GHSA-C7HF-C5P5-5G6H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 14:47 – Updated: 2026-03-13 13:35
VLAI?
Summary
Uptime Kuma is Missing Authorization Checks on Ping Badge Endpoint, Leaks Ping times of monitors without needing to be on a status page
Details

Summary

The GET /api/badge/:id/ping/:duration? endpoint in server/routers/api-router.js does not verify that the requested monitor belongs to a public group. All other badge endpoints check AND public = 1 in their SQL query before returning data. The ping endpoint skips this check entirely, allowing unauthenticated users to extract average ping/response time data for private monitors.

Affected Code

File: server/routers/api-router.js, approximately line 304

The ping badge endpoint directly calls UptimeCalculator.getUptimeCalculator(requestedMonitorId) without first checking if the monitor is public. Compare with the status badge endpoint (~line 148) which correctly queries:

SELECT monitor_group.monitor_id FROM monitor_group, `group`
WHERE monitor_group.group_id = `group`.id
AND monitor_group.monitor_id = ?
AND public = 1

Protected vs Vulnerable Endpoints

Endpoint Has public=1 check?
/api/badge/:id/status Yes
/api/badge/:id/uptime/:duration? Yes
/api/badge/:id/avg-response/:duration? Yes
/api/badge/:id/cert-exp Yes
/api/badge/:id/response Yes
/api/badge/:id/ping/:duration? No — vulnerable

PoC

  1. Install Uptime Kuma (tested on latest v2 stable via Docker)
  2. Create an HTTP(s) monitor (e.g., monitoring http://localhost:3001)
  3. Do NOT add the monitor to any public status page or group
  4. Wait for heartbeats to accumulate (~5 minutes)
  5. Query unauthenticated:
curl http://localhost:3001/api/badge/1/status   → returns N/A (correct, monitor is private)
curl http://localhost:3001/api/badge/1/ping/24  → returns "Avg. Ping (24h): 10ms" (LEAKED)

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker can: - Enumerate private monitor IDs - Extract average response time data for private monitors - Infer existence and reachability of internal monitored services

Suggested Fix

Add the same public monitor check before the UptimeCalculator call:

let publicMonitor = await R.getRow(`
    SELECT monitor_group.monitor_id FROM monitor_group, \`group\`
    WHERE monitor_group.group_id = \`group\`.id
    AND monitor_group.monitor_id = ?
    AND public = 1
`, [requestedMonitorId]);

if (!publicMonitor) {
    badgeValues.message = "N/A";
    badgeValues.color = badgeConstants.naColor;
}

Screenshot 2026-02-24 at 4 49 40 PM

File Alons til View He

Severity ?
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.3"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "uptime-kuma"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32230"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-12T14:47:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T19:16:16Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe `GET /api/badge/:id/ping/:duration?` endpoint in `server/routers/api-router.js` does not verify that the requested monitor belongs to a public group. All other badge endpoints check `AND public = 1` in their SQL query before returning data. The ping endpoint skips this check entirely, allowing unauthenticated users to extract average ping/response time data for private monitors.\n\n## Affected Code\n\nFile: `server/routers/api-router.js`, approximately line 304\n\nThe ping badge endpoint directly calls `UptimeCalculator.getUptimeCalculator(requestedMonitorId)` without first checking if the monitor is public. Compare with the status badge endpoint (~line 148) which correctly queries:\n```sql\nSELECT monitor_group.monitor_id FROM monitor_group, `group`\nWHERE monitor_group.group_id = `group`.id\nAND monitor_group.monitor_id = ?\nAND public = 1\n```\n\n## Protected vs Vulnerable Endpoints\n\n| Endpoint | Has public=1 check? |\n|----------|-------------------|\n| /api/badge/:id/status | Yes |\n| /api/badge/:id/uptime/:duration? | Yes |\n| /api/badge/:id/avg-response/:duration? | Yes |\n| /api/badge/:id/cert-exp | Yes |\n| /api/badge/:id/response | Yes |\n| /api/badge/:id/ping/:duration? | **No \u2014 vulnerable** |\n\n## PoC\n\n1. Install Uptime Kuma (tested on latest v2 stable via Docker)\n2. Create an HTTP(s) monitor (e.g., monitoring http://localhost:3001)\n3. Do NOT add the monitor to any public status page or group\n4. Wait for heartbeats to accumulate (~5 minutes)\n5. Query unauthenticated:\n```bash\ncurl http://localhost:3001/api/badge/1/status   \u2192 returns N/A (correct, monitor is private)\ncurl http://localhost:3001/api/badge/1/ping/24  \u2192 returns \"Avg. Ping (24h): 10ms\" (LEAKED)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can:\n- Enumerate private monitor IDs\n- Extract average response time data for private monitors\n- Infer existence and reachability of internal monitored services\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAdd the same public monitor check before the UptimeCalculator call:\n```javascript\nlet publicMonitor = await R.getRow(`\n    SELECT monitor_group.monitor_id FROM monitor_group, \\`group\\`\n    WHERE monitor_group.group_id = \\`group\\`.id\n    AND monitor_group.monitor_id = ?\n    AND public = 1\n`, [requestedMonitorId]);\n\nif (!publicMonitor) {\n    badgeValues.message = \"N/A\";\n    badgeValues.color = badgeConstants.naColor;\n}\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1228\" height=\"710\" alt=\"Screenshot 2026-02-24 at 4 49 40\u202fPM\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/80aeae2d-be08-449f-8b39-c50da7aaedba\" /\u003e\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1271\" height=\"770\" alt=\"File Alons til View He\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d50c9a00-282a-4b79-b5e1-f77afde9223a\" /\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-c7hf-c5p5-5g6h",
  "modified": "2026-03-13T13:35:38Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T14:47:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/security/advisories/GHSA-c7hf-c5p5-5g6h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32230"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/issues/7038"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/issues/7135"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/commit/303a609c05d0b174a5045c90f53c2b557d4febae"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/louislam/uptime-kuma/releases/tag/2.2.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Uptime Kuma is Missing Authorization Checks on Ping Badge Endpoint, Leaks Ping times of monitors without needing to be on a status page"
}


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