GHSA-C5GG-V573-HV7F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-18 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: don't WARN for connections on invalid channels
It's not clear (to me) how exactly syzbot managed to hit this, but it seems conceivable that e.g. regulatory changed and has disabled a channel between scanning (channel is checked to be usable by cfg80211_get_ies_channel_number) and connecting on the channel later.
With one scenario that isn't covered elsewhere described above, the warning isn't good, replace it with a (more informative) error message.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71227"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-18T15:18:40Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mac80211: don\u0027t WARN for connections on invalid channels\n\nIt\u0027s not clear (to me) how exactly syzbot managed to hit this,\nbut it seems conceivable that e.g. regulatory changed and has\ndisabled a channel between scanning (channel is checked to be\nusable by cfg80211_get_ies_channel_number) and connecting on\nthe channel later.\n\nWith one scenario that isn\u0027t covered elsewhere described above,\nthe warning isn\u0027t good, replace it with a (more informative)\nerror message.",
"id": "GHSA-c5gg-v573-hv7f",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:25Z",
"published": "2026-02-18T15:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71227"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10d3ff7e5812c8d70300f6fa8f524009a06aa7e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/579cf5939f8f4c4f88c75862d0c573fb13567b74"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6acc2d23f13d60874981b4828ba156ba01c86510"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99067b58a408a384d2a45c105eb3dce980a862ce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c02b1d244a5d799696ca74d3fba6539c8d76195f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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