GHSA-C6RR-7PMC-73WC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 18:26 – Updated: 2026-02-27 20:55Impact
The RSASHA256Algorithm and RSASHA1Algorithm contracts fail to validate PKCS#1 v1.5 padding structure when verifying RSA signatures. The contracts only check if the last 32 (or 20) bytes of the decrypted signature match the expected hash. This enables Bleichenbacher's 2006 signature forgery attack against DNS zones using RSA keys with low public exponents (e=3). Two ENS-supported TLDs (.cc and .name) use e=3 for their Key Signing Keys, allowing any domain under these TLDs to be fraudulently claimed on ENS without DNS ownership.
Affected contracts
| Contract | Address | Status |
|---|---|---|
| RSASHA256Algorithm | 0x9D1B5a639597f558bC37Cf81813724076c5C1e96 | Vulnerable |
| RSASHA1Algorithm | 0x6ca8624Bc207F043D140125486De0f7E624e37A1 | Vulnerable |
| DNSSECImpl | 0x0fc3152971714E5ed7723FAFa650F86A4BaF30C5 | Uses vulnerable algorithms |
| DNSRegistrar | 0xB32cB5677a7C971689228EC835800432B339bA2B | Attack entry point |
Patches
The bug was reported via Immunefi with possible solutions. The patch was merged at https://github.com/ensdomains/ens-contracts/commit/c76c5ad0dc9de1c966443bd946fafc6351f87587
Workarounds
- Deploy the patched contracts
- Point DNSSECImpl.setAlgorithm to the deployed contract
Resources
https://github.com/ensdomains/ens-contracts-bug-62248-pr-509
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@ensdomains/ens-contracts"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22866"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-25T18:26:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T16:23:25Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe `RSASHA256Algorithm` and `RSASHA1Algorithm` contracts fail to validate PKCS#1 v1.5 padding structure when verifying RSA signatures. The contracts only check if the last 32 (or 20) bytes of the decrypted signature match the expected hash. This enables Bleichenbacher\u0027s 2006 signature forgery attack against DNS zones using RSA keys with low public exponents (e=3). Two ENS-supported TLDs (.cc and .name) use e=3 for their Key Signing Keys, allowing any domain under these TLDs to be fraudulently claimed on ENS without DNS ownership.\n\nAffected contracts\n\nContract | Address | Status\n-- | -- | --\nRSASHA256Algorithm | 0x9D1B5a639597f558bC37Cf81813724076c5C1e96 | Vulnerable\nRSASHA1Algorithm | 0x6ca8624Bc207F043D140125486De0f7E624e37A1 | Vulnerable\nDNSSECImpl | 0x0fc3152971714E5ed7723FAFa650F86A4BaF30C5 | Uses vulnerable algorithms\nDNSRegistrar | 0xB32cB5677a7C971689228EC835800432B339bA2B | Attack entry point\n\n\n\n\n### Patches\n\nThe bug was reported via Immunefi with possible solutions. The patch was merged at https://github.com/ensdomains/ens-contracts/commit/c76c5ad0dc9de1c966443bd946fafc6351f87587\n\n\n### Workarounds\n\n- Deploy the patched contracts\n- Point DNSSECImpl.setAlgorithm to the deployed contract\n\n### Resources\n\nhttps://github.com/ensdomains/ens-contracts-bug-62248-pr-509",
"id": "GHSA-c6rr-7pmc-73wc",
"modified": "2026-02-27T20:55:13Z",
"published": "2026-02-25T18:26:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ensdomains/ens-contracts/security/advisories/GHSA-c6rr-7pmc-73wc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22866"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ensdomains/ens-contracts/commit/c76c5ad0dc9de1c966443bd946fafc6351f87587"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ensdomains/ens-contracts"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ensdomains/ens-contracts-bug-62248-pr-509"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "ENS DNSSEC Oracle Vulnerable to RSA Signature Forgery via Missing PKCS#1 v1.5 Padding Validation"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.