GHSA-9P38-94JF-HGJJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-03 21:41 – Updated: 2026-03-19 18:36
VLAI?
Summary
OpenClaw has macOS `system.run` allowlist bypass via quoted command substitution
Details

Summary

In OpenClaw's macOS node-host path, system.run allowlist parsing in security=allowlist mode failed to reject command substitution tokens when they appeared inside double-quoted shell text.

Because of that gap, payloads like echo "ok $(id)" could be treated as allowlist hits (first executable token echo) while still executing non-allowlisted subcommands through shell substitution.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: npm openclaw
  • Latest published affected version: 2026.2.21-2
  • Affected range: <= 2026.2.21-2
  • Patched version (planned next release): 2026.2.22

Notes: - Default installs are not affected (security=deny by default). - The issue requires opting into security=allowlist on the macOS node-host path.

Impact

Approval/authorization bypass in allowlist mode that can lead to unintended command execution on the node host.

Preconditions

  • Target uses macOS node-host / companion-app execution path.
  • Exec approvals set to security=allowlist.
  • Ask mode is on-miss or off.
  • Allowlist contains a benign executable used in a shell wrapper flow (for example /bin/echo).

Reproduction (example)

Use a shell-wrapper command where the visible executable is allowlisted but the quoted payload contains substitution:

  • command argv: /bin/sh -lc 'echo "ok $(/usr/bin/id > /tmp/openclaw-poc-rce)"'
  • allowlist pattern includes /bin/echo

Before the fix, allowlist analysis could resolve this as allowlisted while shell substitution still executed.

Remediation

  • Upgrade to 2026.2.22 (or newer) when released.
  • Temporary mitigation: set ask mode to always or set security mode to deny.

Fix Commit(s)

  • 90a378ca3a9ecbf1634cd247f17a35f4612c6ca6

Release Process Note

patched_versions is pre-set to planned next release 2026.2.22. After npm release is out, advisory can be published directly.

OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.2.22"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22179"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-03T21:41:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-18T02:16:22Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nIn OpenClaw\u0027s macOS node-host path, `system.run` allowlist parsing in `security=allowlist` mode failed to reject command substitution tokens when they appeared inside double-quoted shell text.\n\nBecause of that gap, payloads like `echo \"ok $(id)\"` could be treated as allowlist hits (first executable token `echo`) while still executing non-allowlisted subcommands through shell substitution.\n\n### Affected Packages / Versions\n- Package: npm `openclaw`\n- Latest published affected version: `2026.2.21-2`\n- Affected range: `\u003c= 2026.2.21-2`\n- Patched version (planned next release): `2026.2.22`\n\nNotes:\n- Default installs are not affected (`security=deny` by default).\n- The issue requires opting into `security=allowlist` on the macOS node-host path.\n\n### Impact\nApproval/authorization bypass in allowlist mode that can lead to unintended command execution on the node host.\n\n### Preconditions\n- Target uses macOS node-host / companion-app execution path.\n- Exec approvals set to `security=allowlist`.\n- Ask mode is `on-miss` or `off`.\n- Allowlist contains a benign executable used in a shell wrapper flow (for example `/bin/echo`).\n\n### Reproduction (example)\nUse a shell-wrapper command where the visible executable is allowlisted but the quoted payload contains substitution:\n\n- command argv: `/bin/sh -lc \u0027echo \"ok $(/usr/bin/id \u003e /tmp/openclaw-poc-rce)\"\u0027`\n- allowlist pattern includes `/bin/echo`\n\nBefore the fix, allowlist analysis could resolve this as allowlisted while shell substitution still executed.\n\n### Remediation\n- Upgrade to `2026.2.22` (or newer) when released.\n- Temporary mitigation: set ask mode to `always` or set security mode to `deny`.\n\n### Fix Commit(s)\n- `90a378ca3a9ecbf1634cd247f17a35f4612c6ca6`\n\n### Release Process Note\n`patched_versions` is pre-set to planned next release `2026.2.22`. After npm release is out, advisory can be published directly.\n\nOpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-9p38-94jf-hgjj",
  "modified": "2026-03-19T18:36:18Z",
  "published": "2026-03-03T21:41:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-9p38-94jf-hgjj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22179"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/90a378ca3a9ecbf1634cd247f17a35f4612c6ca6"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-allowlist-bypass-via-command-substitution-in-system-run"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw has macOS `system.run` allowlist bypass via quoted command substitution"
}


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