GHSA-95C3-6VVW-4MRQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 17:06 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:47[SECURITY] registry_001 Vulnerability Report
While analyzing the code logic, an area that may lead to unintended behavior under specific conditions was discovered.
Overview
- Verified Version:
c5c4b9e8890dd5754bee889b2f1417f4fe3b5ce5 - Vulnerability Type: Authentication bypass via cross-registry OIDC token replay
- Affected Location:
cmd/publisher/commands/login.go:67-105,130-135,199-224;cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:24-38,58-75,108-165;internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:75-135,229-277,280-296 - Trigger Scenario: a workflow invokes
mcp-publisher login github-oidc --registry <other-registry>(or equivalent publish flow) and the publisher still requests a GitHub Actions ID token with the shared audiencemcp-registry; any other registry deployment running this code can replay that token to its own/v0/auth/github-oidcendpoint and mint a publish-capable registry JWT for the same GitHub owner namespace.
Root Cause
The client-side and server-side GitHub OIDC flow is bound only to a global audience string, not to the specific registry instance being targeted. On the client side, the publisher always appends audience=mcp-registry when requesting the GitHub Actions ID token, regardless of the selected --registry URL. On the server side, the exchange endpoint validates only that same fixed audience and then derives publish permissions directly from repository_owner. As a result, a token legitimately obtained while interacting with one registry deployment remains acceptable to any other deployment that shares the same code and audience string.
Source-to-Sink Chain
- Source
cmd/publisher/commands/login.go:67-105,130-135,199-224parses the user-controlled--registryflag intoflags.RegistryURL, creates aGitHubOIDCProvider, and callsauthProvider.GetToken(ctx)for the chosen authentication method. - Propagation
cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:24-38obtains an OIDC token and immediately exchanges it against the selected registry URL.cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:58-75buildsexchangeURL := o.registryURL + "/v0/auth/github-oidc"and posts the GitHub token to whichever registry instance was selected.cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:108-165constructsfullURL := requestURL + "&audience=mcp-registry"and therefore requests the same audience for every registry deployment. - Sink
internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:75-135validates only the shared audience value passed intoValidateToken.internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:254-277callsh.validator.ValidateToken(ctx, oidcToken, "mcp-registry")and, on success, signs a new registry JWT.internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:280-296convertsclaims.RepositoryOwnerinto the publish permission patternio.github.<owner>/*, which is then embedded into the new registry JWT.
Exploitation Preconditions
- The victim uses the GitHub Actions OIDC publishing path.
- The victim workflow targets another registry deployment first, such as staging, self-hosted infrastructure, or an attacker-controlled registry URL.
- The receiving registry deployment can observe the posted OIDC token and replay it before expiry to another registry deployment running the same shared audience configuration.
Risk
This breaks deployment isolation between registry instances. A token issued for one registry interaction can be replayed across trust boundaries, allowing one deployment to impersonate the same GitHub owner identity on another deployment.
Impact
An attacker-controlled or compromised registry deployment can mint a valid registry JWT on another deployment and inherit publish permissions for the victim GitHub owner namespace. In practical terms, this enables unauthorized publication or update actions for names such as io.github.<owner>/* on the victim registry instance.
Remediation
- Replace the shared audience string with a registry-specific audience, such as a deployment-specific client ID or origin-derived identifier.
- Ensure the publisher requests the audience that matches the exact registry instance it is targeting, and ensure the server validates that same instance-specific value.
- Consider binding the exchange to additional deployment-specific claims so that a token captured by one registry cannot be replayed on another.
- Add regression tests that cover cross-deployment replay attempts between different registry URLs.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44428"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T17:06:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T22:16:44Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "# [SECURITY] registry_001 Vulnerability Report\n\nWhile analyzing the code logic, an area that may lead to unintended behavior under specific conditions was discovered. \n\n## Overview\n- Verified Version: `c5c4b9e8890dd5754bee889b2f1417f4fe3b5ce5`\n- Vulnerability Type: Authentication bypass via cross-registry OIDC token replay\n- Affected Location: `cmd/publisher/commands/login.go:67-105,130-135,199-224`; `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:24-38,58-75,108-165`; `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:75-135,229-277,280-296`\n- Trigger Scenario: a workflow invokes `mcp-publisher login github-oidc --registry \u003cother-registry\u003e` (or equivalent publish flow) and the publisher still requests a GitHub Actions ID token with the shared audience `mcp-registry`; any other registry deployment running this code can replay that token to its own `/v0/auth/github-oidc` endpoint and mint a publish-capable registry JWT for the same GitHub owner namespace.\n\n## Root Cause\nThe client-side and server-side GitHub OIDC flow is bound only to a global audience string, not to the specific registry instance being targeted. On the client side, the publisher always appends `audience=mcp-registry` when requesting the GitHub Actions ID token, regardless of the selected `--registry` URL. On the server side, the exchange endpoint validates only that same fixed audience and then derives publish permissions directly from `repository_owner`. As a result, a token legitimately obtained while interacting with one registry deployment remains acceptable to any other deployment that shares the same code and audience string.\n\n## Source-to-Sink Chain\n1. Source\n `cmd/publisher/commands/login.go:67-105,130-135,199-224` parses the user-controlled `--registry` flag into `flags.RegistryURL`, creates a `GitHubOIDCProvider`, and calls `authProvider.GetToken(ctx)` for the chosen authentication method.\n2. Propagation\n `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:24-38` obtains an OIDC token and immediately exchanges it against the selected registry URL.\n `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:58-75` builds `exchangeURL := o.registryURL + \"/v0/auth/github-oidc\"` and posts the GitHub token to whichever registry instance was selected.\n `cmd/publisher/auth/github-oidc.go:108-165` constructs `fullURL := requestURL + \"\u0026audience=mcp-registry\"` and therefore requests the same audience for every registry deployment.\n3. Sink\n `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:75-135` validates only the shared audience value passed into `ValidateToken`.\n `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:254-277` calls `h.validator.ValidateToken(ctx, oidcToken, \"mcp-registry\")` and, on success, signs a new registry JWT.\n `internal/api/handlers/v0/auth/github_oidc.go:280-296` converts `claims.RepositoryOwner` into the publish permission pattern `io.github.\u003cowner\u003e/*`, which is then embedded into the new registry JWT.\n\n## Exploitation Preconditions\n1. The victim uses the GitHub Actions OIDC publishing path.\n2. The victim workflow targets another registry deployment first, such as staging, self-hosted infrastructure, or an attacker-controlled registry URL.\n3. The receiving registry deployment can observe the posted OIDC token and replay it before expiry to another registry deployment running the same shared audience configuration.\n\n## Risk\nThis breaks deployment isolation between registry instances. A token issued for one registry interaction can be replayed across trust boundaries, allowing one deployment to impersonate the same GitHub owner identity on another deployment.\n\n## Impact\nAn attacker-controlled or compromised registry deployment can mint a valid registry JWT on another deployment and inherit publish permissions for the victim GitHub owner namespace. In practical terms, this enables unauthorized publication or update actions for names such as `io.github.\u003cowner\u003e/*` on the victim registry instance.\n\n## Remediation\n1. Replace the shared audience string with a registry-specific audience, such as a deployment-specific client ID or origin-derived identifier.\n2. Ensure the publisher requests the audience that matches the exact registry instance it is targeting, and ensure the server validates that same instance-specific value.\n3. Consider binding the exchange to additional deployment-specific claims so that a token captured by one registry cannot be replayed on another.\n4. Add regression tests that cover cross-deployment replay attempts between different registry URLs.",
"id": "GHSA-95c3-6vvw-4mrq",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:47:13Z",
"published": "2026-05-08T17:06:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/security/advisories/GHSA-95c3-6vvw-4mrq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44428"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/pull/1229"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/commit/3f89fc2b1fb34fd49f3c0e1b39e964a5c67b613f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/registry/releases/tag/v1.7.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "MCP Registry\u0027s GitHub OIDC tokens are replayable across registry deployments due to shared audience"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.