value was rendered without any scheme validation. Mustache\u0027s\ndefault HTML escaping protects against injection of new HTML tags but does\n**not** prevent `javascript:` URIs in `href` attributes, since `javascript:`\ncontains no characters that HTML-escaping would alter.\n\n### Attack vector\n\nAn administrator sets a navigation item\u0027s link to:\n```\njavascript:alert(document.cookie)\n```\n\nAny authenticated user who clicks the navigation link executes the script in\ntheir browser context.\n\n### Impact\n\n- Session hijacking via cookie theft\n- Actions performed on behalf of the victim user\n- Requires administrative access to modify navigation configuration\n- Requires user interaction (clicking the malicious link)\n\n### Mitigating factors\n\n- Exploitation requires administrative access to modify the `navItems`\n  configuration\n- User interaction (clicking the link) is required\n- The Emissary web interface is typically accessed only by authenticated\n  operators within a trusted network\n\n## Remediation\n\nFixed in [PR #1293](https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/pull/1293),\nmerged into release 8.39.0.\n\n### Server-side link validation \u2014 `NavAction.java`\n\nAn allowlist regex was added that only permits `http://`, `https://`, or\nsite-relative (`/`) URLs:\n\n```java\nprivate static final Pattern VALID_LINK = Pattern.compile(\"^(https?:/)?/.*\");\n\nprivate static boolean isValidLink(String link) {\n    if (!VALID_LINK.matcher(link).matches()) {\n        logger.warn(\"Skipping invalid navigation link \u0027{}\u0027\", link);\n        return false;\n    }\n    return true;\n}\n```\n\nInvalid links are logged and silently dropped from the rendered navigation.\n\n### Template hardening \u2014 `nav.mustache`\n\nAdded `rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"` to all navigation link anchor tags as a\ndefense-in-depth measure:\n\n```html\n\u003ca class=\"nav-link\" href=\"{{link}}\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\"\u003e{{display}}\u003c/a\u003e\n```\n\nTests were added to verify that `javascript:` and `ftp://` URIs are rejected\nwhile `http://`, `https://`, and site-relative (`/path`) links are accepted.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, audit the navigation configuration\nto ensure all `navItems` link values use only `http://`, `https://`, or\nrelative (`/`) URL schemes.\n\n## References\n\n- [PR #1293 \u2014 validate nav links](https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/pull/1293)\n- Original report: GHSA-wjqm-p579-x3ww",
  "id": "GHSA-cpm7-cfpx-3hvp",
  "modified": "2026-04-07T20:17:14Z",
  "published": "2026-04-07T20:17:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/security/advisories/GHSA-cpm7-cfpx-3hvp"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35571"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/pull/1293"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary/commit/e2078417464b9004620dde28dcbca2f73ea06c13"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/emissary"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Emissary has Stored XSS via Navigation Template Link Injection"
}



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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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