{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@vendure/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.5.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@vendure/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.6.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@vendure/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.7.4"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-40887"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-89"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T22:38:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAn unauthenticated SQL injection vulnerability exists in the Vendure Shop API. A user-controlled query string parameter is interpolated directly into a raw SQL expression without parameterization or validation, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary SQL against the database. This affects all supported database backends (PostgreSQL, MySQL/MariaDB, SQLite).\n\nThe Admin API is also affected, though exploitation there requires authentication.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `@vendure/core` \u003c 2.3.4\n- `@vendure/core` \u003e= 3.0.0, \u003c 3.5.7\n- `@vendure/core` \u003e= 3.6.0, \u003c 3.6.2\n\nNote: versions 2.3.4 and above in the 2.x line are patched. There were no 2.4.x or 2.x releases between 2.3.x and 3.0.0.\n\n## Patched versions\n\n- `@vendure/core` 2.3.4\n- `@vendure/core` 3.5.7\n- `@vendure/core` 3.6.2\n\n## Details\n\nIn `ProductService.findOneBySlug`, the request context\u0027s `languageCode` value is interpolated into a SQL `CASE` expression via a JavaScript template literal:\n\n```ts\n.addSelect(\n    `CASE translation.languageCode WHEN \u0027${ctx.languageCode}\u0027 THEN 2 WHEN \u0027${ctx.channel.defaultLanguageCode}\u0027 THEN 1 ELSE 0 END`,\n    \u0027sort_order\u0027,\n)\n```\n\nTypeORM has no opportunity to parameterize this value because it is embedded directly into the SQL string before being passed to the query builder.\n\nThe `languageCode` value can originate from the HTTP query string and is set on the request context for every incoming API request. The value is cast to the `LanguageCode` TypeScript type at compile time, but no runtime validation is performed -- the raw query string value is used as-is.\n\n## Attack vector\n\nAn unauthenticated attacker can append a crafted `languageCode` query parameter to any Shop API request to inject arbitrary SQL into the query. No user interaction is required. The vulnerable endpoint is exposed on every default Vendure installation.\n\n## Mitigation\n\n**Upgrade to a patched version immediately.**\n\nIf you cannot upgrade right away, apply the following hotfix to `RequestContextService.getLanguageCode` to validate the `languageCode` input at the boundary. This blocks injection payloads before they can reach any query:\n\n```ts\nprivate getLanguageCode(req: Request, channel: Channel): LanguageCode | undefined {\n    const queryLanguageCode = req.query?.languageCode as string | undefined;\n    const isValidFormat = queryLanguageCode \u0026\u0026 /^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$/.test(queryLanguageCode);\n    return (\n        (isValidFormat ? (queryLanguageCode as LanguageCode) : undefined) ??\n        channel.defaultLanguageCode ??\n        this.configService.defaultLanguageCode\n    );\n}\n```\n\nThis replaces the existing `getLanguageCode` method in `packages/core/src/service/helpers/request-context/request-context.service.ts`. Invalid values are silently dropped and the channel\u0027s default language is used instead.\n\nThe patched versions additionally convert the vulnerable SQL interpolation to a parameterized query as defense in depth.",
  "id": "GHSA-9pp3-53p2-ww9v",
  "modified": "2026-04-15T21:18:33Z",
  "published": "2026-04-14T22:38:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vendurehq/vendure/security/advisories/GHSA-9pp3-53p2-ww9v"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vendurehq/vendure"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "@vendure/core has a SQL Injection vulnerability"
}