GHSA-8M32-P958-JG99
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-04 06:06 – Updated: 2026-04-07 14:19Summary
Directus's Single Sign-On (SSO) login pages lacked a Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy (COOP) HTTP response header. Without this header, a malicious cross-origin window that opens the Directus login page retains the ability to access and manipulate the window object of that page. An attacker can exploit this to intercept and redirect the OAuth authorization flow to an attacker-controlled OAuth client, causing the victim to unknowingly grant access to their authentication provider account (e.g. Google, Discord).
Impact
A successful attack allows the attacker to obtain an OAuth access token for the victim's third-party identity provider account. Depending on the scopes authorized, this can lead to: - Unauthorized access to the victim's linked identity provider account - Account takeover of the Directus instance if the attacker can authenticate using the stolen credentials or provider session
Patches
This issue has been addressed by adding the Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin HTTP response header to SSO-related endpoints. This header instructs the browser to place the page in its own browsing context group, severing any reference the opener window may hold.
Workarounds
Users who are unable to upgrade immediately can mitigate this vulnerability by configuring their reverse proxy or web server to add the following HTTP response header to all Directus responses: Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "directus"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.17.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35408"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-346",
"CWE-693"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-04T06:06:00Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T22:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nDirectus\u0027s Single Sign-On (SSO) login pages lacked a `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy` (COOP) HTTP response header. Without this header, a malicious cross-origin window that opens the Directus login page retains the ability to access and manipulate the `window` object of that page. An attacker can exploit this to intercept and redirect the OAuth authorization flow to an attacker-controlled OAuth client, causing the victim to unknowingly grant access to their authentication provider account (e.g. Google, Discord).\n\n## Impact\n\nA successful attack allows the attacker to obtain an OAuth access token for the victim\u0027s third-party identity provider account. Depending on the scopes authorized, this can lead to:\n- Unauthorized access to the victim\u0027s linked identity provider account\n- Account takeover of the Directus instance if the attacker can authenticate using the stolen credentials or provider session\n\n## Patches\n\nThis issue has been addressed by adding the `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin` HTTP response header to SSO-related endpoints. This header instructs the browser to place the page in its own browsing context group, severing any reference the opener window may hold.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nUsers who are unable to upgrade immediately can mitigate this vulnerability by configuring their reverse proxy or web server to add the following HTTP response header to all Directus responses: `Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy: same-origin`",
"id": "GHSA-8m32-p958-jg99",
"modified": "2026-04-07T14:19:49Z",
"published": "2026-04-04T06:06:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-8m32-p958-jg99"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35408"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/directus/directus"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Directus: Missing Cross-Origin Opener Policy"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.