GHSA-C83F-3XP6-HFCP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-25 22:00 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:53Impact
Users providing user generated input into the resolveEndpoint method on requests.
Patches
Upgrade to Saloon v4+
Upgrade guide: https://docs.saloon.dev/upgrade/upgrading-from-v3-to-v4
Description
When building the request URL, Saloon combined the connector's base URL with the request endpoint. If the endpoint was a valid absolute URL (e.g. https://attacker.example.com/callback), the code used that URL as-is and ignored the base URL. The request—and any authentication headers, cookies, or tokens attached by the connector—was then sent to the attacker-controlled host. If the endpoint could be influenced by user input or configuration (e.g. redirect_uri, callback URL), this allowed server-side request forgery (SSRF) and/or credential leakage to a third-party host. The fix (in the next major version) is to reject absolute URLs in the endpoint: URLHelper::join() throws InvalidArgumentException when the endpoint is a valid absolute URL, unless explicitly allowed, requiring callers to opt-in to the functionality on a per-connector or per-request basis.
Credits
Saloon thanks @HuajiHD for finding the issue and recommending solutions and @JonPurvis for applying the fix.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "saloonphp/saloon"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33182"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T22:00:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-26T01:16:27Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nUsers providing user generated input into the `resolveEndpoint` method on requests.\n\n### Patches\nUpgrade to Saloon v4+\n\nUpgrade guide: https://docs.saloon.dev/upgrade/upgrading-from-v3-to-v4\n\n### Description\nWhen building the request URL, Saloon combined the connector\u0027s base URL with the request endpoint. If the endpoint was a valid absolute URL (e.g. https://attacker.example.com/callback), the code used that URL as-is and ignored the base URL. The request\u2014and any authentication headers, cookies, or tokens attached by the connector\u2014was then sent to the attacker-controlled host. If the endpoint could be influenced by user input or configuration (e.g. redirect_uri, callback URL), this allowed server-side request forgery (SSRF) and/or credential leakage to a third-party host. The fix (in the next major version) is to reject absolute URLs in the endpoint: URLHelper::join() throws InvalidArgumentException when the endpoint is a valid absolute URL, unless explicitly allowed, requiring callers to opt-in to the functionality on a per-connector or per-request basis.\n\n### Credits\nSaloon thanks @HuajiHD for finding the issue and recommending solutions and @JonPurvis for applying the fix.",
"id": "GHSA-c83f-3xp6-hfcp",
"modified": "2026-03-30T13:53:47Z",
"published": "2026-03-25T22:00:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/saloonphp/saloon/security/advisories/GHSA-c83f-3xp6-hfcp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33182"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.saloon.dev/upgrade/upgrading-from-v3-to-v4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/saloonphp/saloon"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Saloon is vulnerable to SSRF and credential leakage via absolute URL in endpoint overriding base URL"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.