{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.0.13"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@mikro-orm/sql"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.0.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 6.6.13"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@mikro-orm/knex"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44680"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T19:17:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nMikroORM\u0027s identifier-quoting helper (`Platform.quoteIdentifier` and the postgres/mssql overrides) and its JSON-path emitters (`Platform.getSearchJsonPropertyKey`, `quoteJsonKey`) did not properly escape characters that delimit the SQL identifier or string-literal context they emit into. When application code passes attacker-influenced strings to public ORM APIs that expect an identifier or a JSON-property filter, an attacker can break out of the quoted context and inject arbitrary SQL.\n\n## Affected APIs\n\nThe vulnerability is reachable when application code passes an attacker-influenced string to any of the following documented APIs:\n\n* **Multi-tenant `schema` option** \u2014 `em.fork({ schema })`, `qb.withSchema(name)`, `wrap(entity).setSchema(name)`, `em.create(Cls, data, { schema })`. The schema name is concatenated into the SQL identifier and never had its dialect quote character escaped.\n* **`em.find` / `qb.where` JSON-property filters** \u2014 `em.find(Entity, { jsonCol: { [userKey]: value } })`. The user-supplied JSON sub-keys cannot be validated against any metadata (JSON columns are schemaless by design), and were spliced into the SQL string literal of the JSON path expression without escaping.\n* **`qb.where` / `qb.orderBy` / `qb.groupBy` / `qb.having` / `qb.select` keys** \u2014 keys containing `.` or `::` bypassed the structured-where metadata validator in `CriteriaNode`, then flowed through the same broken `quoteIdentifier`. Apps that forwarded raw filter keys from request input were already broken on authorization grounds (e.g. `{ isAdmin: true }`); the SQL injection here is a defence-in-depth failure on top of that.\n\nThe vulnerability does **not** affect documented escape-hatch APIs (`raw()`, the `sql` tagged template, `qb.raw()`, `em.raw()`) \u2014 those are documented as accepting raw SQL and are the application\u0027s responsibility to sanitize.\n\n## Impact\n\n* **Confidentiality** \u2014 read from any table/schema the database user has access to (cross-tenant data leak in multi-tenant deployments).\n* **Integrity** \u2014 on dialects supporting multi-statement queries (MSSQL, MySQL with multi-statement enabled), execute additional arbitrary SQL statements (data modification, in-database privilege escalation).\n* **Availability** \u2014 DROP/TRUNCATE via injected statements where the database user has the privilege.\n\n## Affected dialects\n\nAll SQL dialects supported by MikroORM. The identifier-quoting bug exists in every dialect\u0027s `quoteIdentifier` (the dialect\u0027s own quote character \u2014 backtick, double quote, or right bracket \u2014 was not doubled when embedded in the identifier). The JSON-path bug exists in all dialects\u0027 `getSearchJsonPropertyKey`/`quoteJsonKey`.\n\nMongoDB driver is **not** affected (no SQL).\n\n## Patches\n\n* v7: upgrade to **7.0.14** or later.\n* v6: upgrade to **6.6.14** or later.\n\nPatches:\n* Identifier quoting: #7653 (master) / #7654 (6.x)\n* JSON-path keys: #7656 (master) / #7657 (6.x)\n\n## Workarounds\n\nIf users cannot upgrade immediately:\n\n* For multi-tenant apps using `em.fork({ schema })` / `wrap().setSchema()` / `qb.withSchema()`: validate the schema name against a strict allowlist (e.g. `^[A-Za-z_][\\w$]*$`) **before** passing it to MikroORM.\n* For applications that pass `where` / `orderBy` filters from request input: validate every key against the entity\u0027s known properties before constructing the filter; do not pass keys containing `.` or `::` from user input.\n* For applications that allow filtering on JSON columns from request input: validate every JSON sub-key against an allowlist (or against `^[a-zA-Z_][\\w]*$`) before passing it to `em.find`.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported and patched by Martin Ad\u00e1mek (project maintainer) during an internal security review.",
  "id": "GHSA-cfw5-68c4-ffqp",
  "modified": "2026-05-08T19:17:45Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T19:17:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mikro-orm/mikro-orm/security/advisories/GHSA-cfw5-68c4-ffqp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mikro-orm/mikro-orm/pull/7654"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mikro-orm/mikro-orm/pull/7657"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mikro-orm/mikro-orm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MikroORM has SQL injection via runtime-controlled identifiers and JSON-path keys"
}